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Germans in Brazil 

Introduction 
THIS BOOK has been a long time in the making. More than a decade ago, as I completed Bonds of Loyalty: German Ameri-
cans and World War I, I began to examine other countries for 
parallels to the American experience. I was particularly attracted 
by the possibilities offered by Brazil as another historical case 
study to illuminate social behaviors in periods of national crises, 
especially war, as they relate to immigrant peoples. Like the United 
States, Brazil had received a large European immigration in pro-
portion to its total population, beginning about 1825 and building 
up somewhat inconsistently until World War I. As a Latin and 
Catholic country, Brazil was especially attractive to immigrants 
form Spain, Italy, and Portugal, but a large contingent of Ger-
mans, substantially Protestant in religion and north European in 
culture, settled in the southernmost states of Brazil-Rio Grande 
do SuI, Santa Catarina, and Parana-and in major cities such as 
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Salvador (Bahia). By 1914, 
when war in Europe began, nearly 400,000 persons of German or-
igin resided in Brazil. Most lived in relatively exclusive ethnic en-
claves located in both urban and rural districts. Although some 
German immigrants were well integrated into Brazilian society, 
the majority remained largely unassimilated in language, culture, 
and politics. 
Studying Brazil was attractive to me for several reasons. Years 
ago I had offered Latin American history as a minor field in my 
doctoral program. Thus, Brazil was not entirely terra incognita for 
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me. Moreover, the German-Brazilian experience was unique in 
that Brazil was the only South American country that declared 
war on Germany in World War I. Its history seemed especially 
suited for comparisons with the United States with respect to its 
treatment of its German ethnic minority. 
As I explored the relevant bibliography I soon discovered that 
American scholars had published very little on German immigra-
tion to Brazil and that they knew practically nothing about the 
German-Brazilian experience in World War I. I remembered a hast-
ily produced book, The Germans in South America, by Clarence H. 
Haring, that included a long chapter on the Germans in Brazil 
during the war. Haring had written this book immediately follow-
ing his return from a trip to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in 1918 
or 1919. Although his vision was clouded by the intense emotions 
generated by the Great War, his fragmentary study has remained 
until now the fullest account in the English language of the im-
pact of the war on German-Brazilian society. 
English-language materials treating the Germans in Brazil gener-
ally were almost as sparse-a paragraph here, an article there. By 
far the best work was a series of articles by the Brazilian-American 
anthropologist, Emilio Willems, an authority on the assimilation 
of German Brazilians. Virtually all other secondary sources are in 
either German or Portuguese, though one of the truly outstand-
ing works on the subject is in French: La colonisation allemande et Ie 
Rio Grande do Sui (1959), by Jean Roche. A glance at Roche's eighty-
page bibliography reveals the extent of books and articles, as well 
as primary sources, published on the German Brazilians in the 
German language. Since many of these titles are not available in 
the United States, it became clear that if I were to study Germans 
in Brazil, I needed to go to Germany, where much of this exten-
sive material could be found. 
Research in Germany was made possible by the award of a Ful-
bright senior research fellowship in 1974-75. I worked primarily 
at the Institut fUr Auslandsbeziehungen in Stuttgart, which has 
an outstanding collection on Germans who emigrated to other 
lands, including Brazil. 
While in Stuttgart I was able to examine a substantial body of 
material in the German language-newspapers, reminiscences, 
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letters, anniversary booklets, and publications such as yearbooks, 
annuals or calendars, reports, bulletins, and catalogs, produced 
by German-Brazilian individuals, churches, schools, societies, 
publishers, and commercial associations, in addition to an ex-
tensive collection of secondary works on German immigration. 
This research was later supplemented by work in Brazil, chiefly at 
the Instituto Hans Staden in Sao Paulo, made possible by grants 
from the American Philosophical Society and the University of 
Nebraska. 
It had long since become obvious to me that the idea of a brief 
comparative study, such as I had originally planned, was not 
viable. In order to make meaningful comparisons between the ex-
periences of Germans in the United States and in Brazil, I needed 
to discover and synthesize basic information about the latter coun-
try that was not otherwise available in the English language. Events 
that emerged from ethnocultural conflict cannot be understood 
without some command of the context-the social structure, the 
institutions, and the attitudes and beliefs of the immigrants, in 
addition to the responses of the most or receiving society to these 
strangers in their midst. Obviously, no attempt can be made here 
to provide a comprehensive profile of the German Brazilians in 
the manner of Jean Roche and the French annalistes or other advo-
cates of systematic social history. Instead, my purpose is to pro-
vide enough information to render German-Brazilian behavior 
understandable. Thus my project was transformed from an ar-
ticle in comparative history to a book treating the German ethnic 
experience in Brazil in the era of World War I-a parallel volume 
to Bonds of Loyalty. 
Comparisons between the Brazilian and the American experi-
ences are by no means absent from this book, but they are less 
central, comprehensive, and systematic than I had originally in-
tended. Before I could draw any meaningful contrasts, I found 
that I had to present basic historical information about German 
immigrants in Brazil and their place in Brazilian society. Com-
parisons are therefore included, not to provide the bases for gen-
eralizations about ethnic group conflict in time of national crises, 
but rather to examine this period of Brazilian history from another 
perspective. 
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The first three chapters establish the historical context for under-
standing what happened to the Germans in Brazil during the pe-
riod of the war in Europe and its immediate aftermath, 1914 to 
1920. The large pattern of German settlement in Brazil, offered in 
Chapter I, is followed by a study of German ethnic institutions-
churches, schools, societies-and the German-language press to 
reveal literacy levels, religious and linguistic characteristics, and 
the measure of assimilation (or lack thereof) into Brazilian society. 
Ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images, along with at-
tendant concerns and fears, are analyzed next to show how and 
why the Brazilian majority (or, more properly, the governing elite) 
acquired a distorted image of the Germans. 
The long period of Brazilian neutrality in the European war 
from 1914 to 1917 is treated in the next section, beginning with 
Chapter 4. It was a time of incubation of ethnic tensions as the 
Portuguese-language press became a vehicle for anti-German 
atrocity propaganda and as the German-language press countered 
with propagandistic efforts of its own. The German ethnic com-
munity was rejuvenated with a new sense of self-esteem as the 
verbal conflict caused German-Brazilian institutions to surge with 
vitality. The climax of this trend, treated in Chapter 5, came in 
April, 1917, as the Brazilian government broke off diplomatic rela-
tions with Germany in response to its policy of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare. German districts in several Brazilian cities were 
thereupon visited by riotous mobs. Homes were ransacked, com-
mercial structures put to the torch, and German-language print-
ing presses were destroyed. This wave of anti-Germanism, which 
came at a time when Brazil was technically still neutral, was much 
more destructive than anything experienced by Germans in the 
United States. The events of the summer of 1917 leading to the 
declaration of war are treated briefly in Chapter 6. 
The war itself and its aftermath are treatell in the final section, 
beginning with Chapter 7, which describes a second round of de-
structive anti-German riots and the efforts of the Brazilian gov-
ernment to cope with the problem of the German ethnic minority, 
many members of which were enemy aliens. This is followed by 
an analysis of the German Brazilians' response to the wartime re-
pression that they were forced to endure, and the final chapter in-
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cludes a series of comparisons with the experiences of Germans 
in the United States. 
My usage of certain terms requires explanation. I think of this 
book as cultural history or, perhaps more precisely, as sociocul-
tural, in the way that anthropologists might use the term. That 
means having some understanding of how a people think-or 
having some notion of their hierarchy of values, how they make 
sense of the world, and how their perception of reality is mani-
fested in their behavior. The specific problem of the Germans in 
Brazil during World War I is first of all a matter of differing cul-
tures in conflict. Having studied German immigrant culture in 
America for many years, I have felt reasonably confident in inter-
preting the behavior of the German Brazilians. It is another matter, 
however, to understand the history of a people-non-German 
Brazilians in this case-whose language and wellsprings of cul-
ture are much different from one's own. Consequently, some er-
rors of fact or interpretation undoubtedly remain in my text. 
Brazilian society, like the American, is an extraordinary amal-
gam of Indian, African, European, and Asian elements. Yet one 
must cut through this complex heterogeneity to identify in a rather 
simplistic way the characteristics of its core culture. The term 
Luso-Brazilian is often used for this purpose in much the same way 
that the foundation of American culture is frequently called Anglo-
Saxon Protestant. Thus, Luso-Brazilian identifies the Portuguese ori-
gins of Brazilian culture, modified by five centuries of develop-
ment in the New World. The Portuguese language and Latin 
Catholic culture remain at the heart of Brazilian diversity. This has 
been especially true of the educated, wealthy classes that have 
dominated the country throughout most of its history. Although 
Luso-Brazilian may refer to specifically Portuguese elements in the 
Brazilian population, I do not intend generally to suggest such an 
exclusive meaning in my usage of the term. As various Brazilian 
and American scholars have shown, members of non-Portuguese 
subgroups, including mulattoes and caboclos, could be fully ac-
cepted by Brazil's dominant classes, provided that standards of 
wealth and education were met. Thus, I use Luso-Brazilian to iden-
tify (rather than to define) the dominant culture of Brazil and its 
representatives, and to distinguish it from the Teuto-Brazilian, 
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which is the term the German Brazilians use to identify them-
selves and their culture. Teuto-Brazilian is itself a "shorthand" 
term, made in Brazil, that masks a rich diversity of provincial ori-
gin, dialect, religion, custom, and habit, as I hope to make clear in 
the chapters that follow. 
A Century of German 
Settlement in Brazil 
A Survey, 1818-1918 
.1 
THE IMMIGRATION of Germans to Brazil began in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. The Peace of Vienna (1815) intro-
duced an extended period of relative stability that was favor-
able for the relocation of persons who were looking for ways to 
improve their economic condition in other lands. Germans, espe-
cially in the southwestern states, were on the move. Russia was 
attractive to many at first, but others went to the United States and 
a few chose to settle in Brazil, where the ruling house of Portugal 
had found refuge in 1808 when one of Napoleon's armies entered 
Lisbon. Dom Pedro, crown prince of Portugal at the time and later 
the first emperor of Brazil, was married to Archduchess Leopol-
dina of Austria. Inevitably her retinue included German-speaking 
persons, many of whom remained permanently in Brazil. They 
were followed by several hundred immigrants from Switzerland 
and the Rhineland who in 1818 established the small colonies of 
Leopoldina and Sao Jorge dos Ilheus in the province of Bahia and, 
in 1820, Nova Friburgo near Rio de Janeiro. 1 
1. Marcus Lee Hansen, The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860, ed. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 107-14; Carlos Fouquet, Der deutsche Ein-
wanderer und seine Nachkommen in Brasilien: 1808-1824-1974 (Sao Paulo, 1974), 
23-24, 46-47, 57; Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., Der deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der 
brasilianischen Nation (3rd ed., revised and expanded; Sao Leopoldo, 1978), 195-
203; Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," in Hartmut 
Froschle (ed.), Die Deutschen in Lateinamerika (Tiibingen, 1979), 184-87; Ferdinand 
Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg: Ursprung und Gestaltung deutschen evangelischen 
Kirchentums in Brasilien (Berlin and Leipzig, 1936), 13-23; George P. Browne, "Gov-
ernment Immigration Policy in Imperial Brazil, 1822-187°" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
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This movement, though generally opposed by the Brazilian 
planter aristocracy, had been sponsored by the Portuguese king, 
Joao VI. At first, immigration was limited to persons who pro-
fessed the Roman Catholic faith, but this restriction was later re-
moved when the first Brazilian constitution was promulgated in 
1824, two years after Dom Pedro declared Brazilian independence. 2 
The Historical Pattern of German Immigration 
The first truly German settlement in Brazil received its impetus 
from Dom Pedro I, who was eager to increase the population of 
Brazil's southern frontier, a region that bordered on the former 
Spanish colonies of La Plata. He hoped to establish a class of 
farmers who would engage in diversified agriculture to balance 
the huge cattle-raising operations in the area and the large-scale 
sugar and coffee plantations farther north. Dom Pedro initially 
feared that units of the Portuguese army stationed in Brazil would 
resist the independence movement. He therefore believed that he 
had to enlarge the number of Brazilian troops. To this end he dis-
patched Major Georg Schaffer, a German adventurer in his ser-
vice, to Hamburg to recruit soldiers and settlers. Both groups 
were expected to become permanent residents of Brazil. Schaffer 
promised free passage and free land on the imperial domain on 
the banks of the Rio dos Sinos at Sao Leopoldo, which was located 
about twenty miles north of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do SuI. 3 
One hundred twenty-four persons-peasants, artisans, mer-
Catholic University of America, 1972), 38-56. Although the settlers at Nova Fri-
burgo were chiefly French Swiss of the Catholic faith, they were joined in 1823 by a 
contingent of German Protestant families. Ferdinand Schroder, Die deutsche Ein-
wanderung nach Siidbrasilien bis zum Jahre 1859 (Berlin, 1931), 31. Michael M. Hall, 
"The Origins of Mass Immigration in Brazil, 1871-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, Co-
lumbia University, 19~), treats Italian immigration primarily. For a general guide 
to the literature, see Manfred Illi, Die deutsche Auswanderung nach Lateinamerika: 
Eine Literaturiibersicht, Lateinamerika-Studien, II (Munich, 1977), 44-87. 
2. Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 33-34, 46; Fritz Sudhaus, Deutschland 
und die Auswanderung nach Brasilien im 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1940),21; Wilhelm 
Monckrneier, Die deutsche iiberseeische Auswanderung (Jena, Germany: 1912), 209. 
3. Carlos H. Oberacker, Jr., Jorge Antonio von Schaeffer: Criador da primeira cor-
rente emigratOria alema para 0 Brasil (Porto Alegre, 1957); Browne, "Government Im-
migration Policy," 64-91; Dr. [Paul] Aldinger, Deutsche Mitarbeit in Brasilien (Curi-
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chants, and their families, plus a Protestant minister-consti-
tuted the first contingent of settlers. Arriving late in 1824, they 
were greeted by the emperor and his wife as they stopped in Rio 
de Janeiro on their way south. In Porto Alegre they were received 
by Jose Pinheiro, president of the frontier province of Rio Grande 
do SuI. 4 Unlike several other colonies of immigrants founded in 
the 1820S, this one prospered, though not easily. 
In the decades that followed, thousands of immigrants from the 
German states settled in southern Brazil. By the end of the cen-
tury, according to Jean Roche, between 150,000 and 200,000 Ger-
man immigrants and their descendants resided in Rio Grande do 
SuI alone. 5 It should be noted, however, that estimates of ethnic 
populations by less meticulous scholars than Roche are some-
times inflated by including the children of exogamous marriages 
and by failing to exclude the number of returnees. 
The Brazilian government continued to foster immigration from 
Europe in a variety of ways throughout the nineteenth century. 
Among the earliest incentives it offered were free passage, plus 
seeds, animals, and implements. Non-Catholics were tolerated so 
long as their houses of worship did not bear the standard insignia 
of churches-crosses, spires, and the like. At times, immigrants 
were also lured by exemption from certain taxes or from military 
service for a period of years. Later the government provided trans-
portation from the port of entry to an immigrant settlement; loans 
and grants went to colonization companies; salaries of clergymen 
tiba, 1923); Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1964), 38-41; Albert Schmid, Deutsches Siildnerschicksal in Brasilien: Die 
Fremdenbataillone des Kaisers Dom Pedro 1, ihre Revolte und ihre Aufliising (Porto 
Alegre, 1951). 
4. For detailed data on founders, locations, crops raised, and exports of Sao 
Leopoldo, see Ernesto Pellanda, A coloniza{:iio germanica no Rio Grande do SuI, 
1824-1924 (Reparti{:iio de estatistica do estado do Rio Grande do SuI) (Porto Alegre, 
1925),31-76. 
5. Jean Roche, La colonisation allemande et Ie Rio Grande do SuI (Paris, 1959), 
133-35; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 27-31; Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag, 
289-92; Oskar Canstatt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, Auswandererfursorge und Aus-
wandererziele (Berlin-Schoneberg, 1904), 253; Joachim Fischer, "Geschichte der 
Evangelischen Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses," in Joachim Fischer and 
Christoph Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos: Geschichte und Gegenwart der Ev. 
Kirche Lutherischen Bekenntnisses in Brasilien (Erlangen, W. Germany, 1970), 90-92. 
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and teachers in certain colonies were paid; and various public 
buildings were erected at government expense. 6 
For several years after the establishment of the Sao Leopoldo 
colony (until Dom Pedro was forced to abdicate in 1831), Euro-
pean immigration to Brazil numbered about a thousand persons 
per year. 7 Then, during the turbulent first year of the regency, it 
ceased altogether. In the late 1830S and 1840s, immigration re-
sumed as the government attracted several hundred persons each 
year, chiefly from Germany and Portugal. Following the Euro-
pean revolutions of 1848, however, the annual totals spiraled to 
ten or fifteen thousand persons, of whom one-fifth were German. 
By the 1870S, Brazilian immigration had expanded to include 
thousands of persons from Portugal, Italy, and Spain, as well as 
Austria, Russia, and Switzerland, many of whom were German-
speaking. The high point was reached in 1891, when 216,000 per-
sons were received from all sources. This substantial increase was 
related to the abolition of slavery. As the children of slave mothers 
were freed in 1871 and the slaves themselves were emancipated in 
1888, immigration provided an adequate, inexpensive supply of 
laborers to perform the manual work on the sugar and coffee 
plantations. Moreover, there were some Brazilians with racist sen-
timents who welcomed the immigration as a means to augment 
the white proportion of the population and thereby counter-
balance the huge, newly freed black population. 8 
6. For a summary of various Brazilian laws at the imperial as well as provincial 
level, see Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 27-45. For a full analysis, see Browne, 
"Government Immigration Policy." See also Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 
87-88; and Monckmeier, Die deutsche uberseeische Auswanderung, 209. 
7. See table summarizing Brazilian immigration from all countries, Jose Fer-
nando Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniza¢o no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), facing p. 60; 
Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 155. 
8. Imre Ferenczi (comp.) and Walter F. Willcox (ed.), International Migrations, 
Vol. I, Statistics (New York, 1929),549-50: George P. Browne, "Politica Imigratoria 
no Brasil Regencia," Blumenau em Cadernos, XVI (1975), 3-14; T. Lynn Smith, Bra-
zil: People and Institutions (Rev. ed.; Baton Rouge, 1963), 118-33; Oberacker, Der 
deutsche Beitrag, 286-8g; Thomas Holloway, "Immigration and Abolition: The Tran-
sition from Slave to Free Labor in the Sao Paulo Coffee Zone," in Dauril Alden and 
Warren Dean (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Por-
tuguese India (Gainesville, 1977), 150-77. Carneiro, Imigrapio e coloniza~ao no Brasil, 
also relates immigration to slavery and its abolition. F. de Leonardo Truda, A colo-
nisac;ao allema no Rio Grande do SuI (Porto Alegre, 1930), 111-28; Thomas E. Skid-
more, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York, 1974). 
A Century of German Settlement 11 
During these decades of the late nineteenth century, German 
immigration averaged only about two thousand per year, briefly 
rising to five thousand in 1890 and 1891. No doubt the numbers 
would have been higher had it not been for much bad publicity in 
the German press about Brazil as a place for emigrants to settle. 
The problem had come to a head in the 1850S and was directly 
related to the fact that more than half of the Germans in Brazil 
were Protestants, a tiny minority in an officially Catholic country. 
Throughout the latter half of the century, many emigration pam-
phlets, books, and periodicals published in Germany, such as Der 
Deutsche Auswanderer, described Brazil as undesirable or unattrac-
tive for Germans. Criticism was repeatedly leveled at abuses attrib-
utable to unscrupulous recruiting agents and the parceria system (a 
sharecropping arrangement that perpetuated land monopoly), 
but problems emerging from religious differences were perceived 
as being especially troublesome. Moreover, at that time a Protes-
tant marriage had no legality in Brazil and was treated as concu-
binage. Prussia, the large and powerful state from which a sub-
stantial proportion of the German emigration originated, saw 
itself as the protector of Protestantism and hence instructed its 
minister to Brazil to negotiate for the introduction of civil mar-
riage. Several such bills were introduced in the Brazilian legis-
lature in the late 1850S, but none was passed, due to conservative 
opposition.9 
The Prussian government responded in 1859 to this inaction 
with a directive sponsored by August von der Heydt, the minister 
of the interior, that officially discouraged emigration to Brazil. The 
Heydt'sche Reskript, as it was called in German, also curtailed the 
recruitment activities of agents and shipowners. Prussia encour-
aged other German states to join in a united effort to get Brazil (1) 
to recognize the legality of Protestant marriage, (2) to guarantee 
inheritance rights of immigrants and their children, (3) to grant 
Protestants equal rights with Catholics to erect their own churches 
and schools, and (4) to end the parceria system. 
9. Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniZllfiio no Brasil, table facing p. 60; Walker, Germany 
and the Emigration, 127-29, 177-81; Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung, 
61-62; Hall, "The Origins of Mass Immigration," 13-20; Roche, La colonisation alle-
mande, 515-17; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 89; George P. Browne, "Secu-
larization and Modernization in Imperial Brazil: The Question of Non-Catholic 
Marriage," Revista de Hist6ria de America, LXXXIII (1977), 121-33. 
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In 1861, Brazil moderated its marriage law sufficiently to recog-
nize the validity of Protestant marriages contracted before the im-
migrant partners arrived in Brazil. The new law, which went into 
effect in 1863, also permitted Protestant clergymen to perform civil 
marriage ceremonies, provided they were properly licensed by the 
government. Nothing else was done about the German complaints 
until 1890 after the emperor was exiled and the new republican 
constitution was promulgated, and with it the institution of civil 
marriage. Thus Prussia did not withdraw the Heydt'sche Reskript 
until 1895.10 
Nothing in the Prussian regulation actually prevented a person 
from emigrating to Brazil if he wanted to do so. Hence there is no 
reliable way of estimating the effect of such policies. Surely most 
German emigrants of the late nineteenth century recognized that 
the United States, rather than Brazil, offered the more congenial 
cultural and economic environment. In the early 1880s, when 
German emigration to the United States attained unprecedented 
heights (25°,000 in 1882), there was no comparable increase in the 
numbers of persons who chose to go to Brazil. Yet after 1896, 
when the German government no longer officially discouraged 
the movement, the number of emigrants to Brazil dropped to less 
than 1,000 per year. Not until just before World War I, from 1908 
to 1914, did the volume increase to nearly 5,000 per year. The 
highest ever recorded was 8,004 in 1913.11 
The census of 1920 provides a statistical summary of German-
born persons in Brazil in the era of World War I. It shows that Ger-
many ranked a distant fourth behind Italy, Portugal, and Spain as 
a source of immigrants. It demonstrates further that Germans 
were highly concentrated in the southern states of Rio Grande do 
SuI, Santa Catarina, and Parana and in major cities, most notably 
Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. Nearly 53,000 per-
10. Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung, 99, 113, 119, 126, 177; Browne, 
"Secularization and Modernization," 131; Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 79; 
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 71; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 89; Can-
statt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, 252. For a full discussion of the position of the 
German government regarding emigration to Brazil, see Gerhard Brunn, Deutsch-
land und Brasilien (1889-1914) (Cologne and Vienna, 1971), 127-54. 
11. Ferenczi (comp.) and Willcox (ed.), Statistics, 550-51; Carneiro, Imigrar;iio e 
colonizar;iio no Brasil, table facing p. 60. 
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sons were counted as German nationals (Reichsdeutsche), but such 
a datum has limited meaning because membership in the German 
cultural group was far more important than was place of birth or 
actual citizenship. According to one generous estimate made by a 
German Brazilian, the number of persons of German birth and 
descent in 1920 in Rio Grande do SuI, the most German of the Bra-
zilian states, was between 360,000 and 400,000 in a total popula-
tion of 2,142,000.12 
The Spatial Distribution of German Settlements 
The historical pattern of German settlement in the southern states 
of Brazil is closely connected to the geography of the region. At 
least three major topographic features must be considered-the 
coastal plain (the littoral), the Great Escarpment, and the interior 
uplands (the campanha). The coastal plains, often narrow and 
swampy, had been occupied by Portuguese settlers from the earli-
est times. Here is where the seaports and most of the major cities 
developed. This region is sharply delineated by the Great Escarp-
ment, perhaps the most striking feature of Brazilian topography, 
which begins near Bahia and stretches southwestward near the 
coast to Rio Grande do SuI. In some places, most notably between 
Santos on the coast and Sao Paulo on the plateau, the escarpment 
rises abruptly to 2,600 feet in elevation. From this point a vast up-
land is tilted slightly toward the interior, so that it is drained by 
rivers flowing north and west to the Rio Parana, which eventually 
enters the sea near Buenos Aires. In Rio Grande do SuI, much of 
this upland region was the cattle country of the gauchos; it was 
sparsely settled and divided into huge estates called esttincias. 
South of the state of Sao Paulo, the escarpment tends to broaden 
into a hilly, heavily forested region called the serra. A series of 
12. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, [Sr.], Die volkspolitische Lage des Deutschtums in Rio 
Grande do SuI (Jena, Germany, 1936), 92-95. Heinz Kloss has summarized these 
and other estimates in Statistisches Handbuch der Volksdeutschen in iibersee (Stuttgart, 
1943),61-67. The larger context of European immigration to Brazil has been stud-
ied carefully in recent years. For useful introductions, see Smith, Brazil, 118-43; 
and Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, Population and Economic Develop-
ment in Brazil: 1800 to the Present (Baltimore, 1979),80-117. See also Hall, "The Ori-
gins of Mass Immigration"; and Browne, "Government Immigration Policy." 






Map 1. Areas of nineteenth-century German settlement in southern Brazil. Shaded 
areas indicate heavy rural settlement. Names of cities and towns are restricted to 
those mentioned in the text. 
smaller ridges, less clearly defined, are broken by valleys and 
rushing streams. North of Porto Alegre, the escarpment turns in-
land and crosses the state of Rio Grande do SuI from the coast 
nearly to the Argentine boundary at the Rio Uruguay.13 This hilly 
region, located in the central part of the state, is drained by the 
I). Preston James, Latin America (4th ed.; New York, 1969), 698-99, 800-804. 
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Rio Jacu!, which flows eastward into a huge coastal lagoon, Lagoa 
dos Patos, at Porto Alegre. 
RIO GRANDE DO SUL 
The largest number of German immigrants settled in Brazil's south-
ernmost state, Rio Grande do SuI, which is roughly the size of 
New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey combined. The first of 
the many German settlements there was Sao Leopoldo, which is 
located on the Rio dos Sinos, the first of several tributaries that 
flow south out of the serra into the Rio Jacui. The region north and 
west of Sao Leopoldo became the heartland of the German settle-
ments, most of which were located along the terraces on the north 
side of the Jacu! Valley. An area of nearly four thousand square 
miles, the district stretches from Taquarcl at the eastern end to 
Santa Cruz in the west, a distance of more than one hundred 
miles. Its average width is twenty-five miles. 14 
The Germans were the first Europeans to settle this region. 
Since it was unsuited for grazing cattle and contained no lodes of 
precious minerals or gems, it had been ignored by the Portuguese, 
whose interest in the area had been limited to raising rice on the 
Jacu! plain. Similarly, early immigrants from the Azores were at-
tracted to the prairie grasslands south of the Rio Jacui. The Ger-
mans, in contrast, were strongly drawn to the forested lands. The 
landscape was somewhat reminiscent of Germany and they liked 
the abundance of wood, the reasonably fertile soil, the more than 
adequate rainfall, and the opportunity to live as they pleased in 
virtual isolation from other social and cultural groups. In the dec-
ades following the founding of Sao Leopoldo, the Germans spread 
out across the serra to Santa Maria and eventually to Cruz Alta on 
14. Truda, A colonisa¢o allemii, 31-44; Browne, "Government Immigration Pol-
icy," 92-101. The most detailed study of the German settlements in Rio Grande do 
SuI is La colonisation allemande by Roche, a French historian of the annaliste school. 
Roche provides an integrated analysis of the topography, climate, plant life, and 
history of the region. His maps (pp. 91, 92, 1<>7) are especially helpful. Aurelio 
Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit in Rio Grande do SuI (Sao Leopoldo, 1934), is a detailed 
account, especially for the early years. Many statistics are provided in Pellanda, A 
coloniza¢o germanica no Rio Grande do SuI. For a study that places the German eth-
nic group within the context of general European immigration to Rio Grande do 
SuI, see Dietrich von Delhaes-Guenther, "La influencia de la immigracion en el 
desarrollo y composicion ethnica de la poblacion de Rio Grande do Sui," Jahrbuch 
fUr Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikils, XIII (1976), 420-33. 
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the plateau. From there they descended into the valley of the Rio 
Iju! on the western slope near the Argentine border, establishing 
colonies there and across the Rio Uruguay in the Misiones ter-
ritory of Argentina. Some pushed on into Paraguay. 15 
The early years were especially difficult for the Germans in 
southern Brazil. Inevitably the immigrant group included a num-
ber of vagrants, impostors, and assorted scoundrels. The Teuto-
Brazilians, as they Came to be called, were frequently threatened 
by bands of thieves, hostile Indians, and inhospitable Luso-Bra-
zilians. Often harassed and exploited by corrupt local officials, 
they had little legal protection and, except for paying taxes, they 
were usually excluded from participation in government. 16 Often 
they were caught up in frontier wars; at least four major conflicts 
involved Rio Grande do SuI during the imperial era. In one in-
stance, the Paraguayan War of 1867, more than forty soldiers were 
recruited in the German settlement of Dois Irmaos, but only three 
survived. 17 
The majority of the Germans in Rio Grande do Sui were small 
farmers who cultivated the soil with primitive equipment and 
with the help of their typically large families. Living in isolated 
clearings in the subtropical forest or in small, almost exclusively 
German rural villages, they did not have to conform to established 
15. Preston E. James, "The Expanding Settlements of Southern Brazil," Geo-
graphical Review, XXX (1940), 608-16; Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 64-91, 181-87. 
Schroder, Die deutsche Einwanderung, 81-92, offers brief descriptions of each 
colony and gives the names of settlers, their products, churches, origins in Ger-
many, population data, etc. For an example of a study of a Single colony, see Klaus 
Becker, "A funda¢o e os primeiros 30 anos de Teutonia," in I. Col6quio de Estudos 
Teuto-Brasileiros (Porto Alegre, 1963), 217-27; and Joao Guilherme Correa de Souza, 
"Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira: Aspectos de sua estrutura e organizac;ao so-
dais," in 1. Col6quio, 181-20l. 
16. Karl von Koseritz, Bi/der aus Brasilien (Leipzig, 1885), 138; Truda, A colo-
niStlfiio allemii, 27; Joseph L. Love, Rio Grande do Sui and Brazilian Regionalism, 
1882-1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1971), 13. For examples of friction in Sao Leopoldo, 
see Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 158, 162, 240. 
17. Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 104-12, 208-29; Heinz Dressel, Der deutsch-
brasilianische Kolonist im alten Siedlungsgebiet von Siio Leopoldo, Rio Grande do Sui: Eine 
soziologische Studie unter besonderer BerUcksichtigung von Dois Irmiios (Neuendettelsau, 
w. Germany, 1967), 18. A local uprising called the Muckerkrieg involved German 
religious radicals with government troops in 1874. See Roche, La colonisation alle-
mande, 511; and Canstatt, Die deutsche Auswanderung, 423-25. 
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or preexisting social and cultural standards, except in border 
areas. Linguistic acculturation was unnecessary. In general, their 
situation required only minimal adaptation to the larger social 
environment. 18 
The physical environment was another matter. If a settler came 
into the area and devoted all his energy to clearing the forest so 
that he could farm as he had in Europe, he was almost sure to fail. 
By the time he could accomplish the task of clearing the land of 
trees, crucial planting seasons would have passed. Instead, the 
German pioneers typically adapted the primitive slash-and-burn 
techniques that they had learned from the caboclos, who were 
poor, despised natives of mixed Indian and Portuguese blood. 
Lacking capital and credit, as well as effective means of transpor-
tation, the typical German colono also turned to indigenous crops 
such as manioc and maize, which he planted among the partially 
carbonized tree trunks. When the fertility of a given clearing was 
exhausted after several years, the pioneer would move to another 
spot and start the process over again. Such primitive, subsistence 
agriculture often became a more or less permanent part of the 
German-Brazilian way of life and was sometimes continued long 
after improvements in transportation and access to credit and 
world markets rendered such methods obsolete. Emilio Willems, 
an anthropologist who is the foremost student of German-Brazil-
ian life, declares that the physical environment of the subtropical 
rain forest had forced a radical break with German peasant tradi-
tions. ''Technology, food habits, dress, and housing patterns," he 
observes, "had changed almost beyond recognition; instead of a 
peasant village there were widely scattered farmsteads, transpor-
tation was by ox cart or mule train, and the settler's participation 
in the money economy was marginal at best." 19 
18. Liene Maria Martins Schutz, "Imigra¢o alema: Processo, costume e influ-
encias," in Anais do 1° simp6sio de hist6ria de imigra¢o e coloniza¢o alema no Rio 
Grande do Sui (Sao Leopoldo, 1974), 275. 
19. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 18; James, "Expanding Settlements," 608; Emilio 
Willems, A acultura¢o dos a/emaes no Brasil: Estudo antropologico dos imigrantes 
alemiies e seus descendentes no Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1946), 329ff. See also Emilio Willems, 
"Social Change on the Latin American Frontier," in David H. Miller and Jerome O. 
Steffen (eds.), The Frontier: Comparative Studies (Norman, 1977), 262-63 (quotation 
on p. 264). Cf. Terry Jordan, German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in Nine-
teenth Century Texas (Austin, 1966). 
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A German-Brazilian farmer with his family in temporary quarters in the forested 
serra of southern Brazil 
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien 
Nevertheless, the German cu1turallandscape remained distinc-
tive.20 In areas where Germans were more densely clustered and 
after decades of development, there were sharp contrasts be-
tween different ethnic group settlements. The landscape of the 
Jacul floodplain, where Luso-Brazilians cultivated rice and cus-
tomarily lived in temporary camplike structures, was noticeably 
different from that of the German settlements to the north. Archi-
tectural forms and styles; the care bestowed upon the land, build-
ings, and flower gardens; and the types of crops raised-all re-
flected the cultural values of the Teuto-Brazilian community in the 
20. I have analyzed the relative importance of environmental forces, such as 
those emphasized by Emilio Willems, and the persistence of cultural forms in my 
essay, "Regionalism and the Great Plains: Problems of Concept and Method," 
Western Historical Quarterly, XV (1<)84), 19-38. See also my comments on concep-
tual schemas based on the environmentalism of Frederick Jackson Turner in "Eth-
nic Minority Groups in the American West," in Michael P. Malone (ed.), Historians 
and the American West (Lincoln, 1<)83), 387-413. 
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A German-Brazilian school building in Neu-Bremen, with the teacher's residence 
attached. Note the use of German Fachwerk (timbered framework with spaces filled 
with bricks). 
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien 
serra. Similarly, the German district varied in appearance from the 
zone of Italian colonies that formed on the crest of the transitional 
area. There, extensive vineyards were the dominant feature. The 
Italian homesteads were more substantial than the Luso-Brazil-
ian, but generally less neat than the German. 21 
German cultural characteristics were most dearly evident in the 
Schneiss or Pikade, the names the Germans gave to the form of ag-
ricultural settlement common in the serra. The founders of a col-
ony would make a long, straight cut through the forest (Urwald) 
that would subsequently become a road. Individual settlers would 
21. Roche, La colonisation allemande, provides a full description of German-
Brazilian housing forms. See also Alba Maria B. Gomes et al., "A colonizac;ao al-
ema na area de Joaneta," in I. Col6quio, 166-76; and Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in 
Brasilien," 190-93. James, "Expanding Settlements," 616; Dressel, Der deutsch-
brasilianische Kolonist, 30; Roy Nash, The Conquest of Brazil (New York, 1926), 
182-83. 
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A view of Estrela, Rio Grande do Sui, a strongly German community located in the 
serra approximately fifty miles west of Porto Alegre on the Rio Taquari 
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien 
then receive long, narrow plots of land of one or two hundred 
acres that stretched out at right angles from the road. Farmhouses 
were built at the side of the road, thereby creating a strung-out 
rural village. Several such Pikaden would constitute a colony. The 
center of the colony was the Stadtplatz, a cluster of buildings in-
cluding the church, school, civil offices, stores, workshops, and 
the mill. This form of spatial organization was imported from cen-
tral Germany, where the Waldhufendorf or Strassendorf was com-
mon. Occasionally German settlers in the United States attempted 
to establish colonies organized in this way, but they certainly were 
not typical, chiefly because the pattern of land sales as specified 
by American law, beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785 
through to the Homestead Act of 1862 and subsequent amen-
datory legislation, worked against their formation. The first struc-
tures erected by the German colonists in Brazil were primitive, 
and slash-and-burn techniques were used, but gradually over a 
period of many years the people built more substantial structures 
and adopted more conventional agricultural methods. Neverthe-
less, as Emilio Willems has emphasized, many of these commu-
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nities remained in poverty and extreme cultural isolation for gen-
erations, well into the twentieth century. 22 
SANTA CATARINA 
Isolation was also typical of many German colonies that were 
founded in Santa Catarina, a state the size of Indiana that lies di-
rectly north of Rio Grande do SuI. Here the Great Escarpment was 
broken by the Rio Itajaf and, on its northern border, the Rio 
Negro. These rivers, plus several smaller streams, formed heavily 
forested valleys between the coast and the interior plateau. As in 
Rio Grande do SuI, wooded areas had been avoided by the Luso-
Brazilians, who preferred the coastal lowlands or the cattle-grazing 
lands of the upland. Because the terrain did not encourage con-
tiguous settlements like those on the terraces of Rio Grande do 
SuI, the German colonies tended to be separated by intervening 
ridges and valleys occupied by other ethnic groups, most fre-
quently Italians. Pikaden were therefore less common in Santa 
Catarina and individual holdings tended to be smaller than those 
in Rio Grande do SuI. 23 Here also the Germans tended to concen-
trate in towns and hence to dominate the economic and social 
structures of their local communities. 
The earliest German settlements in Santa Catarina, such as Sao 
22. Alfred Hettner, "Das Deutschtum in Siidbrasilien," Geographische Zeit-
schrift, VIII (11)02), 612-14; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 175-82; Leo Waibel, 
"European Colonization in Southern Brazil," Geographical Review, XL (1950), 
529-47; Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," 189-1)0; Hanns Porzelt, Der 
deutsche Bauer in Rio Grande do Sui (Ochsenfurt am Main, Germany, 1937),41-43. 
For studies of specific communities, see Gomes et al., "A colonizac;ao alema," 
151-62; Giralda Seyferth, A coloniza¢o alemil no vale do Itaja(-Mirim: Um estudo do 
desenvolvimento economico (Porto Alegre, 1974), 47-51; and Dressel, Der deutsch-
brasilianische Kolonist. The latter is a detailed sociological study of the inhabitants of 
Dois Irmaos, a Pikade called Baumschneis by the Germans, located on the Rio dos 
Sinos upstream from Sao Leopoldo. For a brief description of the Pikade in En-
glish, see Terry G. Jordan, "Aspects of German Colonization in Southern Brazil," 
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLII (1962), 346-53. Cf. Robert C. Eidt, Pio-
neer Settlement in Northeast Argentina (Madison, 1971), 163-65, 199-200 (Eidt's list 
of advantages of the Waldhufendorf settlement form). 
23. James, "Expanding Settlements," 616-17; Jordan, "Aspects of Coloniza-
tion," 351. Carneiro, Imigra~iio e coloniza¢o no Brasil, 67-68, draws contrasts in pat-
terns of colonization between Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina. 
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Pedro d' Alcantara and Rio Negro, were established in the late 
1820S on strategically important routes that led southward from 
Sao Paulo to the southern border of Brazil. Virtually abandoned 
by the Brazilian government in the 1830S, these settlements barely 
survived until Santa Catarina captured the attention of a new gen-
eration of colonizers at mid-century. 24 
The most renowned of the later colonies to be established in 
Santa Catarina and perhaps the most successful in all Brazil was 
Blumenau, founded in 1850 on the banks of the Rio Itajai by Dr. 
Hermann Blumenau, who served as director of the colony until he 
returned to Germany in 1880, by which time his colony had grown 
to fifteen thousand inhabitants. It was thoroughly, though not ex-
clusively, German. The German language was spoken everywhere 
in Blumenau-in the homes, on the streets, and in stores, hotels, 
schools, and churches. As late as World War I, at least two-thirds 
of all the inhabitants of Blumenau spoke German as their mother 
tongue, even though by that time few were German-born. The 
proportion was even higher in the surrounding rural districts. 
The two local newspapers were published in German; imported 
German goods were everywhere in evidence. Even official govern-
ment records were kept in German in the early days of the settle-
ment. Like many of the Rio Grande do SuI colonies, Blumenau 
was isolated well into the twentieth century by lack of transporta-
tion connections. Although roads within the district were satis-
factory for the times, connections with coastal communities were 
miserable. Water transportation on the Rio Itajai was the standard 
mode, but the harbor facilities in the port city of Itajai were inade-
quate. In short, the isolated district of Blumenau was well suited for 
the flowering of an immigrant German society on Brazilian soil. 25 
24. Percy E. Schramm, "Die deutsche Siedlungskolonie Dona Francisca (Bra-
silien: St. Catharina) im Rahmen gleichzeitiger Projekte und Verhandlungen," 
Jahrbuch [iir Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, I (1964), 
309; Jose Deeke, "Erste Anfiinge der Kolonisation Santa Catharinas. Periode bis 
1848," in Gottfried Entres (ed.), Der Staat Santa Catharina in Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart unter besonder Beriicksichtigung des Deutschtums: Gedenkbuch zur loo-Feier 
deutscher einwanderung in Sta. Catharina (Florianopolis, 1929), 28-35, hereinafter 
cited as Gedenkbuch; Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 101-104. 
25. R. A. Hehl, "Die deutsche Colonisation in Sud-Brasilien," Petermann's Mit-
teilungen, XXVIII (1882), 464; Jose Deeke, Das Munizip Blumenau (Sao Leopoldo, 
1917); Jose Deeke, "Die intensiviere deutsche Kolonisation in Santa Catharina," in 
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Joinville, founded at the same time as Blumenau, was the sec-
ond major German colony in Santa Catarina. Located on the coast 
in the northeastern corner of the province near Sao Francisco do 
SuI, this settlement occupied lands purchased by the Hamburg 
Colonization Company from the Prince of Joinville, son of the re-
cently deposed King Louis Philippe of France. The prince had ac-
quired the land as part of the dowry of his wife, Dona Francisca, 
the sister of the Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro II. From the begin-
ning this colony, known at first as Dona Francisca, attracted not 
farmers but urban dwellers-craftsmen whose skills provided a 
foundation for industrial development-in addition to a number 
of well-educated persons who left Germany for political reasons. 
Like Blumenau, Joinville developed many voluntary associations, 
a German-language newspaper, and numerous ethnic businesses. 
By 1880, its population reached eighteen thousand. 26 
By no means were the German settlements in Santa Catarina 
limited to the Blumenau and Joinville districts. As in Rio Grande 
do SuI, German frontiersmen spread throughout the forested 
areas southward to Brusque and other communities, northward 
to Sao Bento, and westward past the cattle country to the valley of 
the Rio Uruguay, where in some districts they constituted as much 
as a quarter of the population. Between 1880 and 1915, a substan-
tial immigration of German artisans contributed to the further in-
dustrialization of Joinville, Blumenau, and other strongly German 
cities of Santa Catarina. 
Late in the nineteenth century the Germans were joined by 
large numbers of other immigrants-Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, 
as well as Italians-especially in the northern part of the province 
Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 40-52; Jose Ferreira da Silva, "Historia de Blumenau," in 
Centenario de Blumenau, 1850-2 de Setembro-1950 (N.p., [1950]); Jose Ferreira da 
Silva, Hist6ria de Blumenau (Florianopolis, [ca. 1972]); Oberacker, "Die Deutschen 
in Brasilien," 185; Clarence H. Haring, The Germans in South America: A Contribution 
to the Economic History of the World War (New York, 1920), 27-31; Fouquet, Der 
deutsche Einwanderer, 31-37; Seyferth, A colonizapio alemil no vale do Itajai-Mirim, 
87-98. 
26. Hehl, "Die deutsche Colonisation in Siid-Brasilien," 461-62; Emesto 
Niemeyer, Die Deutschen in Brasilien (Curityba, 1926),33-37; Sudhaus, Deutschland 
und die Auswanderung, ~-75; Schramm, "Die deutsche Siedlungskolonie Dona 
Francisca," 308-22. 
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A view of Sao Bento, Santa Catarina, located on the Rio Negro. Many German 
settlers moved north from Sao Bento into the state of Parana. 
Reprinted from Kahle, Deutsche Heimat in Brasilien 
near the Rio Negro. By the time of World War I, there were ap-
proximately 100,000 persons of German heritage in Santa Cata-
rina; most were of Brazilian birth and citizenship. The total popu-
lation of the state was 669,000, according to the census of 1920.27 
PARANA. 
The third southern Brazilian state with many German inhabitants 
is Parana, located north of Santa Catarina across the Rio Negro. 
Parana, a state about the size of Nebraska, was still a frontier re-
gion as late as 1920, when its population had reached only 685,000. 
27· Carneiro, Imigra¢o e coloniza~iio no Brasil, 54-59; Gerd Kohlhepp, "Die 
deutschstammigen Siedlungsgebiete im sudbrasilianischen Staate Santa Cata-
rina," in Heide/berger Studien zur Kulturgeographie (Wiesbaden, 1966), 219-44. See 
especially his maps (pp. 224, 230). For the economic development of the German 
district in Santa Catarina, see Gerd Kohlhepp, Industriegeographie des nordiistlichen 
Santa Catarina (Sudbrasilien): Ein Beitrag zur Geographie eines deutschbrasilianischen 
Siedlungsgebietes (Heidelberg, 1968), 77-100. 
A Century of German Settlement 25 
Although a German colony had been founded on the Rio Negro 
as early as 1829, most settlements after 1870 consisted of exten-
sions from Sao Bento and other German concentrations in Santa 
Catarina. Other clusters of German families developed in the big 
cities of the state, especially in Curitiba, the capital. 
Outnumbered by Italian and Russian (i.e., Polish, Ruthenian, 
and Ukrainian) immigrants, the German element in Parana was 
enlarged by the arrival of Wolgadeutsche and Schwartzmeerdeutsche 
from Russia, beginning in 1877. Many of these Germans from 
Russia were Mennonite pacifists fleeing conscription into the Rus-
sian army. Accustomed to the rich soils and open spaces of the 
Russian steppes, many farmers among them settled on the cam-
pos, the grasslands of the plateau, where they tried, without much 
success, to raise wheat. As in the United States, the Germans 
from Russia sought to establish colonies that were exclusively 
Mennonite, Evangelical, Lutheran, or Catholic. Many of these 
early settlers experienced severe problems, causing a strong emi-
gration across the western border into Argentina and Paraguay. In 
general, however, the Germans in Parana were either concen-
trated in the areas of Curitiba and Ponta Grossa or were widely 
scattered across the state. More urban than rural and always a 
small minority in this state, the Germans tended to assimilate 
more rapidly here than they did in Santa Catarina or Rio Grande 
do Sul. 28 
OTHER GERMAN COLONIES IN BRAZIL 
Compared with the huge settlements in the southern states, other 
German colonies in Brazil were numerically insignificant. There 
were clusters of German immigrants in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, and even as far north as Bahia and Per-
28. Wilhelm Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana: Das deutsche Jahrhundertbuch 
(Curitiba, 1929), 3-33; Werner Aulich, Parana und die Deutschen: Versuch einer 
charakterologischen Geschichtsschreibung (Curitiba, 1953); Friedrich W. Brepohl and 
Wilhelm Fugmann, Die Wolgadeutschen im brasilinanischen Staate Parana (Stuttgart, 
1927); Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 37-39; Altiva Pilatti Balhana and Cecilia 
Maria Westphalen, "0 Censo dos Alemaes do Parana em 1917:' Jahrbuch fUr 
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, XIII (1976), 404-19; 
Joseph W. Fretz, Immigrant Group Settlements in Paraguay (North Newton, Kan., 
1962). 
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nambuco, but in most places their numbers were small, except in 
the city of Sao Paulo. They were usually so mixed with immi-
grants from other countries that they usually failed to achieve a 
strong identity in any given locality. 
Espirito Santo, a small mountainous state located on the coast 
northeast of Rio de Janeiro, provides an important exception. 
Here the German-speaking people numbered seventeen or eigh-
teen thousand in 1914, according to one estimate. Most were 
farmers living in isolated areas and practicing a primitive agricul-
ture. Few were engaged in commerce or industry. Except for their 
churches, the Espirito Santo Germans and their descendants were 
unable to create the complex organizational structures typical of 
their compatriots in the southern states. 29 
Most German immigrants avoided the huge coffee plantations 
of Sao Paulo and the other states of the middle region. There were 
some, of course, who tried to operate under the prevailing parceria 
system, as, for example, at Rio Claro. A few were successful; after 
several years of sharecropping, they acquired the means to settle 
elsewhere. One of the largest coffee planters of Sao Paulo in the 
pre-World War I period was Francisco Schmidt, who immigrated 
from Germany as a youth, amassed one fortune as a coffee mer-
chant, and made another as a planter. By 1914 his trees numbered 
in the millions and his agricultural employees in the thousands.3D 
29. Ernst Wagemann, "Das Deutschtum in Sudamerika. II. Die deutschen 
Kolonisten in den tropischen Urwaldern Brasiliens," Deutsche Rundschau, CLXIII 
(1915), 162 and passim; see also Ernst Wagemann, Die deutschen Kolonisten im 
brasilianischen Staate Espirito Santo, Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Vol. 
CXLVII, pt. 5 (Munich and Leipzig: 1915), 1-151. A translation into Portuguese, A 
colonizat;tio alemii no Espirito Santo (Rio de Janeiro, 1949), was also published serially 
in Boletim Geogrtifico, VI (1948-49). Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 50-53. For a 
folkloric study of the Espirito Santo Germans, see Renato Jose Costa Pacheco, "As-
similac;ao de alemaes no Espirito Santo," Sociolagia, XVI (June, 1954), 183-201; Re-
nato Jose Costa Pacheco, "Colonos alemaes no Espirito Santo: Progresso ou estag-
nac;ao?" in 1. Co16quio, 239-45. This volume also contains two studies of German 
communities in Pernambuco. 
30. Warren Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford, 
Calif., 1976), 92-104; Joseph 1. Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-
1937 (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 49, 79, 203; Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics: 
The Culture of Modern Brazil (New York, 1966), 131; "Die grosste Kaffeeplantage der 





Map 2. Nineteenth-century German settlement in the coastal regions of Brazil 
from Sao Paulo to Salvador (Bahia). Names of cities and towns are restricted to 
those mentioned in the text. 
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URBAN CONCENTRATIONS OF GERMANS 
Such rural societies were a world apart from the ethnic commu-
nities that developed in the large towns where Germans con-
stituted a majority, such as Sao Leopoldo, Blumenau, Joinville, 
Brusque, and Sao Bento. In such places they were able to evolve 
self-contained socioeconomic structures that included all the 
strata-rich entrepreneurs and professional persons at the top, 
supported by small merchants, clerks, skilled industrial workers, 
and, at the lower levels, unskilled laborers and the farming popu-
lation in the surrounding countryside. In such a society, as Emilio 
Willems has pointed out, there was little economic interdepen-
dence and few incentives to develop social intercourse with Luso-
Brazilian society. 31 
In some of the large coastal cities, most notably in Porto Ale-
gre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, the Germans were numerous 
enough to develop the complex of supporting voluntary organiza-
tions that gave coherence to their immigrant society-churches, 
schools, commercial associations, and social clubs of many kinds, 
as well as German-language newspapers and a variety of commer-
cial enterprises catering to the ethnic trade. Both Porto Alegre and 
Sao Paulo had approximately twenty thousand German-speaking 
inhabitants in 1920; in Rio de Janeiro the number was considerably 
less, about four thousand. 32 In such cities, however, the Germans 
inevitably had many more interpersonal contacts with members 
of the dominant Luso-Brazilian society as they went about their 
daily tasks as merchants, industrialists, craftsmen, and laborers. 
They learned Portuguese much more rapidly than did their iso-
lated brethren. Assimilation in such a setting was relatively easy 
for persons so inclined. 
From the Brazilian point of view, these urban Germans were im-
portant because, together with Italians and other immigrants, 
155-57; Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag, 420-21; Thomas Holloway, Immigrants on 
the Land: Coffee and Society in Sao Paulo, 1886-1934 (Chapel Hill, 1980), 139. 
31. Siegfried Endress, Blumenau: Werden und Wesen einer deutschbrasilianischen 
Landschaft (Tiibingen, 1938); Emilio Willems, "Some Aspects of Cultural Conflict 
and Acculturation in Southern Rural Brazil," Rural Sociology, VII (1942),379. 
32. Kloss, Statistisches Handbuch, 66; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 49. 
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they influenced the developing structure of the receiving society 
in a positive way. Gilberto Freyre, the eminent Brazilian sociolo-
gist and historian, has noted that traditionalist "old stock" Bra-
zilians of the upper classes preferred intellectual and bureaucratic 
pursuits and often felt that they were above competing in the ma-
terialistic business world. They were thus unwilling to assume the 
functions of the middle class in a dynamic, modernizing society. 
By contrast, the skills and attitudes of the upwardly mobile urban 
immigrants allowed them to move easily into the breach, thereby 
expanding the emerging middle class and adding validity and 
prestige to middle-class values through their accomplishments. 33 
The commercial and industrial elite among the urban German 
group experienced remarkable success. In 1915, firms in Rio 
Grande do SuI that were identifiably German accounted for al-
most as much value of industrial production as did all firms 
owned or managed by persons with Portuguese names. Germans 
dominated the production of shoes, nails, glass, leather goods, 
hats, candles, and chocolate. 34 
Problems of Teuto-Brazilian Leadership 
The leadership of the urban ethnic subsocieties naturally fell to 
the wealthy, educated owners and managers of Teuto-Brazilian or 
German-owned commercial and industrial firms; to engineers 
and technicians; and to prominent clergymen, journalists, and 
other professional persons. Business leaders especially were sub-
ject to strong cross pressures. Their daily activity in commerce or 
industry automatically encouraged rapid assimilation, and, as up-
wardly mobile persons in an increasingly industrialized and ur-
banized country, they understood that the achievement and main-
tenance of economic, social, and political power depended upon 
high status within the larger society, not within the ethnic sub-
group. Moreover, they readily sensed that psychological depen-
dence upon their fellow Germans could inhibit advancement. It 
33. Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 89-90, 186; Gilberto Freyre, Order and Prog-
ress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic, ed. and trans. Rod W. Horton (New York, 
1970), 251-
34. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 391-92. 
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could, in fact, become a source of social deprivation. At the same 
time, as Enu1io Willems has observed, such persons were ex-
pected by their ethnic subsociety to defend the group interest 
against the dominant native society. Thus, if they exercised leader-
ship among their fellow Germans, they could hinder their own 
upward movement within the larger social structure; if they failed 
to defend their ethnic group interest, they would naturally lose 
prestige and status within the subsociety.35 The alternative cho-
sen by persons who were thus trapped depended, of course, on 
unique circumstances and individual social and psychological 
needs. 
For leaders such as clergymen, whose ties with the German 
subsociety were personally intimate, and for those whose inter-
ests were economically intertwined with the group, such as pub-
lishers of German-language newspapers, the dilemma scarcely 
existed. For them, the maintenance of the German language, cul-
tural traditions, and various ethnic institutions and associations 
was essential. Inevitably they became the champions of immi-
grant ethnocentrism. Because they controlled the pulpits, the edi-
torial columns, and the speakers' rostrums, their views were usu-
ally identified by the host society as those of the entire group. 
Reichsdeutsche 
The attitudes of the clergy resembled those of many Reichs-
deutsche-subjects of the German kaiser-who disdained Bra-
zilian citizenship. Many in this group were educated, middle-
class persons. Not a few were associated with German fIrms in 
Brazil and displayed the attitudes of sojourners in a strange land 
who looked forward to the day when they could return to their 
mother country. Some were excessively proud of their German 
culture, which, they were convinced, was certainly superior to 
Brazilian. Karl von Koseritz, a talented refugee of the revolutions 
of 1848 who became an outstanding leader of the Germans in the 
southern provinces, complained bitterly about the Rio de Janeiro 
35. Emflio Willems, "Immigrants and Their Assimilation in Brazil," in T. Lynn 
Smith and Alexander Marchant (eds.), Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent (1951; rpr. 
Westport, Conn., 1972), 214. 
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Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn 
32 Germans in Brazil 
Germans, many of whom were Reichsdeutsche. They know noth-
ing of the Germans in Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, he 
said, and they cared even less; they involved themselves in Brazil-
ian affairs only insofar as such matters impinged upon their imme-
diate economic interests; they were concerned chiefly with circum-
stances in Germany and with international politics as it affected 
commerce. According to Koseritz, the Rio Germans had almost 
nothing in common with the Germans of the south, who, he as-
serted, were in Brazil to stay; they became naturalized and partici-
pated in the political life of the state, won economic influence, and 
earned the respect of Luso-BraziIians.36 
Although Koseritz drew his lines rather too sharply, he was at 
least partly correct in his analysis of the urban Germans in com-
parison to the settlers of the Unoald. It is unlikely, however, that 
Koseritz understood the extent to which both groups were merely 
responding in their own way to radically different physical and 
social circumstances. 
Comparisons with the United States 
The urban and rural environments of Brazil were different not 
only from each other but even more from what the immigrants 
would have encountered in the United States, had they chosen to 
go there. 37 Located in temperate latitudes, the United States offered 
a physical setting that was similar to what the immigrants had 
known in Germany. But most of Brazil is in the tropics; inevitably 
most Germans were attracted to the subtropical provinces of the 
south where the differences, sharp though they were, seemed less 
pronounced. In some respects, the German districts of Rio Grande 
do Sul resemble the hill country of central Texas, which also had 
many Germans among its earliest settlers. 
36. Koseritz, Bilder aus Brasilien, 137-38; Carlos H. Oberacker, Jr., Carlos von 
Koseritz (Sao Paulo, 1961), 52; Porto, Die deutsche Arbeit, 19B-201. 
37. The best introduction to the history of Germans in the United States is the 
brilliant essay, "The Germans," by Kathleen N. Conzen, in Haroard Encyclopedia 
of American Ethnic Groups, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass., 19&», 
405-25. But see also laVern J. Rippley, The German-Americans (Boston, 1976); and 
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There were other differences as well. Americans were accus-
tomed to German immigrants in ways Brazilians were not. Al-
though both the American and the Brazilian Germans emigrated 
from the same parts of Germany and often for the same reasons, 
America had received a substantial contingent in the colonial pe-
riod who were well assimilated into American society by the time 
the mass movement in the nineteenth century got under way. 
Numerically the German-Brazilian immigration was only a 
small fraction-less than a twentieth-of the 5.5 million Germans 
who streamed to the United States between 1820 and 1920. But in 
Brazil the Germans clustered in isolated rural colonies that easily 
and naturally fostered the retention of immigrant language and 
culture. It is true that in the United States, Germans were also 
strongly attracted to farming; only Scandinavians exceeded them 
in this respect. But it is also true that they were more urban than 
was the American population generally in the nineteenth century 
and much more so than were the German Brazilians, who, de-
spite their relatively small numbers, became a sharply defined so-
ciety within society and retained an identity as a separate people 
that was much stronger than what was typical of Germans in the 
United States. 
The exclusive, rural concentrations of German immigrants were 
at least partly the consequence of government policies. Through-
out much of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian government 
pursued policies aimed at attracting immigrants. Subsidies were 
granted; transportation costs were sometimes paid; settlements 
were founded and administered by the government; and the im-
age of Brazil as a desirable place for immigrants was deliberately 
developed. The United States government, by contrast, did noth-
ing directly to promote immigration. Throughout much of the 
century, it was an unrestricted activity, neither aided nor hin-
dered. Moreover, while American land policy worked against the 
creation of exclusive settlements, Brazilian policy had the effect of 
encouraging it, especially in isolated areas.38 Thus, the Strassen-
dorf mode of settlement was common in Brazil, especially Rio 
Grande do SuI, but was rarely even attempted in the United States, 
38. Browne, "Government Immigration Policy," 217-47. 
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so powerful were the effects of the American laws governing the 
alienation of public land. 
Brazilian conditions generally combined to slow the process 
whereby German immigrants were absorbed into the receiving so-
ciety. While they were forced to adapt to the subtropical environ-
ment, their isolation enhanced their capacity to withstand other 
forms of assimilation. Germans in the United States, however, 
seemed less subject to the physical environment, but more vul-
nerable to the assimilative power of the social environment. Thus, 
the cultural landscape of the German districts in southern Brazil 
was often distinctive, whereas in the United States physical marks 
of German culture were usually less evident, except perhaps to 
the practiced eye. 39 
Questions about the pattern of settlement-when and why im-
migrants chose to come to a new land, where they settled, and 
what the characteristics of their new physical and social environ-
ments were-are first steps toward understanding the behavior of 
an immigrant group. But there are other equally important ques-
tions to pursue if their history is to be understood. One must ask 
who the immigrants were in terms of wealth, education, occupa-
tion, and religion in comparison with members of the receiving 
society; what kinds of institutions they succeeded in creating and 
how well they sustained immigrant society and culture; what sort 
of assimilation patterns emerged; and what variations in behavior 
may be discerned among the internal elements of the group. In 
short, their social structure also must be analyzed. 40 
39. Cf· Charles van Ravenswaay, The Arts and Architecture of German Settlements 
in Missouri (Columbia, Mo., 1977); and Russel L. Gerlach, Immigrants in the Ozarks: 
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GERMAN IMMIGRANTS built a new society in Brazil that was different not only from the life they had known in Ger-
many but also from the established Luso-Brazilian society. 
Over a period of nearly a century they had developed a fairly 
distinctive ethnic community of nearly 400,000 persons, mostly 
Brazilian-born and German-speaking, infused with a strong sense 
of group identity and difference from other Brazilians, especially 
those of Portuguese antecedents. Under conditions of consider-
able adversity, they had adapted their agricultural practices; built 
churches, schools, and a complex of ethnic organizations; and 
had developed a substantial German-language press-all in a 
relatively high degree of isolation and with little help from others. 
Most rural districts in which the Germans settled had the char-
acteristics of a frontier area, even though nearby territories had 
been inhabited by Europeans many years earlier. Population den-
sity was relatively low in the German areas; most of the settlers 
were farmers and had spread out across the hilly, forested terrain. 
Despite this dispersion, they were able to found and maintain 
many of the auxiliary institutions that are customarily associated 
with effective cultural maintenance. 
The Role of the Churches 
The institution most readily created in such a setting was the 
church. By all accounts, it played a central role in the history of 
the Germans in Brazil and in their assimilation. This is not to say 
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that every German immigrant was a practicing Christian or that 
the church was a pervasive influence in everyone's life-or even 
that everyone in a given colony was a member of one church or 
another. Yet the various churches, individually and collectively, 
performed social roles that were crucial to the life of the commu-
nity. In many cases, especially in isolated areas, there were no 
other agencies, public or private, that could fulfill those roles 
effectively. 1 
The religious affiliation of the immigrants had always been a 
significant issue, in Brazil more so than in the United States. Ca-
tholicism had been the state religion, and at first Protestants were 
not welcome. As a central element in the development of Luso-
Brazilian culture, the Catholic church played a role not unlike that 
of many Protestant denominations in the United States in early 
American history. Inevitably, the process of assimilation was more 
difficult for Protestants than it was for Catholic immigrants in Bra-
zil. The government's opposition to Protestantism during the em-
pire period, when most of the German colonies were established, 
unquestionably contributed to the self-imposed segregation of 
Protestant communities and fixed itself in their collective memo-
ries. Moreover, government schools were under the supervision 
of the Catholic church during this time. Emilio Willems has ob-
served that religion drew a line of cultural demarcation between 
Catholics and Protestants among the Germans of Brazil. Differ-
ences in their philosophical conceptions and roles of behavior 
may be traced to the churches' differing hierarchies of values re-
garding law, government, and economic pursuits. 2 
Although the Protestants were a tiny minority in a great sea of 
Brazilian Catholics, they constituted a majority in most German-
Brazilian communities. According to one estimate made in the 
early 1920S, 54 percent of the Germans in Rio Grande do SuI were 
Protestant, the remainder Catholic. Among individual govern-
mental units (municipios, comparable to counties in the United 
States), there was a great range. For example, German Protestants 
1. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, [Sr.], 1m Sonnen land Brasilien: Bilder und Gestalten. 
Erlebnisse aus Brasilien (Karlsruhe, 1932), 270; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 509. 
For a brief survey, see Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," 238-44. ct. 
Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 14. 
2. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 516; Willems, A acultura(iio dos alemiies no 
Brasil, 463. 
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were estimated at 63 percent in Porto Alegre, 56 percent in Sao 
Leopoldo, 84 percent in Cruz Alta, and 90 percent in Sao Lou-
renzo. Among the predominantly Catholic German communities 
were Sao LUlz at 88 percent, Montenegro and Passo Fundo at 68 
percent, and Lageado at 62 percent. The scattered character of the 
population is indicated by the number of stations served in indi-
vidual parishes. For example, in the municipio of Lageado, three 
Catholic parishes served 13,500 persons in twenty-six stations, 
and four Evangelical parishes served 6,534 persons in twenty-two 
stations. Within a given municipio, there could be much variation. 
The settlers of one valley might be almost entirely Protestant; just 
a few miles away a neighboring nucleus could be exclusively 
Catholic. 3 
The conditions surrounding Catholic and Protestant churches 
alike were primitive, especially in the early years. If the colonists 
wanted a church, they had to provide it for themselves. At first 
they worshiped in family groups in homes; later, small and often 
crude chapels were erected. Catholics were served occasionally by 
circuit-riding priests, but many of these clergymen were ignorant 
of the German language. It sometimes happened that a person 
would appear in a colony, claiming to be a clergyman, and then 
turn out to be a rogue who was exploiting the wretched circum-
stances of the people for his own personal advantage. 4 In most 
cases, small local groups were served effectively by dedicated 
laymen. Such informal arrangements were more easily made by 
Protestants than by Catholics, who permitted no one but a priest 
to celebrate the mass, to baptize, and to consecrate marriages. 
If the colonists in the Urwald wanted their children to receive 
the rudiments of an education, they had to establish their own 
schools, because the state and federal governments were usually 
unable or unwilling to establish schools in the German districts. 
The immigrants did the only thing they could under the circum-
stances: they recreated to the best of their ability what they re-
membered of their village schools in Germany. Thus, after a local 
parish had been formed and the services of a bona fide clergyman 
3. Souza, "Vma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 196-99; Hundert Jahre Deutsch-
tum in Rio Grande do Sui, 1824-1924 (Porto Alegre, 1924),448,496. Cf. Silva, Hist6-
ria de Blumenau, 268-94, and see table (p. 136). 
4. Such impostors were known as Pseudopfarrer. See Schroder, Brasilien und Wit-
tenberg, 368-69. 
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obtained, they would start a school, usually with the pastor as the 
only teacher. The church school was in effect the public school; 
there was no alternative. In Dois Irmaos, for example, Evangelical 
clergymen served as the teachers of the school from 1868 to 1938-
a seventy-year period in which the education of the young in the 
community was entirely in the hands of the church. Inevitably the 
language of instruction and of the textbooks and other teaching 
material in this school was German. Compared to modern schools 
or to schools in Germany at that time, these were miserable af-
fairs, but they were better than nothing. 5 
The Catholic Church 
As a general rule, the Catholics among the German Brazilians 
were less exclusive or separatistic and less self-conscious than 
were the Protestants. The Catholics shared the faith of the vast 
majority of Brazilians; they were served by a church that, in fact as 
well as in name, was universal. Ancient as Christianity itself, the 
church embraced millions of adherents in many countries and 
ministered in many tongues. While it may be argued that Catholi-
cism was an intimate part of the culture of countries with Latinate 
languages, such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, it served 
Germans, Poles, Irish, and many others equally well. The Catholic 
church, in other words, was not a ready agency for the perpetua-
tion of specific ethnocultural ideals. Consequently the barriers 
separating Catholic Germans from Luso-Brazilian society were 
not as formidable as were those surrounding the Protestants. The 
Catholics were considerably closer to the Brazilian core culture 
than were the Protestants. 
The multinational character of the Catholic church was espe-
cially apparent in the clergy. During most of the early period the 
few Catholic priests who ventured into the Urwald were ordinarily 
not German. The Catholics of Dois Irmaos, for example, were 
served for two decades by circuit-riding priests from other areas; 
their first resident pastor, who came to the community in 1848, 
was a Pole. In those days, priests read the mass in Latin, but other 
ministrations, limited and inadequate though they may have been, 
5. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 133-46; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische 
Kolonist, 19; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 179. 
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were frequently in Portuguese, and thus, in effect, clerics ad-
vanced the linguistic acculturation of the people. In the towns the 
Catholic parishes were often multi-ethnic, serving Luso-Brazil-
ians, Italians, Spanish, Germans, and Poles; under such circum-
stances, Portuguese was used in church and school as the only 
language common to all. There were, of course, exclusively Ger-
man parishes also, especially later in the century, served in most 
cases by German-born and German-trained clergy. Even in those 
churches, however, the priests would often preach first in Portu-
guese and then repeat their message in German. 6 
In general, the record of the German priests in Brazil was im-
pressive. By the end of the century, German Catholic clergymen 
(and Italian as well) far outnumbered those of Portuguese origins 
in Rio Grande do SuI. A few years later, a priest named Johann 
Becker, who had come to Brazil from Germany as a child, was 
consecrated as archbishop of Porto Alegre. However, there was no 
distinctively German seminary for the training of priests in Brazil. 
A Jesuit seminary had been established in Sao Leopoldo, but Por-
tuguese was the language of instruction there. 7 
It is clear that among most German Catholics of Brazil, the church 
came first and ethnicity second. Nevertheless, they founded dis-
tinctively ethnoreligious institutions in the early part of the twen-
tieth-century, including an orphanage, a home for the aged, and, 
later, a school for the training of teachers of German Catholic 
schools, and they established a number of German-language pub-
lications. 8 Even though most German Catholics lived in close 
proximity to German Protestants, they tended to remain separate 
and often felt a closer bond with fellow Catholics of other ethnic 
groups than with their German Protestant neighbors. 9 
6. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 19; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 
520, 524; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 58; Haring, The Germans in South Amer-
ica,38. 
7. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 195; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 521; 
Haring, The Germans in South America, 48; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 58. 
8. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 192-94; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 
522; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 59. 
9. Souza, "Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 197. The division between 
Catholic and Protestant antedates their arrival in Brazil by three centuries. Yet their 
Brazilian experience had the effect of intensifying antipathies, as during the Far-
roupilha Revolt, or Farrapenkrieg, as the Germans called it. According to one sec-
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Protestant Denominations 
For half a century, dozens of German Protestant congregations in 
southern Brazil sustained their independence and pursued their 
goals as best they could.1O But the task was greater than their re-
sources. In the 1880s, individual congregations began to develop 
closer ties with various Protestant missionary societies in Ger-
many. The most important of these was the Gustav-Adolf Ve-
rein, which supported congregations of German Protestants any-
where outside Germany with contributions for the construction 
of church buildings and schools and for various social programs. 
Meanwhile, the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft of Barmen sent 
pastors and teachers to serve in Brazilian parishes. ll 
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Brazilian Protes-
tants had been unable for decades to unite individual congrega-
tions into synods for the accomplishment of larger goals. No sem-
inaries or colleges had been founded, nor was there any significant 
measure of doctrinal unity. Gradually a network developed among 
the widely dispersed Protestant clergymen, primarily because of 
efforts of Dr. Hermann Borchard, a pastor sent to Brazil by the 
Prussian state church in 1864. It was not until 1886, however, that 
the German Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande do SuI was founded 
under the leadership of Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, pastor of the 
Evangelical congregation in Sao Leopoldo. Patterned on the North 
American synodical structure in which congregational autonomy 
was not surrendered to the central church body, the Riogran-
denser Synod, as it was usually called, quickly became the largest 
German Protestant organization in Brazil. 12 In Santa Catarina a 
ondary source, this conflict, which raged in Rio Grande do Sui from 18}5 to 1845, 
engulfed German settlers and tended to range Protestants against Catholics. 
Gruesome tales of brutality and bitter obstinacy were then passed on to younger 
generations. Oskar Canstatt, Brasilien: Land und Leute (Berlin, 1877), 41}. 
10. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 51-176, Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 
94-95, 102-1O}. 
11. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 97-101; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 
190; Walter Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," in Bruno Geissler (ed.), Die Kultur-
bedeutung der deutschen evange/ischen Kirche in Brasilien (Leipzig, 1922), 12-2}. 
12. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 109-15; Erich Fausel, Dr. Rotermund: Ein 
Kampf um Recht und Richtung des Evangelischen Deutschtums in Sudbrasilien (Sao 
Leopoldo, 19}6); Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 195-2}5. 
The German Evangelical church in Porto Alegre. This imposing structure was not 
typical of Protestant church buildings, most of which were of more modest pro-
portions. In terms of its architectural design, it might just as well have been built 
in Germany or the United States. 
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschtum 
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conference of Evangelical pastors was organized in 1896, and 
later, in 1911, a synod was established. A number of Lutheran 
congregations joined together in 1905 to form the Evangelical Lu-
theran Synod of Santa Catarina, Parana, and Other States in South 
America. North American influence was again apparent; the first 
president of this body was Otto Kuhr, a German who had served 
as a circuit-riding Lutheran preacher in the United States before 
he was called to Brazil. Finally, in 191), a synod of Evangelical 
congregations was organized in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito 
Santo, and Minas Gerais. In contrast to the theological differences 
between Lutherans and Evangelicals in the United States, there 
were relatively few between these two Protestant groups in Brazil. 13 
Protestant Links with Germany 
In the midst of this flurry of organizational activity, the German 
government took a step that eventually linked it closely to most 
Evangelical churches in Brazil. By means of a law passed in 1900, 
the Prussian state church (an amalgam of Lutheran and Calvinist 
elements created in 1819 and known as the Evangelical church) 
was granted supervision over German Evangelical congregations 
in other countries. In return for subsidies and other forms of as-
sistance, the churches of the German diaspora were to accept the 
oversight of the Evangelischen Oberkirchenrat in Berlin. It was en-
tirely a voluntary proposition, and the German Brazilians debated 
the question at length. The result was that many individual Evan-
gelIcal congregations, though not the synods, accepted affiliation 
with the state church of Prussia. 14 
Undoubtedly this organizational bond with the Prussian state 
church and German bureaucracy helped to stimulate the develop-
ment of auxiliary institutions in the Evangelical church, especially 
in Rio Grande do SuI. Before long, the Riograndenser Synod de-
veloped a teachers association that had its own professional jour-
nal and founded a teachers college with help from Germany. An 
association of local women's societies was established and peri-
odicals were published for the laity. Because of the minority status 
13. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 344-52; Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 
116-20. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 37-39· 
14. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 140-43; "Stimmen aus Kirche und Schule," 
Sao Leopoldo Sonntags-Beilage der Deutschen-Post, September 28, 1924. 
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of Protestantism in Catholic Brazil, the Evangelical churches had 
always been closely identified with the pursuit of ethnocultural 
ideals. The new ties with Germany sealed this relationship, and 
the Riograndenser Synod became, in effect, the strongest agency 
for the promulgation of cultural chauvinism in Brazil. Almost all 
the pastors were now supplied, directly or indirectly, by the Prus-
sian church; schools were subsidized by the German government; 
and pastors, teachers, and their families became in some measure 
representatives of Germany and German culture in Brazil.1s 
The tendency of the Evangelical church and its auxiliary agen-
cies to serve as defenders of Deutschtum (a term they understood 
to mean their ethnocultural heritage of language, custom, and be-
lief) was enhanced by the ecumenical character of the church. In-
stead of holding to a distinctive or particular theology, as many 
Lutherans in the United States did, the Evangelicals sought to in-
clude all German Protestants. 16 The desire to emphasize Deutsch-
tum now became their common denominator. 
The Reverend Martin Braunschweig, who was provost during 
the pre-World War I years, later wrote that the German Evan-
gelical church was by far the strongest and most comprehensive 
agency for maintaining the German language and culture in Brazil 
and argued that the tie with German culture was vital for the 
church: ''The German Evangelical church can live only so long as 
German Volkstum lives in Brazil." Max Dedekind, an Evangelical 
pastor in Brazil, wrote that the Germans in Brazil wanted to re-
main German and especially to retain the German language in 
their churches and schools. Even though the Brazilian govern-
ment had given them no assistance, he continued, the Germans 
would nevertheless remain loyal and true citizens, but within the 
context of German cultural work. Another Evangelical pastor ap-
proached the outer limits of chauvinism in his defense of the cul-
tural bond: 
Our German Evangelical Church ... regards its German cultural heri-
tage as a God-given gift to be held in honor and nourished in church 
and school. Among the gifts the founders brought with them from 
15. Emilio Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants in Brazil," Sociology 
and Social Research, XXV (1940), 128; Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 93; Oberacker, Die 
volkspolitische Lage, 53. 
16. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 187-91; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 39. 
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Germany are the deeply German conception of the Gospel, the Ger-
man church services, the German language, and the rich treasures of 
art, science, and theology. Evangelical beliefs and German nationalism 
have been intimately bonded since Luther's times; they cannot be sepa-
rated without injury. The German Evangelical Church in Brazil there-
fore wears its German dress consciously and proudly. . . . It can fill its 
responsibility only when it is consciously a German national church. 
Most leaders of the Evangelical synods in Brazil seemed to agree 
that the relationship with the Prussian state church served to 
strengthen, as one of them expressed it, "the preservation of the 
German language, manners, and customs."17 
Lutheran Links with the United States 
In their emphasis on the cultural bond with Germany, the Evan-
gelical pastors were diametrically opposed to the position taken 
by German-speaking missionaries from the United States who 
were sent to serve German Brazilians by the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, a conservative Lutheran body then known as the 
German Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other 
States. Even though the Brazilian branch of the "Missouri Synod" 
was small in comparison with the Riograndenser Synod, it was 
perceived as a major threat by the Evangelical leaders, and they 
denounced it vehemently because of its stance on language and 
culture. 
In the United States the Missouri Synod had always promoted 
the maintenance of the German language and culture as a means 
to sustain its theological conservatism. Ever since its founding in 
1845, it had stressed the importance of parish schools and syn-
odical colleges and seminaries for the training of native pastors 
and teachers. But in Brazil this position underwent a remarkable 
transformation, beginning in 1899, when the first Missouri Synod 
missionary arrived in Rio Grande do SuI. Offering itself as an al-
ternative to the Evangelical synods and their close nationalistic 
17. Martin Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora und die neue Zeit," in 
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 46; Max Dedekind, Deutschtum und Evangelium 
in Brasilien (Leipzig, 1929), 37, 45; Wilhelm Teschendorf, "Mittel-Brasilien," in 
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 11. For other expressions of Deutschtumspolitik, 
see Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 187-91; and Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland 
Brasilien, 270 and passim. 
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ties with Germany, the Missouri Synod stressed the progressive 
abandonment of the German language and the gradual adoption 
of Portuguese, especially in the cities. Emphasizing its strong 
confessional orientation in contrast to the ecumenism of the Evan-
gelicals, it grew rapidly, and by 1920, there were thirty-one Mis-
souri Synod pastors serving sixteen thousand adherents. It quickly 
established a small seminary in Porto Alegre for the training of a 
native clergy; there, in a monthly periodical, Professor Johann 
Kunstmann articulated his church's position. 18 During the early 
decades of the century, however, most of the Missouri Synod pas-
tors were American-born and trained. Despite the importance 
they placed on adopting Portuguese, few acquired a skillful com-
mand of the language in those early years, and they continued to 
minister to their people in the German language. 
Few Protestant churches other than the Evangelical and Lu-
theran existed among the Germans of Brazil in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. A number of German-Russian Men-
nonite congregations had been founded, particularly in Parana. 
Small clusters of the German Baptists and Adventists could be 
found here and there-perhaps a dozen or more congregations, 
especially in Rio Grande do SuI-but they were relatively unim-
portant. Several North American denominations established mis-
sions in Brazil in the early years before World War I. Presbyterians 
were the most numerous, followed by the Baptists. Congrega-
tionalists, Methodists, and Episcopalians were also present, but 
among these denominations, only the Baptist group included a 
large number of Germans. 19 
18. Carlos H. Warth, "Die Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Brasiliens," in Fischer 
and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 75-80; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 
440-42, 445, 492-93, 496; Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 379-83; Dedekind, 
Deutschtum und Evange/ium, 45; Oberacker, Die volkspolitische Lage, 59; Porzelt, Der 
deutsche Bauer, 94; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 191-92; Oberacker, 1m Son-
nenland Brasilien, 141-42. For a detailed exposition of the Missouri Synod's posi-
tion, see Johann Kunstmann, "Vom Deutschtum der Missourier," Evangelisch-
Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fUr Sad-Amerika, XIV (May 1, August 15, September 1, 
1917),114-16,121-24,130-34. The annual report of the synod's seminary in Porto 
Alegre shows that Portuguese was taught in every class. See Kirchenblatt, XIV 
(January 1, 1917). 
19. Koseritz' Deutscher Volkskalender far Brasilien auf das Jahr 1917 (Porto Alegre, 
[1916]); Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 448; Aulich, Parana und die Deutschen; Schroder, 
Brasilien und Wittenberg, 383. 
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Unchurched Teuto-Brazilians 
Although church historians might create the impression that all 
German Brazilians were members of one denomination or an-
other, this certainly was not the case, especially in the cities, where 
diversity rather than homogeneity was the typical pattern. It is all 
but impossible to calculate the proportion of persons who ignored 
or opposed the churches and their domination of German immi-
grant society. No doubt some people who were counted as mem-
bers in fact participated only rarely in the church's functions. 
Nonmembers were proportionately more numerous among those 
immigrants who were better educated and more highly skilled in 
the crafts and professions. Some, like Karl von Koseritz, were 
strong advocates of cultural maintenance and, at the same time, 
resolutely anticlerical. 20 Others, for individual psychological and 
social reasons, were simply eager to assimilate as rapidly as pos-
sible into Brazilian society. They learned Portuguese quickly, 
tended to marry outside the group, and divested themselves of 
the obvious marks of their German ethnicity. Because they wanted 
to disappear as Germans, they left few traces. 21 
Such rapid assimilators were rare enough in the solidly German 
districts, but in the marginal areas and in the large cities they 
were not uncommon. Mark Jefferson, an American geographer 
who traveled through southern Brazil in 1918, observed that in 
Santa Maria, located at the western end of the German district in 
Rio Grande do SuI, a high level of linguistic and marital assimila-
tion had occurred; the architecture revealed no German influence 
and the German language was not heard on the streets and in 
public places.22 In large cities such as Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo, 
where the Germans were a small minority, there were greater op-
20. The freethinking Koseritz was especially opposed to clerical influence. 
A former student at the University of Heidelberg, he fled to Brazil after the unsuc-
cessful revolution of 1848, served in the Brazilian army against the Argentine dic-
tator Manuel Rosas, and then settled in Rio Grande do SuI, first in Pelotas and later 
in Porto Alegre, where he was unusually influential as a journalist and political 
leader. In several respects his career bears a resemblance to that of Carl Schurz in 
the United States. See Oberacker, Carlos von Koseritz. Cf. Hans Trefousse, Carl 
Schurz: A Biography (Knoxville, 1982). 
21. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 30 , 45. 
22. Mark Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," Geographical Review, XVI 
(1926), 521 -47. 
Social and Cultural Institutions 47 
portunities for submersion into the mainstream. It is unlikely, 
however, that rapid assimilation was as common in Brazil as it was 
in the United States, where the German settlements were much 
less exclusive and the cultural differences between the German 
immigrants and the host society were not as great. 
In contrast to the rapid assimilators, the anticlerical element 
constituted a strong force in support of German cultural mainte-
nance, especially in the cities and larger towns. Many people were 
influenced by well-educated, articulate political refugees such as 
Koseritz, who felt that Brazilian Deutschtum was being enervated 
by a pervasive materialism and indifference to the German cultural 
heritage. Their remedy for what was in fact an entirely normal so-
cial process was to stimulate the formation of non-church-related 
voluntary associations, such as singing societies, marksmen's or 
rifle clubs, gymnastic organizations (Turnvereine), and the like. 23 
Clubs and Societies 
It must be said, however, that the various Vereine would have ap-
peared even if there had been no Forty-eighters like Koseritz 
among the German immigrants. Societies were created wherever 
German Brazilians were numerous enough in one place to orga-
nize and maintain them. Thus they were most common in the 
cities and towns, such as Porto Alegre and Blumenau, but they 
could also be found in the Pikaden and Strassendorfer of Rio Grande 
do SuI. Dois Irmaos, for example, had a Schiitzenverein (rifle club) 
modeled directly on the German pattern, a Hilfsverein (charitable 
society), and a Leseverein (library association). 24 
Most of the German ethnic societies combined a variety of pur-
poses. Some of the Turnvereine, for example, offered programs in 
singing, theater, and literature. Other organizations served purely 
social and recreational purposes-shooting, bowling, dancing, 
and card playing. 25 Still others, such as mutual benefit insurance 
23. Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 124-30. 
24. Souza, "Uma comunidade Teuto-Brasileira," 184; Seyferth, A coloniza~tio 
alemti no vale do Itajai-Mirim, &}-94; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 
19-20. Cf. Silva, Historia de Blumenau, 242-55. 
25. For a sociological study of bowling clubs in one community, see Jose Fraga 
Fachel, "Os grupos de bohio e os 'Kranzchen' em Santa Cruz do Sui," in I. Colo-
quio, 311-38. 
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The imposing clubhouse of the Germania Society in Porto Alegre as it appeared a 
year before its destruction in the anti-German riot of April 16, 1917 
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender: 1917 
associations and commercial and professional organizations, 
added social activities to economic goals. One of the largest so-
cieties in Brazil was the Handwerker-Unterstutzungs-Verein of 
Curitiba, Parana, with nearly nineteen hundred members in 1913. 
Essentially a mutual benefit society for life and health insurance, 
it had a Turnersektion in addition to a variety of social and cultural 
functions. Like the smaller Deutscher Sangerbund ofCuritiba, this 
Verein provided a clubhouse for its members. In Rio de Janeiro, the 
Germania Society, which had been founded in 1821, built a broad 
program around a nucleus of members in commerce. In Porto Ale-
gre, a union of German Vereine maintained a hospitaP6 
26. Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 100-105; Heinrich Hinden, Deutsche und 
Deutscher Handel in Rio de Janeiro: Ein hundertjiihriges Kulturbild zur Zentenar Feier der 
Gesellschaft "Germania," 1821-1921 (Rio de Janeiro, 1921); Fischer, "Geschichte der 
EKLB," 149. 
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Among the Germans both in Brazil and in the United States, 
anticlericalism was strongest in the Turnvereine, but other secular 
societies attracted substantial numbers of church members. The 
churches often tended to see the clubs as competitors and chari-
table purposes, but also for economic activities. 27 In general, how-
ever, the rivalry between the two types of organizations was not 
as keen in Brazil as it was in the United States. 
In other instances, German associational activity transcended 
ethnicity. For example, the Beethoven Club of Rio de Janeiro, 
founded in 1881, was organized solely for the cultivation of Ger-
man classical music; not all of its six hundred members were Ger-
man. According to Koseritz, the club's annual concert was a great 
social event, held in the most luxurious hall in South America, 
and was attended by Emperor Pedro II and his family.2B 
German Schools 
In most respects, the associational activity (Vereinsleben) of the 
German Brazilians was similar to that of their ethnic cousins in the 
United States. A major difference, however, pertains to education. 
In Brazil, where for both cultural and economic reasons illiter-
acy was endemic, school societies (Schulvereine) were very com-
mon. In the United States, where literacy was standard among 
whites and a nearly unIversal public school system had evolved 
in the nineteenth century, such school societies were largely 
superfluous. 
When the Germans first settled in southern Brazil, there were 
few tax-supported public schools, and none in the forested moun-
tain area they chose as their new home. Few of the immigrants 
were well educated themselves, but they placed a high value on 
literacy. In the early years the fathers of families sometimes took 
turns teaching the children in the colony. Later, as the number of 
Evangelical pastors increased, the educational function was fre-
quently shifted to the church, notably in Rio Grande do SuI. But 
in Santa Catarina, Parana, and Sao Paulo, the schools were more 
often maintained by Schulvereine, especially among Protestants.29 
27. Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 102-103. 
28. Koseritz, Bilder aus Brasilien, 294. 
29. Dressel, Derdeutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 19-20; Oberacker, "Die Deutschen 
in Brasilien," 233-35; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 174; Karl Fouquet, "Die 
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The parents would procure a building of some kind for use as a 
school and seek the services of a teacher, often a recent immi-
grant. His pay was paltry and his tenure short because he was 
likely to be looking for other, better-paying employment. Most of 
the schools consisted of only one classroom, and instruction was 
commonly limited to basic reading, writing, arithmetic, and reli-
gion. Ordinarily, children would attend classes for no more than 
two or three years. Later in the nineteenth century, the curriculum 
in many schools was expanded to include the geography and his-
tory of Germany and Brazil. All instruction was in the German 
language, at least partly because few of the teachers, as recent im-
migrants, understood Portuguese. 30 Wretched though they were, 
these schools helped to raise the literacy rate in the German colo-
nies high above the national average. 
In Luso-Brazilian society, formal education was largely limited 
to the upper or wealthier classes. In districts where there were 
few German or Italian immigrants, as in the cattle-grazing cam-
panha, illiteracy ran as high as 85 percent. As recently as 1920, 
only 24.5 percent of the Brazilian population was classified as lit-
erate. Rio Grande do SuI, with its numerous German and Italian 
immigrants, registered the highest rate of any state in the country 
with 38.8 percent, but in Sao Leopoldo municipio, the proportion 
soared to 62 percent, and among the Germans the figure was 
higher still. Gradually, the ruling classes in Brazil began to see 
public schools as potentially important agents for the assimilation 
of the colonos and that education was the responsibility of the 
state. 31 
But early efforts at public school education were not adequate. 
deutsch-brasilianische Schule, ein Werk der Selbsthilfe," in Gerhard Friesen and 
Walter Schatzberg (eds.), The German Contribution to the Building of the Americas 
(Hanover, N.H., 1977), 322; Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," 16; Porzelt, Der 
deutsche Bauer, 86; Silva, Historia de Blumenau, 295-326. A particularly insightful 
study of the rural school is by Egon Schaden, "Aspectos historicos e sociologicos 
da escola rural Teuto-Brasileira," in 1. Coloquio, 65-77. 
30. Fouquet, "Die deutsch-brasilianische Schule," 321; Fischer, "Geschichte der 
EKLB," 135; Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 11. 
31. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 130; Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 88; Artur H. Neiva 
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A director of education in Rio Grande do SuI reported in 1879 that 
the German schools he had visited were excellently. organized, 
well equipped, and well attended. The government schools, by 
contrast, were miserable affairs, entirely lacking in equipment 
and left in the hands of incompetent teachers. He recommended 
that in the German districts the government schools be closed. 
Some years later a German school society sought government as-
sistance in adding to the faculty of its school a Brazilian teacher 
who was a specialist in teaching the Portuguese language and 
Brazilian history, geography, and literature. When the govern-
ment failed to respond, the society successfully hired a teacher 
from Germany who had the desired competence. He served until 
the school was closed during World War I.32 
By the turn of the century, the Germans of southern Brazil had 
developed an extensive private school system. In Santa Catarina 
the governor's office reported in 1916 that 40 percent of the schools 
in the state were privately operated. The actual figure may have 
been significantly higher. 33 At the same time, in Blumenau munici-
pio, there were 10 state and 113 private schools enrolling 520 and 
5,011 children, respectively. In Joinville municipio, the proportion 
was much the same: 5 government schools with 303 students; 64 
private, with 3,}28 enrolled. 34 Not all the schools classified as pri-
vate were German; some were Italian and a few were Polish. But 
the great majority-at least 80 percent-used the German lan-
guage exclusively. Some were heavily subsidized by the Prussian 
state church, the Gustav-Adolf Verein, the Allgemeine Deutsche 
Schulverein, and other similar societies in Germany. Five years 
32. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 214; Fou-
quet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 180. 
33. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 19, 1917. The data are grouped 
in four categories: federal, state, municipal (county), and private schools. In the 
tabulation of students in each category, the enrollments in the municipal group 
were lumped with the private, suggesting that the municipal schools were Ver-
einschulen and the private were the parochial schools. Cf. Fischer, "Geschichte der 
EKLB," 136. 
34. Fouquet, "Die deutsch-brasilianische Schule," 322; Herbert Koch, "Die 
staatlichen Schulen in Santa Catharina," Mitteilungen des Deutschen Schulvereins [iir 
St. Catharina, XII (August-September, 1917), 29-30. The same data are to be found 
in Herbert Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen in Brasilien (Langensalza, Germany, 
1923), 18-19, and pp. 25-39. 
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The school maintained by the Deutsche Hilfsverein of Porto Alegre. Most Gerrnan-
Brazilian schools of the time were much less pretentious in appearance. 
Reprinted from Hundert Jahre Deutschturn 
later, data from Rio Grande do SuI revealed a total of 698 private 
schools in the state, of which 60 percent were Protestant, the re-
mainder Catholic. 35 
In some areas where the Teuto-Brazilian population was less 
highly concentrated, Vereine were organized to found "intercon-
fessional" schools in which both Protestant and Catholic children 
were enrolled but instructed separately in religion. 36 Protestants 
were especially fearful that if they failed to maintain their own 
schools, their children would either lapse into illiteracy or be pros-
elytized in Catholic schools. Thus the position of the Protestants 
resembled that of the Catholics in the United States who worked 
mightily during the same decades to build their huge system of 
parochial schools. 
35. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 214; Hun-
dert Jahre Deutschturn, 236; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 180-82; Dressel, Der 
deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 11. 
36. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 137; Mummelthey, "Santa Catarina," in 
Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 16; Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen, 25. 
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The teachers college started by the Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande do Sui in 
Santa Cruz in 1913 
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender: 1917 
A bureaucratic support system for the German schools began to 
emerge in the years before World War I. German Catholics, backed 
by the Jesuit order, founded a teachers association in 1898. Two 
years later they launched a professional journal for teachers, The 
Evangelicals quickly followed suit and, in 1904, went on to create 
an organization to coordinate the work of the many Schulvereine in 
Santa Catarina. In all instances and in the face of much poverty, 
these organizations strove to raise the level of instruction, to hire 
better-qualified teachers, to coordinate curricula, and to represent 
the interests of the German schools against increasing opposition 
from the government. In 1913, after several false starts, the Rio-
grandenser Synod established a small teachers college (really a 
secondary school patterned on the German gymnasium) in Santa 
Cruz. This venture was strongly encouraged by Provost Martin 
Braunschweig, the representative of the Prussian state church, 
54 Germans in Brazil 
and it received substantial monetary support from sources in Ger-
many until war was declared in 1917. Later, in 1926, it was moved 
to Sao Leopoldo, where it continues to exist today.37 
The German-Language Press 
Like the churches, schools, and voluntary associations, the Ger-
man-language press was also an essential structural element in 
the immigrant house of culture. The ftrst attempts to develop 
newspapers for the Germans in Brazil occurred in the 1850S, but 
these efforts required subsidies from external sources and hence 
failed to reflect the needs and interests of the immigrants. It was 
not until another decade had passed that the size of the German 
immigrant population had increased sufficiently to support a 
German-language press. The Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre and 
the Kolonie-Zeitung of Joinville were both founded in the early 
1860s. At least fifty other newspapers were started in the follow-
ing half-century. Most were short-lived, but others survived for 
many years. The majority appeared once or twice each week. By 
1900, there were at least a dozen thriving papers, including dailies 
in Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo. 38 
The German-language press, like other immigrant institutions, 
tended to reflect the same divisions that were evident in religious 
life. Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, the dynamic Evangelical pastor of 
Sao Leopoldo, founded the Deutsche Post in 1881; this paper con-
sistently supported the close connection between Protestantism 
and the maintenance of German culture in Brazil. In Rotermund's 
view, the Deutsches Volksblatt, a rival Catholic paper founded in 
1871 in Sao Leopoldo (but moved to Porto Alegre in 1891), was not 
a German paper at all, but rather a Jesuit sheet printed in German 
type. The Catholics returned the compliment by referring to Ro-
termund's Post as the Deutsche Pest. 39 Similarly repugnant to the 
37. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 136-40; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 
182-83; Hans Gehse, Die deutsche Presse in Brasilien von 1852 bis zur Gegenwart 
(Munster, 1931), 31; Hunderi Jahre Deutschtum, 325; Fouquet, "Die deutsch-
brasilianische Schule," 325. The Catholics did not found an institution specifically 
to train teachers for its German-language schools until 1924, when one was started 
in Alt-Hamburg. PorzeIt, Der deutsche Bauer, 87. 
38. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 23-26, 127. 
39. Hugo Metzler, Aus 60 Jahren (Porto Alegre, 1928), 38; interview with Egon 
Schaden, January 8, 1982, Sao Paulo. 
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Evangelicals and the Catholics alike was the anticlerical, free-
thinking Koseritz' Deutsche Zeitung, founded in 1882 in Porto Alegre 
in direct opposition to the Deutsche Zeitung. Comparable divisions 
emerged in Curitiba, the capital of Parana, where the anticlerical 
Beobachter (1890) was opposed by the Kompass, which was edited 
in a Franciscan cloister. In Sao Paulo, the Germania appealed to 
liberal, freethinking persons in the German community. 40 
In virtually all cases, the German-language newspapers re-
flected the personalities, values, and prejudices of their editors 
and publishers, who, with few exceptions, were born and edu-
cated in Germany. Most of these men actively promoted the main-
tenance of the German language and culture (because their eco-
nomic well-being depended upon it), but they were nonetheless 
loyal to Brazil and performed an invaluable service in educating 
immigrants to Brazilian ways. Most of the immigrant journalists 
made a distinction betweem Deutschtum and Deutschliindertum. 
The former term meant cherishing their German heritage and 
supporting immigrant institutions; the latter implied loyalty to 
Germany, its government, and its kaiser. 41 
Unlike most German-language newspapers in the United States, 
the German-Brazilian papers tended to avoid political involve-
ment and only rarely supported one party or another. Some re-
ceived subventions from the Brazilian government as part of its 
policy of supporting the recruitment of immigrants. Otherwise, 
according to one historian of the Germans in Brazil, the German-
language press was free of government interference, except in 
time of war. 42 
The German Brazilians developed a variety of periodicals in ad-
dition to their newspapers. The most influential of these were re-
ligious; the Catholics, Evangelicals, and Lutherans each had their 
own magazines intended for lay readers.43 Several periodicals for 
40. Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 285; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 202-12; 
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 65-66, 147-49; Erwin Buchmann, "Die deutschspra-
chige Presse in Brasilien," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, IV (1956), 220. 
41. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 206. 
42. Carl F. Wittke, The German-language Press in America (Lexington, Ky., 1957); 
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 205. See also Karl J. R. Arndt and May E. Olson, 
The German Language Press of the Americas, 1732-1968, Vol. II, History and Bibliogra-
phy (Pullach-Miinchen, 1973),91-221. 
43. Examples include Der Christenbote (1908), a monthly published in Blumenau 
for Evangelicals; St. Paulusblatt (1912), intended for Catholic readers in Rio Grande 
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farmers and one for persons in commerce and industry also ap-
peared before World War I. 44 One of the most important products 
of the German-Brazilian press was the so-called Kalender, an an-
nual, book-length publication that included a variety of articles 
concerning daily life, in addition to an almanac and compilations 
of standard information. Often a review of the events of the previ-
ous year was included. The calendars were widely read, even 
though they, like the periodicals, were usually prepared for spe-
cific religious constituencies. 45 
Because of its role in the development of ethnic identity, in the 
support of immigrant voluntary associations, and as a means of 
intragroup communication, the German-language press was a 
strong force for the perpetuation of the immigrant culture. Pre-
sumably it was also significant in the maintenance of the use of 
the German language. Yet it is not entirely clear how important 
the press really was for the remote rural German districts. For ex-
ample, a German-language press never developed in Espirito 
Santo, where most of the immigrants were clustered in rural ghet-
toes and isolated as well from their much more numerous fellows 
in the southern states. Despite this lack, the Portuguese language 
made few inroads in such districts; immigrant language and cus-
toms were retained for generations. Even former slaves and iso-
lated Luso-Brazilians whom chance had placed among the Ger-
mans learned to speak the prevailing German dialect, sometimes 
even as their first language.46 
The many dialects that the Germans ordinarily spoke in their 
daily activities and in their homes tended to become corrupted 
and mixed with one another. Only in districts where the domi-
nant majority came from the same area in Germany could the dia-
do SuI; and the Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt (19<J6), published for Missouri 
Synod Lutherans. Rotermund's Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo published a Sunday 
supplement entitled Sontagsblatt fUr die evangelischen Gemeinden in Brasilien (1887). 
Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 208-209; Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 27-31. 
44. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 31-33. 
45. An example is Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien fUr das Jahr 1914, pub-
lished by Rotermund in an edition of 12,750 copies. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 
35-37; Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwanderer, 210-11. 
46. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 20; Jordan, "Aspects of German 
Colonization," 350. 
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lect be preserved. Dois Irmaos was such a place: The Hunsriicker 
dialect (spoken west of the Rhine and south of the Mosel in Ger-
many) prevailed into the 1960s. But even in homogeneous com-
munities, Portuguese words found their way into everyday speech. 
Erruno Willems has estimated that approximately five hundred 
Portuguese terms were gradually absorbed into the language of 
the German Brazilians. Most of these words concerned political 
and economic activity for which there was no suitable German vo-
cabulary. Borrowings were especially numerous in aspects of the 
horse culture that Germans adopted and adapted from the Luso-
Brazilians.47 
Linguistic Acculturation 
In Brazil as elsewhere, the linguistic acculturation of an immi-
grant population is closely associated with the number and qual-
ity of interpersonal contacts with members of the host or receiv-
ing society. Data from the 1940 census show that in Rio Grande do 
SuI, where the Germans had relatively few contacts with speakers 
of Portuguese, 97.6 percent of the German-Brazilian families ha-
bitually spoke German in their homes; in Sao Paulo, where the 
Germans were well dispersed within the huge city, the proportion 
dropped to 55.1 percent, even though the European-born com-
pared with the Brazilian-born group was much larger there than 
in Rio Grande do SuI. 48 However, these data do not reveal the pro-
portion of habitual German-speakers who could also speak Por-
tuguese. Only in the most isolated rural districts did the children 
grow up ignorant of Portuguese. Yet generalizations about the fail-
ure of German Brazilians to acculturate linguistically are frequently 
based on impressions drawn from such atypical environments. 
In contrast to the people in isolated rural areas, the craftsmen, 
47. Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 34-40; Emilio Willems, "Lin-
guistic Changes in German-Brazilian Communities," Acta Americana, I (October-
December, 1943), 455; Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 127; Emilio 
Willems, "Acculturation and the Horse Complex among German-Brazilians," 
American Anthropologist, n.s., XLVI (April-June, 1944), 158-60. See also Carlos H. 
Oberacker, Jr., "Transformac;6es da lingua alema no Brasil," in Egon Schaden 
(ed.), Homem, cultura e sociedade no Brasil: Sele~6es da Revista de Antropologica (2nd 
ed.; Petropolis, 1977), 383-432. 
48. Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants," 221. 
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industrial workers, and professional persons in the cities and 
large towns learned Portuguese, not merely as an economic ne-
cessity, but also as a matter of social prestige. For educated urban-
ites, the inability to speak Portuguese became a source of social 
deprivation. Persons with social aspirations naturally perceived 
the language of the dominant Luso-Brazilian society as presti-
gious. Many eagerly shed the identifying marks of German eth-
nicity; given names, for example, were often modified or changed 
to Portuguese equivalents. By the time of World War I, there were 
undoubtedly thousands of descendants of German immigrants 
who were unable to speak German and who, despite their family 
names, were well integrated into Brazilian society. Unfortunately, 
there was no way to determine the size of the group.49 
In general, it appears that rapid linguistic acculturation was asso-
ciated with urban residence, employment in the industrial sector, 
high level of education, youth, and membership in the Catholic 
church. 50 There were, however, certain cross pressures, especially 
for the middle and upper classes. Such persons often felt disdain 
for Luso-Brazilian culture, believing that their German heritage 
was superior. At the same time, they had many contacts with 
Luso-Brazilian society because of their education and social sta-
tus, and this produced a strong tendency toward assimilation. 
The Role of the Family 
The basic unit in the social structure of the German-Brazilian 
population was, of course, the family. Isolation tended to enhance 
its importance in the rural areas, where the attainment of material 
success was largely dependent on the labor that children contrib-
uted to the agricultural enterprise. Thus large families were an 
economic asset, and comments about the fecundity of German-
Brazilian families abound. Spectacular examples have been re-
corded: Hans Adam Schmidt, who immigrated at the age of six-
teen to Santa Catarina in 1829, had 829 descendants a century 
later, of whom 748 were living; Jacob Goedert, who arrived in the 
49. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 448; Benjamin F. Schapelle, The German Ele-
ment in Brazil: Colonies and Dialect (Philadelphia, 1917), 33. 
50. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 462. 
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same year at age ten, had 461. More meaningful, however, is the 
calculation that up to 1914 the average number of children in Ger-
man immigrant families was 4.7. According to one estimate, the 
birth rate among members of the Evangelical church in Rio 
Grande do SuI immediately preceding World War I was 4.5 times 
the death rate. 51 
Large families were customary among both Catholics and Prot-
estants. Impressionistic evidence suggests, however, that exog-
amy, or marriage outside the ethnic group, was more frequently a 
Catholic than a Protestant phenomenon. Following a trip to Brazil 
immediately after World War I, the American historian Clarence 
Haring reported that German Protestants were strongly race con-
scious, despised the "dark Brazilians," and rarely married outside 
their church. By contrast, according to Willems, German Catho-
lics were more likely to marry non-German Catholics than Ger-
man Protestants.52 In the solidly German districts endogamy was 
standard, but in the marginal areas a different pattern emerged. A 
study of the records of the Catholic parish of Ijui, located in an 
ethnically mixed area in the western part of Rio Grande do SuI, 
revealed that only 48 percent of the marriages involving German 
parishioners from 1899 to 1932 were between German men and 
German women. The remainder were to Italian (25 percent), Luso-
Brazilian (15.6 percent), and Polish (11.4 percent) partners. Most 
frequent among the exogamous unions were those between 
German women and Italian men (17 percent). Even though Luso-
Brazilians were apparently numerous in this parish, they were 
considered inferior partners because they did not share the Ger-
man work ethic. At the same time, mixed marriages among Prot-
estants in the Ijui area were reportedly rare. 53 
Exogamy was also common among urban residents, especially 
51. Reinhard Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil: A German View," Quarterly 
Journal of Inter-American Relations, I (July, 1939), 8-10. See also Artur Hehl Neiva, 
"Uma familia teuto-brasileira," in I. Col6quio, 85-95. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 146. 
52. Haring, The Germans in South America, 38; Willems, "Assimilation of Ger-
man Immigrants," 129. See also Emilio Willems, "A miscigena~iio entre brasileiros 
de ascendencia germanica," Revista Sociologia, XV (1953), 95-108. Willems' data 
are from a later period, chiefly the 1940s. 
53. Porzelt, Der deutsche Bauer, 95; Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil," 
11-12. 
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A typicaIJy large German family living in the Taquanl munidpio of Rio Grande do Sui 
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 
industrial workers. Conditions in the factory promoted social 
uniformity and equality in wages and living standards. Similarly, 
there was a greater inclination to marry outside the group among 
the well educated. Koseritz himself provides the most distin-
guished example of a German intellectual who married a Luso-
Brazilian. 54 
Conclusion 
The social structure that evolved among the Teuto-Brazilians dur-
ing the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was thus the 
product of the adaptation of the German immigrant culture within 
the social environment of Brazil. Just as geographical conditions 
in that vast, tropical land imposed certain limits on German immi-
grant settlement and forced adaptation in economic behavior, so 
54. Willems, "Assimilation of German Immigrants," 129; Willems, "A mis-
cigenac;ao entre brasileiros," 108; Maack, "The Germans of South Brazil," 12. 
Maack, a German geographer and an apologist for Nazism, considered Koseritz's 
marriage "tragic" because, as a consequence, his descendants were lost to the 
German-Brazilian population. 
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the social environment of Luso-Catholic Brazil acted on the immi-
grants in their new world. Immigrant churches quickly became 
the most important institutions among the German Brazilians. 
Differences in religious belief in relation to Brazilian culture in 
turn not only influenced the character of synodical organizations, 
schools, voluntary associations, and the immigrant press but also 
led to differences in linguistic acculturation and marital assimi-
lation between Catholics and Protestants. Diversity within the 
Teuto-Brazilian subsociety is further revealed by differences in the 
assimilational experiences of urban immigrants and those who re-
mained in isolated rural ghettoes, where the quantity and quality 
of interpersonal contacts were different. Yet, despite these intra-
group variations, the Germans were commonly and stereotypi-
cally perceived by persons outside the group as having uniform 
characteristics and behavior. 
3 
The German Ethnic Group 
in Brazilian Society, 1890-1917 
By THE LAST DECADE of the nineteenth century, the Ger-man ethnic group in Brazil had become a society within a 
society-a large, diverse, and structured community with 
institutions, language, values, and folkways that differed signifi-
cantly from those of the host society. Because of the accidents of 
time and place, the Germans had been allowed to develop their 
own society without much interference, and in general they were 
well received and respected during the last years of the empire. 
European ideas were valued for the contributions they could 
make to Brazilian culture; German culture, science, and education 
were often considered among the best in the world. 1 
With the advent of the republic, however, attitudes toward the 
German Brazilians began to change. The difference was partly a 
matter of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its au-
thority and its ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the 
diffusion of political power among the states and the development 
of political parties on a state basis. The abolition of slavery in 1888 
had created a labor shortage, chiefly in the central and southern 
states, that the government had sought to relieve by recruiting im-
1. Freyre, Order and Progress, 56-57, 123-24, 188-89. Freyre has noted that, of 
all the immigrant groups, the Italians were the most desired, the most imitated, 
and the most highly praised by Brazilian leaders who in those years hoped the 
influx of European immigrants would "whiten" the population. Since Italians were 
closer than Germans to Luso-Brazilians on a sociocultural distance scale, they 
were less separatistic and thus more capable of producing the desired genetic 
effect (see pp. 256-57). Cf. Skidmore, Black into White. 
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migrants from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Germany. At the same 
time, the modernization of the economic structure of Brazil was 
under way, especially in the south. With the expansion of indus-
try in relation to the production of agricultural commodities came 
economic and social dislocations that were new to Brazilians. As 
the world has witnessed so often in the twentieth century, mod-
ernization produced new social problems and tensions, espe-
cially in the cities. Some Brazilians, doubting the capacity of their 
society to absorb the flood of immigrants, demanded that the 
newcomers learn to conform to Brazilian ways. Others urged the 
revitalization of Latin Catholic culture, which in their view had 
been weakened by the infusion of foreign ideas and attitudes. 2 
Nativism 
Nativist sentiments fomented heated disputes, some within the 
German community itself, others among Germans, Italians, and 
Luso-Brazilians. It was a period of much strife, unrest, outrage, 
and even murder. 3 The unstable conditions of the early republican 
era as they affected ethnic groups are revealed in an incident that 
occurred in Porto Alegre in 1895. A radical, freethinking German 
lawyer, Germano Hasslocher, attacked individual Jesuit priests in 
the Portuguese-language press (Gazeta da Tarde) in a manner the 
Catholics deemed despicable. Hugo Metzler, the publisher of the 
Catholic paper Deutsches Volksblatt, thereupon reviled Hasslocher 
as a political apostate. Further insults were followed by threats of 
violence. Meanwhile Metzler, loyal Catholic that he was, had also 
criticized Italians on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of Italian unification (which had been achieved at the expense of 
the papacy). Hasslocher's response was to use Metzler's editorial 
to incite a mob of celebrating Italians, and on September 29, 1895, 
they destroyed Metzler's printshop.4 
Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of Comtean Positiv-
ism that infused the thought of many of the new republican lead-
2. Freyre, Order and Progress, 123, 197; E. Bradford Bums, A History of Brazil 
(New York, 1970), 250-54. For a general discussion, see Brunn, Deutschland und 
Brasilien, 201-17. 
3. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 148-55; Haring, The Germans in South America, 40. 
4. Metzler, Aus 60 Jahren, 38; Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 155. 
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ers. The commitment of the Brazilian Positivists was not merely to 
progress but also to order, which they understood to include a 
harmony among the classes, races, ethnic groups, and sexes. 
They could applaud the diverse origins of Brazilian society and 
culture and yet insist that a new unity-a distinctively Brazilian 
unity-had to be achieved, by force of dictatorship if necessary. 
Thus, the Constitution of 1891 generously granted citizenship to 
all immigrants who wanted it; at the same time, they felt strongly 
that the newcomers should make a conscious effort to assimilate. 
According to this view, Luso-Brazilian society needed to resist the 
tendency of such ethnic groups as the Germans to remain sepa-
rate. To speak a different language, to attend different schools, to 
eat different foods, to wear different clothing, to worship different 
gods-all these actions were undesirable because they implied 
being not merely different but superior. 5 
Nativism also thrived on envy. While there is no record of per-
sistent cultural conflict based on ethnic differences, one mayas-
sume that some Brazilians of the less privileged classes regarded 
the Germans with resentment and jealously. Like any other large 
social grouping, the Germans encompassed a wide variation in 
education, skills, health, and working habits. In fact, large num-
bers experienced a deterioration in socioeconomic status as they 
struggled to survive in the Brazilian environment. But the strong 
image among some Brazilians was that the Germans were better 
housed and fed; that their system of private and parochial schools 
was often superior to what passed for public education in Brazil at 
that time; and that their homes and persons were cleaner and 
healthier. The Germans also seemed willing to work very hard, at 
least in contrast to the impoverished caboclos, among whom labor 
was intermittent and subject to long and frequent interruptions. 
Moreover, the Germans were savers. In order to counter the ef-
fects of inheritance laws that tended to break up farm properties 
into unprofitable units, the German colonos often saved diligently 
in order to provide their sons with agricultural land. Value con-
flicts were apparent in many other aspects of life as well. Willems 
5. Freyre, Order and Progress, 14; Joao Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil, 
trans. Suzette Macedo (Berkeley, 191'4),82-175; Fernando de Azevedo, Brazilian 
Culture (New York, 1950), 159-60,414-18; Freyre, New World in the Tropics, 154; 
Jose Hon6rio Rodrigues, The Brazilians: Their Character and Aspirations (Austin, 
191'7), C)6. 
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has pointed out, for example, that whereas Luso-Brazilians were 
tolerant of prostitution but intolerant of sexual intercourse for un-
married women, Teuto-Brazilians were opposed to prostitution 
but permitted premarital intercourse under controlled conditions 
that normally led to marriage. 6 . 
Nativism displays itself most naturally in the field of politics. 
Even though the Teuto-Brazilians had experienced a great deal of 
success economically, their participation in the political process 
was quite another matter. Government at all levels remained firmly 
in the hands of the Luso-Brazilian landowners and in Rio Grande 
do SuI their power was virtually complete. They usually domi-
nated the local leader of the established party. A rural political 
boss delivered the votes required of him, prevented the opposi-
tion from voting, controlled patronage, and dispensed favors. 
When enticement failed, he might resort to fraud and violence. 7 It 
was difficult for the Germans to find a place in such a system. 
Most of the time they were happy enough to be left alone without 
harassment. 
Political apathy has, in fact, been frequently noted as a charac-
teristic of German immigrants everywhere and should be under-
stood sociologically as an aspect of marginality.8 In southern Bra-
zil, where the cultural isolation of Germans was especially strong, 
social pressure often worked against political participation. For 
6. Although Emilio Willems is in no way responsible for my interpretation 
here, I have relied in part on his numerous works and have modified my views in 
consequence of private correspondence with him. See Willems, A aculturar;iio dos 
alemiies no Brasil. Among his English-language articles, see "Assimilation of Ger-
man Immigrants," 125-32, and "Some Aspects of Cultural Conflict and Accultura-
tion," 375-84. 
7. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 118-20; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 554-55; 
Max Dedekind, Brasilien, das Ziel deutscher Auswanderer und die Deutsche Evange-
lische Kirche in Brasilien (Elberfeld, Germany, 1924), 9. Cf. Victor Nunes Leal, Coro-
nelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in Brazil, trans. from the 
Portuguese edition (1949) by June Henfrey (Cambridge, 1977), 1-25. 
8. Egon Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer-Ein Problem," Staden-Jahrbuch: 
Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, II (1954), 193; Niemeyer, Die Deutschen in Brasilien, 89; 
Arpad Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes e seus descendentes na vida politica 
Brasileira," in I. Col6quio, 247-61; Schutz, "Imigra<;ao alerna," 307-308. Cf. Freder-
ick C. Luebke, "Politics and Missouri Synod Lutherans: A Historiographical Re-
view," Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly, XLV (May, 1972), 141-58; and Nor-
man A. Graebner, "Lutherans and Politics," in John E. Groh and Robert H. Smith 
(eds.), The Lutheran Church in North American Life (St. Louis, 1979), 12-30. 
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example, one German teacher in Rio Grande do SuI felt con-
strained to apologize for having become a Brazilian citizen. He ex-
plained that such a step was prerequisite to becoming an instruc-
tor in a government school, a position to which he aspired.9 As 
the descendants of northern Europeans in a land marked strongly 
by southern European culture, the German Brazilians were an ob-
viously different sort of people. In their separate and isolated 
world, participation in the political process was usually not con-
sidered very important. Mostly they were ignored by the ruling 
classes, and if they attempted to become involved in politics, they 
were easily dominated. 
Throughout the empire period, the majority of German colo-
nos-perhaps 75 percent-never bothered to acquire citizenship. 
For example, in 1852, there were only 165 voters of German stock 
in the entire Sao Leopoldo municipio. The majority were of peas-
ant stock and few had traditions of political participation in Ger-
many. Most were unaware of the rights that were at least tech-
nically theirs. 10 
It was the redoubtable Karl von Koseritz who led the fight for 
political rights and greater political participation among the Teuto-
Brazilians. He was among the first of the Germans, and the first 
non-Catholic, to be elected to the provincial assembly of Rio 
Grande do SuI. In his speeches and publications, he repeatedly 
urged the Germans to become naturalized and to vote. Like many 
of his counterparts in the United States at that time, Koseritz also 
urged his fellow immigrants to organize themselves into a politi-
cal bloc or, as circumstances might demand, a political party, ar-
guing that this was the only way the Germans could enjoy the po-
litical power that was commensurate with their numbers. In 1883 
he confidently but prematurely declared that the Germans had 
been drawn into public life; as he pointed out, they had been 
elected to the councils of several cities and held important posi-
tions in the national guard. By the end of the 188os, four Germans 
had served in the provincial assembly of Rio Grande do SuI. 11 
9. "Anteil des Deutschtums an der Politik," in Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 179. 
10. Hundert 'Jahre Deutschtum, 179; Szilvassy, "Participa~ao dos alemaes," 249. 
11. Koseritz, Bi/der aus Brasilien, 14°,360; Oberacker, Carlos von Koseritz, 51-69; 
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 147; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 179; Roche, La colonisa-
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Neutralizing Teuto-Brazilian Power 
Shortly after the establishment of the republic in 1889, all immi-
grants were granted the option of becoming citizens with the 
right to vote, provided that they could meet a literacy require-
ment. Promising though this enfranchisement was, it did not lead 
to political acculturation. Since the literacy rate of German Brazil-
ians soared above that of the nation as a whole, they represented a 
potential threat to the political dominance of the estancieiros-the 
established landowner class-in districts where German settle-
ments were concentrated. In Rio Grande do SuI, the regime of 
Julio do Castilhos and Antonio Borges de Medeiros (with its Posi-
tivist emphasis on order and commitment to social progress 
through republican dictatorship) solved the problem by negotiat-
ing a sort of gentleman's agreement: Teuto-Brazilians' electoral 
support for the ruling party was exchanged for cultural liberty, 
that is, freedom from any coercive program designed to integrate 
them into the political life of the local communities, the state, or 
the nation. 12 
Electoral docility on the part of the Germans was guaranteed in 
Rio Grande do SuI by a second step-the gerrymandering of elec-
toral districts in 1897. Even though the Germans constituted 24.7 
percent of the registered voters in the state, they were distributed 
among three districts so that the chance of their electing one of 
their number was seriously reduced. A subsequent reapportion-
ment in 1914 preserved the minority status of Germans in all elec-
toral districts. So effective was this arrangement that throughout 
the republican era from 1889 to World War I, rarely more than 
tion allemande, 534, 555; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 250. Actually, 
Koseritz might have been more successful if he had not been so impatient and 
intolerant of the church people, whom he inevitably alienated with his barrage of 
criticism aimed at Jesuits and the Protestant clergy. 
12. Kohlhepp, "Die deutschstammigen Siedlungsgebiete im siidbrasiliani-
schen Staate Santa Catarina," 220; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 250; 
Freyre, Order and Progress, 270. Freyre did not approve of the arrangement. He 
wrote that "descendants of Germans were allowed liberties or privileges entirely 
incompatible with Brazilian cultural basic unity (such as the right to have schools 
where Portuguese was not taught) by politicians who needed German votes in 
order to dominate or control their particular state" (Freyre, New World in the Trop-
ics, 102). 
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three deputies in the state assembly bore German names-ap-
proximately a third of the seats their numbers warranted.13 
Such steps to neutralize the political potential of the Teuto-
Brazilians did not go far enough to satisfy the concerns of some 
Rio Grande do SuI politicians. They believed that measures had to 
be taken to break up the existing colonies and to guarantee that 
new settlements would consist of a mixture of ethnic groups. 
Some nativists wanted to accomplish these goals through a com-
mission that was established in 1897 to investigate the validity of 
the land titles held by the immigrants-Italians as well as Ger-
mans: It was a fact that many immigrants had acquired their land 
from swindlers; they could base their landownership only on 
documents that had been falsified earlier by public officials. Natu-
rally, such titles were thrown out, to the great consternation and 
bitterness of the immigrants, who perceived the work of the ver-
ification commission as a poorly disguised effort to force them off 
their land and break up their colonies.14 
A decade later, another method was devised to restrict the 
growth of immigrant colonies, this time at the national level. In 
1909, Congress passed a law specifying that at least 10 percent of 
the land in an area of small-farmer settlement had to be owned by 
native-born Brazilians. The effect of this legislation was minimal 
because by that time the great majority of the German colonos were 
Brazilian-born. 15 
In some respects, the Teuto-Brazilians fared better in Santa Ca-
tarina than they did in Rio Grande do SuI. The political power of 
the small landowners (as distinguished from the estancieiros) was 
greater in this smaller and poorer state, and the Germans bene-
fited accordingly. Several German colonos attained a political promi-
nence in Santa Catarina that was denied them in Rio Grande do 
Sul. The most distinguished was Lauro Muller. Born in Itajaf of 
immigrant parents, Muller received a military education and be-
came a follower of a well-known Positivist~ Benjamim Constant 
I}. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 552-54, 568; Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 
1}1-}}. 
14. Monckmeier, Die deutsche uberseeische Auswanderung, 214; Gehse, Die deutsche 
Presse, 160. 
15. Karl Heinrich Oberacker, Jr., "Die sozialgeschichtliche Bedeutung der 
deutschen Einwanderung," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, II (1954), 179. 
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Magalhaes. He served as an aide to Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, 
a founder of the republic, and after the coup of 1889, Deodoro ap-
pointed Muller, then twenty-six years of age, as governor of Santa 
Catarina. Muller was subsequently elected to the same office 
three times and also served the federal government as minister of 
commerce in the Rodrigues Alves administration and as foreign 
minister from 1912 to 1917 under presidents Hermes da Fonseca 
and Wenceslau Braz. Other second-generation Germans were ac-
tive in Santa Catarina politics, including Muller's first cousin, 
General Felippe Schmidt, who served as governor from 1914 to 
1918, and the four Konder brothers, who were active in state and 
federal politics in the 1920S and 1930S.16 
Along with these personal successes was a counterpoint of hos-
tility. Positivism was less of a political force in Santa Catarina than 
it was in Rio Grande do Sui, and the immigrants were more highly 
concentrated in communities such as Blumenau, Joinville, and 
Brusque. Because the threat posed by the colonos to the ruling 
Luso-Brazilians had not been neutralized as in Rio Grande do SuI, 
tensions mounted in Santa Catarina and programs of assimilation 
were ardently espoused. 
Several prominent Luso-Brazilian politicians in Santa Catarina 
spoke out against further growth of the German colonies. One of 
the governors in this period, Hermio Luz, condemned the Ger-
mans severely for their separatism. He was especially troubled by 
the German Protestants because, in his view, they wanted only to 
remain German. Everything they did seemed to reflect their at-
tachment to Germany; they wanted no other fatherland. Luz was 
particularly galled by the Evangelical clergy's opposition to mar-
riages of Germans and Luso-Brazilians and by the refusal of Ger-
mans in general to adopt Brazilian customs. 17 
16. Marcus Konder, Lauro Maller (Itajai, 1944); Rodrigo Octavio, "Lauro 
Mueller," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geografico Brasileiro, CCLXV (1964), 172-88; 
Oberacker, Der deutsche Beitrag, 401-405; Martin Fischer, "0 problema da conser-
vac;ao da cultura alema," in I. Col6quio, 344; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch; "A morte do 
Senador Felippe Schmidt," unidentified newspaper clipping, May 10, 1930, in In-
stituto Hans Staden, sao Paulo. 
17. Luz quoted in Martin Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung des deutschen 
Schulwesens in Siidbrasilien," in Geissler (ed.), Die Kulturbedeutung, 51. See also 
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 217. 
Germans in Brazil 
In Santa Catarina, as in the United States, the nativist attack on 
immigrant institutions focused on private schools. Whereas in the 
United States, Catholic parochial schools were targeted for control 
if not elimination, in Brazil it was the Protestant schools that were 
found objectionable. Another important difference is that in the 
United States the public schools were well developed and numeri-
cally preponderant, while in Santa Catarina they were an inade-
quate minority. Given this circumstance, any effort to expand and 
improve the public school system was perceived by Teuto-Brazil-
ian leaders as an attack on the schools. At least two laws, passed 
in 1904 and 1907 by the Santa Catarina legislature, was intended 
to assist in the development of government schools and the regu-
lation of private schools. But it was not until 1911 when Orestes 
Guimaraes was appointed inspector of schools that effective con-
trol was initiated. IS 
Evidently, private school teachers and administrators were less 
than cooperative with state officials. In 1913, Santa Catarina en-
acted legislation requiring them to supply all information con-
cerning curriculum and attendance statistics requested by state 
officials and to permit inspection of their schools. The law further 
specified that private schools were to observe national holidays 
and to comply with hygiene regulations. It expressly recognized 
the freedom of schools that received no government support to 
develop their own curricula, but any institution that accepted 
subventions from either the state or the municipio was required to 
use Portuguese as the language of instruction. Remarkably mild 
by present-day standards, this law was sharply condemned, espe-
cially by the Protestant clergy, who saw it as a sinister effort to 
strangle their schools. 19 
The German Peril 
Among Luso-Brazilian leaders of the educated and governing 
classes, there was a growing concern that the Germans in the 
18. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche StelIung," 51; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 223; 
Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 356; Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 184. 
19. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche StelIung," 51; Schroder, Brasilien und Witten-
berg, 356; Dedekind, Brasilien, 24. Many Brazilians admitted that if the Germans 
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southern states were becoming so numerous and so powerful that 
they could never be assimilated. Early in the twentieth century, 
their fears were heightened by much discussion of the "German 
peril" -a belief that Germany had set itself upon a course of world-
wide imperialism, based in part on the presence of German immi-
grants in various underdeveloped countries, including Brazil. Be-
fore and after the turn of the century, German aggressiveness was 
observed in the South Pacific, China, the Philippines, and the 
Caribbean. When in 1904 the Germans threatened the integrity of 
Venezuela, Brazil's neighbor to the north, in a debt-collection con-
troversy, alarmists in Europe, the United States, and certainly Bra-
zil feared that Germany was taking the first steps in a plan de-
signed to culminate in the creation of a German protectorate over 
southern Brazil and possibly an independent state that would be 
German in language and culture. 20 
The Brazilians' suspicion of German intentions was not un-
founded. Already in the 1840s, there were propagandists in Ger-
many who hoped to encourage German emigrants to go not to the 
United States but to southern Brazil and the La Plata district of 
Argentina and Uruguay. If sufficient numbers could be directed 
there, German language and culture would predominate and the 
people could establish a state that would become rivals of German 
industry rather than consumers of German goods, as they were 
likely to be in undeveloped Brazil. Still others maintained that the 
typical German emigrant lacked the ability to withstand the as-
similative power of Anglo-American culture; he and his descen-
dants would be completely un-Germanized within a few genera-
tions. Brazil, by contrast, offered a setting in which Deutschtum 
could be rooted permanently. 21 
had failed to assimilate, it was not their fault, since the government had failed to 
provide Portuguese-language schools. For example, see Truda, A colonisa(;iio allemii, 
141 - 66. 
20. For a general discussion of the "German peril," see Brunn, Deutschland und 
Brasilien, 201-18. 
21. F. Schmidt, Grundzuge einer geregelten Auswanderung der Deutschen, mit beson-
derer Rucksicht aUf Sudbrasilien (Hamburg, 1842); F. Schmidt, Die geregelte Auswan-
derung nach Brasilien und ihr erster gliinzder Erfolg (Rudolstadt, Germany, 1852); 
Wilhelm Georg Roscher, Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung (Leipzig and 
Heidelberg, 1856), 358. Cf. Sudhaus, Deutschland und die Auswanderung, 48-50. 
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German cultural chauvinists continued to beat the same drum 
until, early in the twentieth century, resistance to acculturation 
became a common theme. Teuto-Brazilians could read, for ex-
ample, about Hermann Leyfer, a German journalist who argued 
that cultural characteristics were inborn, inherited, and inalien-
able and that a person retained them to death, regardless of resi-
dence or other circumstance. "A German remains a German," he 
wrote. "To deny one's nationality is to deny one's self." Others car-
ried the argument farther, asserting that maintaining the German 
language and culture was the duty of Teuto-Brazilians because 
they would thereby enhance and strengthen national culture, 
even as they contributed to Brazil's prosperity by their industry. 
Some writers recommended resistance to assimilation on the 
grounds that Brazilian culture was worthless. Brazil, wrote Wal-
ther Kundt, "is a country that has produced nothing memorable 
in any field, including economics and culture." Furthermore, he 
continued, Brazilians are unable "to establish a properly func-
tioning means of transportation and communication, regulate 
their fmancial affairs, guarantee justice, build a fleet, or maintain 
an army other than one that is really nothing more than a privi-
leged band of robbers." 22 
In Sao Leopoldo, Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund insisted on German 
racial superiority, arguing that Teuto-Brazilians must remain exclu-
sive and racially pure because miscegenation could only introduce 
decadence. "We Germans are an elite," he wrote in his Deutsche 
Post in 1897, "and can fulfill our cultural mission only when we do 
not mix with Latinate people [romanische Rassen]."23 
Meanwhile in Germany the noisy, chauvinistic Pan-German 
League had, by 1900, united twenty thousand supernationalists 
from the urban middle classes and fueled new fears of German 
imperialism. In its widely distributed publications, this organiza-
tion emphasized the cultural kinship of Germans all over the 
world and agitated vociferously for a colonial empire, for an en-
larged navy, for war as an instrument of national policy, and for 
22. Leyfer quoted in Joinville Zeitung, October 21, 1896; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto 
Alegre), February 24, 1900; Walther Kundt, Brasilien und seine Bedeutung fUr 
Deutschlands Handel und Industrie (Berlin, H)03), 18. In 1905, A Federa~iio of Porto 
Alegre published an article summarizing such Pan-Germanist comments. See 
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 206. 
23. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 186. 
Germans in Brazilian Society 73 
the preservation of the German language and culture in German 
settlements overseas. A symptom rather than a cause of the ram-
pant nationalism of the time, the Pan-German League was identi-
fied by English and French propagandists as the coordinating 
agency of German imperialism. Although the league's importance 
was grossly exaggerated, a flood of articles exposing the alleged 
Pan-Germanist conspiracy soon appeared in ne~spapers and pe-
riodicals in Europe, America, and elsewhere, climaxing with the 
publication in 1913 of Pan-Germanism by an American histor-
ian, Roland G. Usher. Typically filled with misinformation and 
overstatement, these materials repeatedly drew upon the same 
sources-either German chauvinists or French and English coun-
terpropagandists-and as a result they succeeded in stirring up 
much anti-German sentiment. 24 
Literature of this kind also appeared in Brazil. By far the most 
significant example is a short book by a noted Brazilian literary 
critic, Sylvio Romero, which was published in 1906. In 0 allema-
nismo no sui do Brasil, Romero, who is distinguished for his recog-
nition of the African contribution to Brazilian culture, warned his 
countrymen of the "German peril," outlined possible steps to 
combat the threat, and urged that measures be taken to assimilate 
the German colonos into Brazilian society. Undoubtedly Romero's 
book contributed to the efforts of the government during the pre-
World War I decade to limit the potential political power of the 
Teuto-Brazilians, to break up the exclusive character of the Ger-
man settlements, and to improve the quality of the public schools 
so that they could indeed function as agents of assimilation.25 
24. Mildred S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914, Studies in His-
tory, Economics, and Public Law, CXII (New York, 1924); Roland G. Usher, Pan-
Germanism (Boston, 1913). For samples of such material, see Frederick W. Wile, 
"German Colonization in Brazil," Fortnightly Review, LXXIX (January, H)06), 
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The Portuguese-language press also warned against the "Ger-
man peril." In August, 1904, for example, the Correia do Povo of 
Porto Alegre published extracts from several nationalistic news-
papers in Germany to illustrate that Pan-Germanists considered 
the three southern states to be within Germany's sphere of influ-
ence. 26 Brazilians were especially offended by a remark of Gustav 
Schmoller, a German professor, regarding the options available to 
the three southernmost states: remaining a part of Brazil, becom-
ing an independent country, or coming "into closer relation" with 
the German Empire. 27 Concern was frequently expressed about 
the opening of German consulates in southern cities and about the 
subsidies the Prussian state church (always described as the Ger-
man goverment) was providing for German Evangelical schools in 
Brazil. 
German-language newspapers in Brazil were by no means 
united in support of Pan-Germanism. The movement had its par-
tisans, of course, but most Teuto-Brazilian journalists were more 
moderate. They believed that it was possible, even desirable, to 
maintain the German language and culture in Brazil, but within 
the framework of loyal Brazilian citizenship. So keen was the op-
position to Pan-Germanism in Porto Alegre, for example, that one 
weekly newspaper, the Rio Grandenser Vaterland, was founded on 
the proposition that the Teuto-Brazilian fatherland was Rio Grande 
do SuI and Brazil, not Germany. This paper expressly declared its 
intention to do battle with Pan-Germanism and its advocates; 
having the support of prominent and powerful Riograndenser 
politicians, it thrived and continued to publish for many years. 2B 
To the German imperial government, the Pan-Germanists were 
de Magalhiies wrote a piece for English readers, but it merely repeated typical 
anti-German propaganda. See his "Germany and South America: A Brazilian 
View," Nineteenth Century and After, LXXXI (January, 1917),67-80. See also Theodor 
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26. Ernest Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande hors d'Europe (Paris, 1908), 144-45. 
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a nuisance. Count Bernhard von Biilow, the German chancellor, 
explicitly repudiated the league. In a speech before the German 
Reichstag on March 19, 1904, he denied unequivocally any inten-
tion to annex territory anywhere in South America. "In Brazil," 
commented von Billow in an interview with a Brazilian journalist, 
"we wish to form no state within a state, and hope that the Ger-
mans there will become useful members of their country." The 
same message was brought to the Teuto-Brazilians by Prince Henry 
of Prussia, the brother of the kaiser, when he stopped in Brazil on 
a world tour a short time earlier.29 Such spokesmen for the Ger-
man government readily admitted that while their country had no 
political aspirations in the Western world, it had a strong eco-
nomic interest and that Germany, like France and England, was 
eager to develop its trade relations with South American countries. 
Had the German government wanted to assume a political role 
in Brazil, the opportunity came in connection with the visit of the 
German cruiser Panther to the port of Itajai, Santa Catarina, in 
1905. When a sailor failed to return to the ship at a designated 
time, the ship's commander, Count von Saurma-Jeltsch, ordered 
several officers and a dozen marines to go ashore and apprehend 
the deserter, which they did, but not without resistance. The ac-
tion was a clear violation of Brazilian sovereignty, and Baron Rio 
Branco, the Brazilian foreigner minister, quickly demanded an 
apology. Meanwhile the Brazilian press became highly agitated 
over the affair. The German minister in Rio de Janeiro at first tried 
to defend Saurma's action, but Chancellor von Billow successfully 
insisted, despite Kaiser Wilhelm's reluctance to discipline the 
commander, that the German government comply and that he be 
recalled. 30 
Thus, during the decade before the outbreak of World War I, 
Brazilians at all levels of society, from the ruling classes to the de-
spised caboclos, had begun to perceive the Germans, both Teuto-
Brazilians and Reichsdeutsche, as a problem-an element that 
threatened the equilibrium of Brazilian society.31 The Germans 
. 29. Chamberlain, "Germany in Southern Brazil," 1021-22. 
30. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 88-99; Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die 
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seemed rich and powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be 
assimilated. To the more suspicious, they were eager accomplices 
in a Pan-Germanist plot to extend German power and the German 
language and culture to all parts of the world. 
Ethnic Images and Perceptions 
The Brazilians' image of the Germans, like most stereotypes, 
rested on insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exag-
gerations, and myths.32 There was little comprehension of the di-
versity within the group, such as the differences that divided 
Catholics from Protestants or the disparate values and behaviors 
that separated farmers from urban workers and businessmen. Per-
ceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of a part of the 
ethnic elite-the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and busi-
nessmen who perpetuated the immigrant culture because it served 
their economic interest and satisfied their psychological needs. 
Meanwhile the ordinary German-Brazilian people went about 
their daily business, gradually adapting to their surroundings and 
rarely giving the problem any thought. If their assimilation was 
unusually slow, it was because they had farther to go, culturally 
speaking, than did the Italians, for example, to whom they were 
frequently and negatively compared. Partly because of this cul-
tural distance they tended to gather in separate communities, es-
pecially in the rural districts. Since the Germans were so numer-
ous, it was relatively easy for them to create the institutions that 
maintained their distinctive cultural forms. Luso-Brazilians, no 
less than the Germans themselves, failed to understand how the 
physical environment in conjunction with the accidents of Brazil-
ian history had promoted German isolationism. They had little 
appreciation for the diversity of German immigrant society and 
the sharp differences that often divided its members. 
Luso-Brazilians were often mystified by the apparent separatism 
of the Germans. They could not understand why the Germans 
would even want to perpetuate their own language and culture in-
defmitely. In their view, Luso-Brazilian culture was especially at-
tractive-it was open, tolerant, hospitable, adaptable, nonideo-
32. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 184. 
Germans in Brazilian Society 77 
logical, humane, and free of rigid social stratification. Brazilians 
were motivated by a spirit of conciliation that sought compromise 
and rejected extremist measures; above all, they considered them-
selves a nonviolent people. 33 Jose Hon6rio Rodrigues, a modern 
authority on Brazilian national characteristics, observes: 
The basic Luso-Brazilian personality has a horror of violence and al-
ways seeks a way of smoothing things over, a path of moderation that 
avoids definite breaks. Cleverness, prudence in shunning extremes, an 
ability to forget, a rich sense of humor, a cool head, and a warm heart 
get the Brazilians through difficult moments .... Conciliation rather 
than revolution has dominated Brazilian history. In part this is because 
the people, with their spirit of concord, prefer to gain less than to have 
recourse to violence, in part because the dominant oligarchic groups 
prefer yielding a little to risking much, and finally because the armed 
forces-democratic, liberal, and progressive in their tendencies-
wield a balance of power that is exercised to moderate minorities 
rather than subjugate majorities. 34 
Rodrigues also supplies a lengthy list of negative characteristics, 
among them a tendency to procrastinate, belief in luck and gam-
bling, psychosocial instability, and susceptibility to the tempta-
tions of nepotism and to the cult of personality.35 The typical Ger-
man colono would have agreed, but would have added a few other 
traits to the list. 
The vaunted tradition of nonviolence did not conform to the 
German Brazilians' experience. They recalled that many of the 
original German settlers were soldiers recruited by the Brazilian 
government to fight its wars on the southern frontier. The colonos 
remembered bloody slaughter and destruction in the wars with 
Argentina and Paraguay; they experienced devastation in the civil 
conflicts in the nineteenth century; and from 1912 to 1915, state 
33. Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 60-61; Neiva and Diegues, "The Cultural Assim-
ilation of Immigrants," 185. 
34. Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 59. Apparently Rodrigues wrote these words be-
fore the Brazilian army assumed control of the government in 1964. Non-Brazilian 
historians have disputed the claim of a nonviolent tradition. See Burns, A History 
of Brazil, 254; and Henry H. Keith, "The Non-Violent Tradition in Brazilian His-
tory: A Myth in Need of Explosion?" in Henry H. Keith and S. F. Edwards (eds.), 
Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society (Columbia, S.c., 1969), 231-40, and com-
mentary by Joseph L. Love, ibid., 241-47. 
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and federal forces numbering thousands of men were required to 
put down a revolt led by a religious mystic in the western territory 
contested by both Santa Catarina and Parana. Beyond that, ban-
ditry seemed endemic in the interior.36 Many Teuto-Brazilians 
were bitter about the government-national, state, and local-be-
cause it seemed oppressive, unfair, corrupt, and unwilling to re-
spond to their needs. They felt excluded from the political pro-
cess; they, either had to fight for their rights or accept whatever 
was served up to them by the Luso-Brazilians. 37 They were criti-
cized for not knowing Portuguese, yet the government gave them 
no schools-and they were criticized for that, too. 
Why should the Germans want to assimilate into such a so-
ciety? asked the most ethnocentric among them. It seemed ob-
vious to them that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their 
own; they found little that might be worthy of adoption or imita-
tion. Unlike the Anglo-American Protestant culture in the United 
States, where German immigrants were virtually unable to with-
stand powerful assimilative forces, Brazilian culture was thought 
to be weak. The Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to combine 
indolence and ignorance with ridiculous conceit. As for their Por-
tuguese language, it was useful to know but unimportant in terms 
of world cultures. Compared with German, it offered few liter-
ary treasures. The distinguished Brazilian anthropologist Egon 
Schaden, reflecting upon his youth as a pupil in a German school 
in Santa Catarina before World War I, recalled that each child had 
a notebook with a firm admonition printed upon the cover: "Re-
member that you are a German!"38 
It was precisely because Luso-Brazilian culture was so ineffec-
tual, the German chauvinists argued, that Teuto-Brazilians should 
feel obligated to preserve their own culture. By infusing Brazilian 
society with their superior values and behaviors, they would per-
36. Tonnelat, L'expansion allemande, 97-98; Bums, A History of Brazil, 253; 
Fischer, "0 problema da conservac;ao," 343. For a detailed study of the Mucker-
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form their best service as loyal Brazilian citizens. Some Germans. 
held that each ethnic group should be allowed to develop its own 
potentialities, Teuto-Brazilian as well as Luso-Brazilian; each was 
to have the same right to survive. According to this doctrine, cul-
tural pluralism would bring strength to the state; assimilation, by 
contrast, was threatening to the state because it meant the gradual 
disappearance of ethnic vitality. 39 
The preservation of the German language was equally essential, 
in the chauvinist view, because if it were to fade from use, so 
would valuable German customs, along with the German sense of 
duty and commitment to the work ethic. At the same time, they 
agreed that it was important for the Germans to master the Por-
tuguese language. Only by speaking it fluently could the Ger-
mans ever hope to find the place they deserved in Brazilian so-
ciety and to influence Brazilian culture properly.4O Proponents of 
this brand of ethnocentrism never questioned the loyalty of the 
immigrants and their children to Brazil. Brazil was their home and 
they were totally committed to it. Most had been born there and 
had never lived anywhere else. Their bonds were with German cul-
ture, not with the German state or the kaiser and his ambitions. 
Immigrant perceptions of the host society may be discerned in 
a variety of sources, including textbooks. For example, a geogra-
phy published in 1916 specifically for German schools by Roter-
mund's Evangelical publishing house offers a generally positive 
portrait of the Luso-Brazilians but also reveals German attitudes: 
The greater number of the inhabitants of our state [Rio Grande do SuI] 
are Luso-Brazilians, descended from,immigrant Portuguese .... But 
these Portuguese did not keep their race pure. For the most part they 
mingled with Indians and negroes so that with time the mixed race of . 
the Brazilians has arisen. 
The Luso-Brazilian country dweller has many attractive qualities. 
He is generally modest and hospitable, much more polite and sociable 
than the German, and he is not so addicted to the abuse of alcohol. He 
has no class prejudice. Rich or poor, ignorant and cultured meet to-
gether in the pleasantest way. But these good qualities are not so well 
developed in the Luso-Brazilian dwellers in cities. Among them are 
39. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 183-84; Willems, "Immigrants and 
Their Assimilation in Brazil," 209. 
40. Oberacker, Die volkspolitische LAge, 76; Dedekind, Brasilien, 9, 45· 
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noticed rather some less agreeable Brazilian qualities, little sense of 
duty, unpunctuality, carelessness, and ingratitude. 
The Brazilian is a zealous patriot and loves his country above every-
thing. 
The textbook writer then assesses his fellow Teuto-Brazilians. 
Protestant opposition to alcoholic drink is again apparent: 
The German colonists are simple, industrious, worthy, and honorable 
men of good reliable character. All the more is it to be lamented that 
here and there one of them has hurt the name of the local Germans by 
quarrelsomeness or drunkenness. The significance of German things 
for Rio Grande is very great. A hundred years ago Rio Grande do SuI 
was a land on whose uplands the Luso-Brazilians grazed a few cattle 
and in whose primeval forest dwelt Indians and wild beasts. Then 
came the Germans and with them came agriculture, commerce, and 
industrial arts into the land. When we visit our thriving German colo-
nies, when we see the German wholesale houses and factories in our 
cities, our hearts are proud of the things German industry and Ger-
man capacity have accomplished. 
What would Rio Grande do SuI be without the Germans? The future 
of the state depends on the further development of the German-
Brazilian population. 41 
This passage exposes the conflict Germans felt as members of Bra-
zilian society. Like any other ethnocultural group, the Germans 
felt the need to emphasize their desirable characteristics (and by 
implication the ways in which they thought themselves superior 
to the Luso-Brazilians). At the same time, however, they sought 
acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an 
essential element in their country's history, and they wanted Bra-
zilians to understand and appreciate how extensive their contri-
butions had been to Brazil's development. 
The literature of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietism therefore describes 
how individual Germans had participated in the exploration of 
the land, the independence movement, and the preservation of 
Brazilian territorial integrity through the wars with Argentina 
and Paraguay. If applauds Koseritz and Rotermund, different as 
they were from each other, for their liberalism. In the Teuto-Brazil-
41. Theodor Radletz, Heimat and Naturkunde fur Deutsche Schulen (Sao Leopoldo, 
1916), quoted in Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," 546. 
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ian view, the liberty of conscience that these and other Germans 
defended helped to initiate the renewal of national intellectual 
life. Filiopietists also stressed the role of the Germans in giving 
work new value and dignity and in condemning slavery as mor-
ally and socially obnoxious. The Germans, they felt, had contrib-
uted significantly to the elevation of moral, cultural, and material 
standards in Brazil. Proud of the role the Germans had played in 
the history of Brazil, they were eager for Teuto-Brazilians to be ' 
recognized for their contributions.42 The filiopietists were also 
convinced that the Germans should take credit, at least in part, for 
the emergence of the middle class in Brazil. Similarly, the fact that 
Sao Leopoldo, Joinville, Blumenau, and other strongly German 
cities were so well planned and administered could be attributed 
to the Germans' communal spirit and their sense of personal re-
sponsibility for the public welfare. 43 
For a substantial but not fully definable portion of the German 
subsociety in Brazil, this kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless. 
Like any other immigrant group, the Germans included persons 
who were favorably disposed toward the language and culture of 
the host society and who wanted to become a part of it as quickly 
and painlessly as possible.44 Unlike the cultural idealists who 
claimed that it was their right (if not their responsibility) to main-
tain their immigrant speech and folkways and who denied the 
right of the government to demand that they learn the language of 
the country, the rapid assimilators were eager to abandon the 
marks of immigrant status that presumably had caused them so-
cial and economic deprivation. 
Between these two extremes-the cultural chauvinists and the 
rapid assimilators-were the majority, who saw no particular 
problem at all. They went about their daily activities without 
thinking much about the status of immigrant culture in Brazil or 
the problems of assimilation. Through daily contacts at work, at 
42. The classic example of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietistic literature is Der deutsche 
Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation, by Karl H. Oberacker, Jr. Originally 
published in 1955, it was revised and expanded in 1978. A second, revised edition 
appeared in Portuguese: A contribufao teuta a forma¢o da na¢o Brasileira (Rio de Ja-
neiro, 1968). 
43. Szilvassy, "Participa.,ao dos alemaes," 248-53. 
44. Fischer, "0 problema da conserva!;iio," 344. 
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the store, at church, in school, or even at home, they learned Portu-
guese more or less automatically. Whether they learned quickly or 
slowly depended upon the individual circumstance and whether it 
provided good or poor opportunities for interaction with speak-
ers of Portuguese. In any case, however, for them the ability to 
speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher social status; it 
was the avenue to social and economic progress, especially for the 
young. 4S 
When governmental personnel began to identify as problems 
the exclusiveness of the rural German colonies and the slowness 
of the Germans to assimilate, as they did in the 1890S and later, 
they thought first of the extreme cases-the highly isolated dis-
tricts where there were no Portuguese-language schools and 
where hundreds of second and third-generation children could be 
found whose knowledge of Portuguese was rudimentary at best. 
Similarly, when they tried to identify typical German attitudes, 
they naturally paid attention to the most conspicuous persons-
the noisy idealists who made speeches and wrote editorials, es-
says, and letters demanding the right to maintain their cultural 
separatism. 
Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of 
the Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture 
were correct, others were out of proportion, and a few, one might 
suppose, were simply wrong. For decades in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Luso-Brazilian majority had ignored the question of Ger-
man assimilation, probably because it had not seemed important 
enough to demand action. Then, when the Germans' failure to 
assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some Brazilians 
tended to overreact and to press for extreme or far-reaching mea-
sures that would enforce greater conformity. Such was the situa-
tion when World War I began. 
45. Schaden, "Der Deutschbrasilianer," 189-93. 
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Brazil and 
the Distant War, 1914-1917 
W ORLD WAR I, central though it is to modem world his-tory, was not a major event in Brazilian development. 
Unlike the United States and most European countries, 
which can trace the origins of numerous contemporary condi-
tions and problems to the Great War, Brazil was involved only pe-
ripherally. Ultimately, Brazil was the only South American nation 
to declare war. On August 4, 1914, when diplomacy failed and hos-
tilities began, the Brazilian government quickly decreed its "com-
plete neutrality." Nevertheless, the international conflict had an 
immediate and severe effect on the Brazilian economy, which was 
already in a nearly chaotic condition because of the extravagance 
and corruption of the Hermes da Fonseca regime (1910-1914).1 
Brazil had been experiencing difficulties in its international 
trade relationships even before war was declared in Europe. There 
had been a substantial decline in Brazilian exports, which in tum 
meant a shortage of European capital for investment purposes. 
Prices dropped accordingly. The Brazilian treasury was directly 
affected by this tum of events because import taxes furnished the 
major source of income; state governments were similarly influ-
1. [Brazil, Ministerio das Rela~6es Exterioresj, The Brazilian Green Book, Consist-
ing of Diplomatic Documents Relating to Brazil's Attitude with Regard to the European 
War, 1914-1917 (London and New York, 1918), 11-13; Percy A. Martin, "Introduc-
tion by the Translator and Editor," A History of Brazil, by ]oao Pandhi Calogeras 
(Chapel Hill, 1939), xiii; Percy Alvin Martin, "Brazil," in A'. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile since Independence (1935; rpr. New Yor!<, 1(63), 166-68. 
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enced because they were financed chiefly by export taxes levied 
on coffee, rubber, sugar, and other agricultural commodities. As 
deficits grew in 1914 and 1915, the Brazilian government resorted 
to the inflationary expedient of issuing unsecured paper currency, 
so that by 1917 the quantity of fiat money in circulation had 
doubled. Overproduction was also a problem. In order to control 
devastating fluctuations in the price of coffee, Brazil had devel-
oped a program in which the government secured foreign loans to 
purchase coffee from the planters. Surpluses were then stockpiled 
in warehouses overseas and released to the international market 
in years of bad harvests. 2 
War upset these arrangements. For several decades Great Brit-
ain had been the largest investor in Brazilian development, but 
going to war meant the diversion of capital into arms and mu-
nitions. Purchases of Brazilian commodities, especially coffee, 
dropped sharply. War also meant the imposition of a British naval 
blockade on the Central Powers, and very quickly the German, 
Austrian, and Belgian markets for Brazilian coffee also vanished. 
In 1914 the value of Brazilian exports dropped 30 percent from 
what they had been the preceding year. The loss of German mar-
kets and investments inevitably increased Brazil's dependency 
upon the Allied Powers and upon the United States, which, like 
Brazil, retained its neutrality at that time. Later, Brazil's relations 
with the Central Powers deteriorated drastically when Germany 
seized huge quantities of Brazilian coffee warehoused in Ham-
burg and Antwerp. The net effect of these developments was that 
Brazil was forced to declare a moratorium on foreign debt pay-
ments until March, 1915.3 
Except for the German and Italian colonos, most Brazilians 
tended to sympathize with the Allies, especially France. The cul-
tural bond with France that had grown strong in Brazil during the 
empire period had continued into the twentieth century. Brazil's 
educational system in particular was founded on French models, 
2. Herman G. James, Brazil after a Century of Independence (New York, 1925), 
168-69; Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 44-47. For a general treatment of 
the role of Germany in Brazil's foreign trade, see Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 
232-73. 
3. Percy Alvin Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925), 36-39, 51; 
Bums, A History of Brazil, 255. 
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and knowledge of the French language was common among the 
elite. Although admiration for French culture was an upper-class 
phenomenon, it had a significant effect on official policy. The Bra-
zilian government, especially in its foreign policy, was strongly in-
fluenced by sentiments expressed in the leading newspapers and 
in the Congress; but in a country where the majority was illiterate, 
these were inevitably the opinions of the educated classes. 4 
For most ordinary people in Brazil, the war in Europe was a dis-
tant affair of no particular consequence. They understood little 
about it; it seemed to affect their daily lives in no direct or discern-
ible fashion. 5 Still, the war tended to evoke sympathies for one 
side or the other, even though at first there was no expectation 
that Brazil should join in. Immigrants and their descendants, no 
matter how many generations removed, felt an emotional bond 
with their ancestral homeland and were convinced of the jus-
tice of its cause. This had the effect of ranging the few English, 
French, and Belgian immigrants with the majority of the Luso-
Brazilians against the Germans and the Italians, since in 1914, 
Italy was still in alliance with Germany. Later, after Italy joined 
the Allies against Germany, the attitudes of the Italian Brazilians 
changed dramatically. 
The German-Language Press Interprets the War 
When the news arrived in Brazil that a state of war existed be-
tween France and Germany, the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre 
got out an extra edition, as it had the day before when Kaiser 
Wilhelm II ordered the mobilization of the army after Germany de-
clared war on Russia. The paper revealed that all Reichsdeutsche 
subject to military service were ordered to report to the nearest 
consular office and prepare to return to Germany. Reservists in 
4. Mario de Lima-Barbosa, Les Franrais dans l'histoire du Bresil (Rio de Janeiro 
and Paris, 1923); Freyre, Order and Progress; Martin, Latin America and the War, 5, 
30,32; Bums, A History of Brazil, 172,201,228. 
5. "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War" and "Situation at Sao Paulo," anony-
mous reports sent to the Department of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence, April 25 and 26, 1918, in Record Group 59, General 
Records of the Department of State, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder, National 
Archives. 
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the Austrian army received a similar call to service. In the suc-
ceeding weeks a few reservists managed to return to Europe, but 
because of the British blockade most got no farther than the con-
sulates, if they reported at all. No doubt there were some, as in the 
United States, who rushed to obtain citizenship in their adopted 
country.in order to escape a pointless death on a European battle-
field. On the other hand, a few Brazilians of German birth or de-
scent actually volunteered and subsequently served in the Ger-
man army; some of them were killed.6 
Within a week after the news of the war reached Brazil, the Ger-
mans there had begun to organize committees for the support of 
the German Red Cross and for the sale of German war bonds. In 
Porto Alegre, the Verband deutscher Vereine (Union of German 
Societies) met with the German and Austrian consuls to discuss 
ways in which they could help families of reservists. Similar activi-
ties occurred in most of the German settlements, especially in the 
cities. Before many weeks had passed, numerous communities 
organized rallies and bazaars in support of the German war effort. 
Collections for war widows, orphans, and other needy persons 
continued thorughout the fall of 1914. By the end of the year, Ger-
mans in Rio Grande do SuI had collected more than $77,000 for 
the assistance of war widows, orphans, and other persons in 
need. Arno Philipp of the Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre) cap-
tured the spirit when he wrote that even though they could not 
sacrifice their blood for their old homeland, it was self-evident 
that they would at least give of their possessions.7 
6. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 3,4,5, 1914, February 17, 1915; Ger-
mania (Sao Paulo), August 19, September 28, 1915; Georg Konigk, Die Politik 
Brasiliens wiihrend des Weltkrieges und die Stellung des brasilianischen Deutschtums 
(Hamburg, 1935), 18; Rudolf Becker, Deutsche Siedler in Rio Grande do Sui: Eine 
Geschichte der deutschen Einwanderung (1938), 76; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher 
Handel, 475. For a classic account of a chauvinistic Teuto-Brazilian response to the 
news of the outbreak of World War I, see Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 
258-68. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 86-89· 
7. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 10, 21, 1914; Brunn, Deutschland und 
Brasilien, 276; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 475; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 
77. Details of the collections in 1915 and 1916 are given in Uhle's Kalender: 1917. 
Jahrbuch fUr das Deutschtum in Brasilien (Curitiba, [1916]), 82. Philipp quoted in 
Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 163. 
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A notice placed in the Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 3, 1914, by the Ger-
man consul in Sao Paulo. It announces the mobilization of reservists in the Ger-
man army and navy and orders such persons in Brazil to return immediately to 
Germany and report to their district commanders. 
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Emotions ran high during the first weeks of the war. One Ger-
man national who happened to be on a trip to South America in 
1914 reported that in Porto Alegre, hatred of the Germans was so 
strong that the personal safety of some of the best-known leaders 
of the German community was endangered and that officers of 
German societies were regularly insulted on the streets. He also 
described how an excited mob consisting 'chiefly of young people 
tried to storm the German consulate in Porto Alegre but were re-
strained by the Brazilian Army. In his view, the trouble was at-
tributable to the pro-Ally propaganda in the Brazilian press. 8 
It is true that most Portuguese-language newspapers favored 
the Allies, though some were more outspoken than others. The 
German explanation of events and their causes was largely ig-
nored. In Bahia, for example, only the Ditirio de Noticias seemed 
willing to accord any space to the German point of view. By con-
trast, another Bahian paper called for the expulsion of all German 
citizens from Brazil. 9 The same pattern prevailed in all the major 
cities. 
If the Portuguese-language newspapers displayed strong par-
tisanship for France and England, the German press was no less 
the defender of the Central Powers. There were about two dozen 
German-language newspapers in Brazil in that time, and all of 
them, from the anticlerical, freethinking Germania of Sao Paulo to 
the Protestant church-oriented Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo, 
deemed it their duty to defend Germany. Even when Austria-
Hungary declared war on Serbia at the end of July, 1914, the 
Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre ventured the opinion that Austria 
naturally would have the sympathy of Germans everywhere, not 
merely because of ethnic solidarity and shared culture, but be-
cause its cause rested on justice. As the Teuto-Brazilian journalists 
saw it, their biggest problem was to refute biased news coverage 
and vicious propaganda. The Portuguese-language press seemed 
filled with caricatures of Germany, its spirit and culture, and its 
purposes in the war. For the most part, educated Germans in Bra-
8. Paul von Kapff (ed.), Erlebnisse Auslanddeutsche im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 
1921),1+ 
9. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania und Deutschtum in Bahia (Berlin, 1923), 
136-37. Cf. Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 275. 
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zil refused to believe any news of the war that had been cleansed 
by British and French censors. 10 
Teuto-Brazilians were especially troubled by the atrocity propa-
ganda that began to appear in the world press before the end of 
the first month of the war. Suddenly they were confronted with 
lurid tales of German brutality in Belgium and France-rape, pil-
lage, massacres of defenseless civilians, and the destruction of 
cultural treasures. According to these mostly fictional accounts, 
fiends in German uniforms had amputated the breasts of Belgian 
women with the stroke of a sword, children had been bayoneted, 
and babies' hands had been chopped off. Unknown numbers of 
people in Brazil as elsewhere accepted these reports at face value, 
and inevitably their attitudes toward all things German were modi-
fied accordingly. Some of the stories were subsequently proven to 
be utterly false; others were distorted and embellished. ll 
Teuto-Brazilians naturally applauded any venture designed to 
counter British and French propaganda. For example, when the 
Uniao Teuto-Brasileiro was founded in Rio de Janeiro, the distant 
Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre declared that it lay in the best in-
terest, both material and spiritual, of Teuto-Brazilians to support 
all such efforts to develop a true understanding of what it meant 
to be German. The fact that Luso-Brazilians were prominent in 
the leadership and membership of the organization was especially 
gratifying. In Rio de Janeiro hundreds of Germans gathered to 
protest the pro-Ally propaganda and unanimously supported a 
defiant and defensive resolution that was later distributed widely 
in Brazil. 12 
The task of countering the propaganda of the Allies was diffi-
cult because there was no accessible German news service. The 
10. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), July 31, August 12, 1914; Gehse, Die 
deutsche Presse, 162ff.; Martin Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui: 
Ihr Werden und Wesen, eine Kulturgeschichte des riograndenser Deutschtums," 
n.d. [ca. 19291 (Typescript in Institut fur Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart), 56; 
Buchmann, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Brasilien," 220. 
11. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 271; James M. Read, Atrocity Propa-
ganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven, 1941), 29-34. I have treated this topic in greater 
detail in Bonds of Loyalty, 85-87. 
12. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 5, 1914; Hinden, Deutsche und 
deutscher Handel, 476; Kapff (ed.), Erlebnisse, 14. 
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transatlantic cable from Emden in Germany to Pernambuco in 
Brazil had been cut during the first week of the war, and commu-
nication by ship was blocked by the British navy. News from non-
Ally sources arrived piecemeal through neutral countries, but it 
was hardly adequate. Several German-language newspapers in 
Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo, in cooperation with certain German 
commercial houses, tried to set up a news service in Petropolis, 
Pedro II's old summer capital in the mountains near Rio de Ja-
neiro. Their idea was to make use of the official reports received 
by the German consul general, but the effort was futile because of 
the lack of means and experience. The Deutsche Post of Sao Leo-
poldo set up an elaborate telegram service through Uruguay to 
Buenos Aires in Argentina in order to tap Spanish sources of 
news. Two stations erected by the Germans in the United States at 
Sayville on Long Island and at Tuckerton, New Jersey, made spo-
radic connections with Brazil by shortwave radio, but this effort at 
long-distance communication lasted only through the month of 
August, 1914, when it was silenced by technical difficulties. 13 
Suspicious as they were of propaganda from French and Brit-
ish sources, the German Brazilians tended to believe the many 
rumors, distortions, and lies that were circulated among them 
through the efforts of German propagandists. So firm was their 
faith in the invincibility of German arms that when a German-
language paper in Rio Grande do SuI published a false report that 
Paris had fallen, some colonos responded with a great celebration, 
complete with fireworks. 14 
In Brazil as in the United States, many of the editors and pub-
lishers of the German-language press were people born in Ger-
many who were rather more eager than the rank-and-file mem-
bers of the Teuto-Brazilian community to defend the fatherland. 
Extravagant partisanship was the result. Not content to address 
only readers of German, they began to include columns of copy in 
Portuguese-allegedly free of bias-in their papers. Readers were 
expected to give such material to Luso-Brazilian acquaintances so 
13. Gehse, Die\deutsche Presse, 114; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande 
do Sul," 56; Fouquet, per deutsche Einwanderer, 207; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 
lW Hinden, Deutsche'und deutscher Handel, 469; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Ger-
mania, 136; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 117. 
14. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 114. 
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that they too could have the benefit of German truth. German-
language papers also reprinted articles in Portuguese from the 
Brazilian press that allegedly distorted war news, disparaged Ger-
many in some way, or slandered Teuto-Brazilians. The Deutsche 
Zeitung of Porto Alegre, for example, provided its readers with a 
reprint in which it was charged that a German rally at Taquara had 
been opened with the singing of the German national anthem, 
rather than the Brazilian. This accusation was then rejected as a 
malicious fabrication. 15 
The next German countermeasure in the propaganda war was 
to try to acquire control of Portuguese-language newspapers. A 
comparable effort in the United States was futile, but in Brazil this 
tactic seems to have been more fruitful. The Tribuna of Rio de Ja-
neiro, for example, was an established paper with a circulation of 
more than ten thousand copies. Then, in 1915, it was purchased 
by German interests and subsidized by the German embassy 
through collections from local German bankers and businessmen. 
In Porto Alegre, the Diario, which had followed a strongly anti-
German line throughout the first year of the war, was bought out 
in September, 1915, by a corporation owned by German Brazil-
ians, and an editor named Willy Liideritz was put in charge. 16 
In Santa Catarina, 0 Dia of Florianopolis and the Novedades 
of Itajai also followed the pro-German line. In both instances 
ownership rested with politicians, such as Felippe Schmidt, who 
naturally cultivated the votes of Teuto-Brazilians. In other cases 
Portuguese-language newspapers were started by Germans after 
the war began. 0 Ditirio of Rio de Janeiro was such a creation. 
Founded by the publisher of the Deutsche Zeitung of Sao Paulo, 
this paper was externally Portuguese but the inside pages were in 
German and were entitled Deutsche Tageblatt. Neither this effort 
nor several others like it were successful. Offensive to the Luso-
Brazilian population, they were equally unable to attract subscrib-
ers among the Germans. 17 
15. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 30, 1914. 
16. Ibid., September 15, 1914. See also Germania (Sao Paulo), July 31, August 5, 
1915. 
17. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 56, 164; Haring, The Germans in South America, 
54-55; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 479; Monatsbliitter des Germanischen 
Bundes fur Sud-Amerika, I (March, 1916), 2. 
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What the German-language press chose to report reveals a great 
deal about the psychology of this beleaguered minority. Reliable 
news of the war itself was in short supply, but there were numer-
ous attacks on the bias of the Portuguese-language press. Col-
umns were filled with accounts of the fund-raising activities of 
Teuto-Brazilian organizations on behalf of the German Red Cross 
and with 'chauvinistic speeches made at pro-German rallies, ba-
zaars, and festivals. More significantly, the German papers were 
intensely interested in what Luso-Brazilian leaders had to say, pro 
or con, about Germany, German culture, or Teuto-Brazilian so-
ciety. Anything an important politician said or did that could be 
construed as favorable to the Germans was reported as a justifica-
tion of their behavior or point of view. 18 Dunshee de Abranches, 
president of the Chamber of Deputies in the Brazilian Congress, 
was identified as a special hero. It was his willingness "to break 
lances for German honor," according to one German source, that 
led to his forced resignation. 19 
The German-language press was most sensitive about what it 
called Deutschenhetze-German baiting or anti-German agitation. 
Dozens of articles on this subject appeared during the first weeks 
and months of the war. Indicative of a siege mentality, they re-
vealed a deep concern for what the writers perceived as the de-
basement of German culture. It was their culture, not Germany 
itself or the course of the war in Europe, that was the central con-
cern of the German Brazilians. What the kaiser said or did, what 
battles his armies won or lost, or what policies his government 
formulated and pursued were important to them because these 
things impinged upon their self-image and their self-esteem. For 
German soldiers to be called barbarians, Huns, or butchers of 
women and children was as unfair as it was untrue; by implication 
such charges could be applied to the German Brazilians as well. 
They perceived themselves as industrious, moral, honest, edu-
cated, loyal citizens of Brazil, but during those early weeks and 
months of the war the Portuguese-language papers carried chill-
18. For example, see Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 31, 1914, report in 
Portuguese on the defense of the Germans made by Toaquin Luiz Osorio, a deputy 
in the Brazilian Congress from Rio Grande do SuI. 
19. Kapff (ed,), Erlebnisse, 14; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 153; 
Brunn, Deutschland und Brasilien, 274. 
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ing stories of German brutality, arrogance, and inhumanity. In 
contrast, the Allies, they were told, were fighting to preserve civili-
zation, freedom, and justice. It is not surprising that the German-
language press responded vigorously and sometimes unwisely. 20 
The Churches Respond to War in Europe 
In Sao Leopoldo old Dr. Rotermund lost his patience. Writing in 
his Deutsche Post, he asserted that the Luso-Brazilians should 
know that the Germans objected to the prejudice and ignorance 
that pervaded the Portuguese-language press in its obvious par-
tisanship for France. The irate clergyman went on to encourage a 
boycott of all businesses whose owners sympathized with the Al-
lies. One had already begun in Porto Alegre, he reported. More-
over, he advised, papers filled with lies about Germany should 
be sent back to the publishers; all economic relations should be 
broken off with such people-Deutschenfresser, he called them (lit-
erally, one who devours Germans). In the past, Germans had 
learned Portuguese in order to trade with them. "We have gone 
much too far in our politeness," he grumbled. "Why don't the 
Lusos learn German? It's high time that we Germans begin to 
speak German-with German words and German action."21 
Widely reprinted in the Portuguese-language press, Roter-
mund's outburst produced a stormy reaction. A huge anti-German 
demonstration was staged outside the Post's building in Sao Leo-
poldo. It is possible that the place would have been destroyed, 
had it not been for the intervention of Dr. Antonio Borges de 
Medeiros, president of the state of Rio Grande do Sui. Borges sub-
sequently requested an interview with the editor of the Post, who 
readily agreed that it was unreasonable to expect Luso-Brazilians 
to learn the German language but insisted that Germans should 
be allowed to use German in their own social relationships. For 
his part, Borges was remarkably restrained. Hoping to calm the 
Germans, he expressed his wish that in regions where Germans 
had no opportunity to learn Portuguese, government officials 
could in fact converse in German and that German could be taught 
20. For example, see Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 12, 13, 1915. 
21. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), September 2, 1914, transcribed in Fischer, 
"Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 236. 
Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, patriarch of the German Evangelical Synod of Rio Grande 
do SuI and publisher of the Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo) 
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender fiir das Jahr 1918 
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in the higher schools along with English and French. Moreover, 
Borges claimed to understand that the concern for the Teuto-
Brazilians was primarily for the welfare of their relatives and 
friends in Germany. Whatever else Borges might have told the 
editor of the Post was not reported. 22 
There was no agreement among the German editors on how ag-
gressive they should be in the defense of their ethnic interests. 
Some charged that in this case the Post had endangered good rela-
tions between Luso- and Teuto-Brazilians; others felt that in the 
end the Post had backed off and was too willing to accommodate 
itself to Brazilian views. Feelings engendered by the war were so 
intense that new German-language publications were brought out 
to promulgate one position or the other. In Montenegro, Rio 
Grande do SuI, a paper was founded in 1914 to foster the integra-
tion of the Germans into Brazilian life; inevitably, Teuto-Brazilian 
chauvinists denounced it as a fraud and a deception. Some months 
earlier in Pelotas, located at the southern end of Rio Grande do 
SuI, several Evangelical clergymen combined to found the Deutsche 
Wacht for German-speakers there, whether they were Teuto-
Brazilians, Reichsdeutsche, Austrians, or Swiss. Its announced 
purpose was to watch over German interests and to bridge the po-
litical and religious divisions within the group. By scorning politi-
cal involvement, the founders made the cultivation of ethnicity 
the paper's raison d'etre. The earthshaking events in Europe, the 
paper observed at the outset of the war, had stimulated conscious-
ness-a development that "fills each good German with pride 
and joy."23 
Other papers observed the same effect. The Deutsche Zeitung of 
Porto Alegre was pleased to note that the war was invigorating 
German ethnicity all over the world; the press, churches, schools, 
societies of all kinds-all had increased in number, strength, and 
scope of activities. Even persons who formerly had felt alienated 
from the ethnic group, the Zeitung noted, were captured by the 
intense new spirit of unity and togetherness. 24 
The German gymnastic societies (Turnvereine) also thrived in 
22. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 165; Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), September 8, 
1914, transcribed in Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui," 237. 
23. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 12, 1914; Deutsche Wacht (Pelo-
tas), n.d., transcribed in Fischer, "Die deutscher Presse in Rio Grande do Sui," 322. 
24. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 13, 1914, March 16, 1915. 
Dr. Antonio Borges de Medeiros, the distinguished, long-term president of the 
state of Rio Grande do SuI 
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this heady enthusiasm for Deutschtum. In May, 1915, the union 
of turners in Porto Alegre started a new monthly publication, 
Deutsche Turnbliitter, declaring in the inaugural issue that its pur-
pose was to strengthen the power of German culture ''by nourish-
ing German customs, German gymnastics, and German songs." 
Subsequent issues continued this emphasis, but unlike the news-
papers, it was silent on the subject of anti-Germanism in Brazil. 25 
Among the churches, the German Evangelical synods experi-
enced a surge of excitement because of the war in Europe. Its 
leaders had declared repeatedly that its bonds with the German 
language and culture were insoluble. In a publication intended for 
the officials of the Riograndenser Synod, Wilhelm Rotermund 
prophesied that Germany's destiny would determine the status of 
"her children" overseas. He made the link between cultural main-
tenance and religious commitment explicit: "We Germans must 
not educate our children in Luso-Brazilian institutions," he wrote. 
"Offerings of life blood will not be required of us, as of our ethnic 
brethren over there, but it is our duty to hold fast to our ethnic 
customs and to our Evangelical faith, even as we must participate 
eagerly in the work of the church and contribute our money to 
Evangelical churches and schools." Above all, Rotermund hoped 
that the war would generate enthusiasm for the German language 
and Brazilian customs, thereby strengthening his church. 26 
Local congregations participated actively in the campaign to 
raise funds for the German Red Cross, buy German war bonds, 
and sponsor bazaars and rallies to aid German victims of war. 
Special prayer services were held for the success of German arms. 
At Taquanl, located north of Porto Alegre, the German and Aus-
trian consuls, dressed in full uniform, joined an overflow crowd 
in a service at an Evangelical church. Even though the great major-
ity of the people in attendance were Brazilian citizens, the preacher 
used "we" and "us" in references to Germany and spoke of the 
German army as "our" army. He admonished the congregation 
that it was their "holy duty to defend their ethnic culture, which 
was threatened with annihilation." 27 
25. Deutsche Turnbliitter, I (May, 1915). 
26. Rundschreiben No. 414 des Vorstandes des Riograndenser Synode, quoted 
in Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21; Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 146-47. 
27. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), August 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 1914. 
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The professional journal published for the teachers of Evan-
gelical schools in Rio Grande do SuI was similarly indiscreet. The 
editor, who also served as the director of the tiny Evangelical 
teachers college of Santa Cruz, spoke of Germany as "we" and of 
its army as "our magnificent soldiers." Virtually every issue of 
this monthly during 1914 and 1915 reveals the Evangelical church's 
exceptional commitment to German ethnocultural values and to 
its psychological investment in the outcome of the war. The idea 
that the Evangelical schools had the responsibility of instructing 
young Teuto-Brazilians in the Portuguese language is entirely 
absent. 28 
The dedication of the Evangelical church to German culture is 
further manifested in the curriculum of the college. In 1916 all 
course work in this three-year institution was offered in the Ger-
man language, except for the history of Brazil. Although the col-
lege offered instruction in Portuguese, its annual report repeat-
edly identifies German-language classes as the most important 
part of the curriculum. Religion was also regularly taught. The 
course of study for the third year included German history since 
1888; the description of this course emphasizes Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and the war. The annual report indicates that in 1916, twelve 
major events in the war, mostly German victories, were singled 
out for special attention and some were celebrated with a free 
day.29 Here, indeed, was a "nursery of Kaiserism." 
In the United States such an epithet was usually reserved for 
the schools of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. In Brazil, 
however, the Missouri Synod was seen in a very different light. 
This church never offered a word of defense for Germany or for 
the preservation of Deutschtum in its official Brazilian publication; 
rather, the war was considered the "worst of evils." Missouri Synod 
leaders saw the European conflict as a judgment of God upon a 
sinful people-punishment for wickedness, unbelief, failure to 
pray, contempt for God's Word, atheism, and the idolatry of hu-
man wisdom as revealed especially in modern science and theo-
logical liberalism. 3O The contrast between this position and the 
28. Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung fiir Rio Grande do Sui, 1914-1915. 
29· 7· Jahresbericht des Deutschen Ev. Lehrerseminar fiir Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa 
Cruz, 1916. 
30. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 253-54; "Was will uns der Liebe Gott sagen durch 
die gegenwartige schwere Kriegsnot?" Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fiir Siid-
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Evangelical view was stark and, to the Evangelicals, unforgivable. 
For a variety of reasons the German Catholics in Brazil were 
much less chauvinistic than were the Evangelicals. They did not 
perceive themselves as being threatened in the same way; because 
of its universal, multi-ethnic character, the Catholic church tended 
to unite its German adherents with Luso-Brazilians rather than to 
separate or isolate them from the rest of society. This tendency is 
reflected in the annual German Catholic Kalender. Compared to 
those put out by Protestant or secular publishers, the Catholic 
publications projected at most a muted pro-Germanism.31 The 
Catholic church was not a ready agency for the organization of ba-
zaars, rallies, or other activities to raise either money or enthusi-
asm for Germany's cause in the war. Moreover, the numerous 
Catholic clergymen of German antecedents generally kept silent 
on the subject, especially in Rio Grande do SuI, where Joao Becker 
was the archibishop of Porto Alegre. Born in Germany and raised 
in Brazil, Becker often displayed the characteristics of second-
generation immigrants who for psychological or situational rea-
sons reject their ethnic heritage. He was exceedingly sensitive to 
criticism that he was a German partisan and he was determined to 
align his administration with the dominant attitudes and behav-
iors of Luso-Brazilian society. 
The inclusive or universal character of the Catholic church was 
hardly enough, however, to raise it above suspicion. Even though 
the church as a whole did not allow itself to become embroiled in 
the propaganda war, there were individual German Catholics, act-
ing independently or on behalf of independent Catholic institu-
tions, who supported the Central Powers as vigorously as did any 
Evangelical or freethinker. This was especially true within the 
Franciscan order, whose members and leaders were mostly Ger-
man. Father Petrus Sinzig of Petropolis is a notable example of an 
active pro-German among the Franciscans. A man of many tal-
ents, Sinzig defended the German point of view in his Vozes de 
Petropolis, a Portuguese-language paper published under Francis-
can auspices. It was Sinzig who tried to organize a substitute 
Amerika, XIV (August 15, 1914); "Was sagt die Bibel vom Weltkrieg?" ibid. (Novem-
ber 15, 1915). 
31. For example, see Der Familienfreund: Katholischer Hauskalender und Wegweiser 
fur das Jahr 1917 (Porto Alegre, [1916]). 
Dom Joao Becker, the German-born archbishop of Porto Alegre 
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press service at the beginning of the war; he was the author of 
such patriotic hymns as "Siegeslied" and "Heil, Wilhelm, Heil!" 
According to the editor of Deutsche Zeitung of Sao Paulo, Sinzig 
was the guiding light in the fight against English and French prop-
aganda. 32 The Franciscan influence was apparent in the Curitiba 
Kompass, widely recognized as a voice of German Catholicism, 
which was published by lay persons under Franciscan sponsor-
ship. It, too, was a vigorous defender of Germany's interests in 
thewar.33 
Like the Evangelicals, many German Catholic institutions and 
parishes became the objects of Luso-Brazilian fears and were sub-
jected to threats and intimidation of various kinds. Early in 1915, 
for example, there was a widespread rumor that the Franciscan 
cloister in Blumenau, Santa Catarina, was a secret arsenal of arms, 
including small cannons, still packed in crates. These weapons 
were allegedly intended for distribution among the Blumenau 
Germans if the monastery were attacked. Officials of the order de-
nounced the allegations as malicious slander, but such rumors 
were not easily dispelled. Indeed, they cropped up again in April, 
1917, following the break in diplomatic relations between Brazil 
and Germany. 34 
Tension Increases 
Throughout 1914 and 1915 the German-language press continued 
to report how organizations in this or that community had raised 
32. Petrus Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren: Vierte Chronik (1915-1921) der Sud-
brasilianischen Franziskanerprovinz von der Unbefleckten Empfiingnis (Curitiba and 
Freiburg, [1922], 140; see also Venantius Willeke, "Deutsche Kulturpioniere in Bra-
silien," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, XIX (1971), 91-103. Sinzig also 
tried to influence non-German-Brazilian opinion by publishing a two-volume col-
lection of essays written by German scholars and translated into Portuguese. 
These writings were in response to a French book (1916) that charged that Germany 
was theoretically and practically inimical to Catholicism. See Jorge Pfeilschrifter 
(ed.), Cu/tura alleman catholicismo e a guerra munditil: Replica de defeza contra 0 livro 
"La guerra allemande et Ie Catholicisme" (2 vols.; Petropolis, 1916, 1917). 
33. For an example of its gushy, intense chauvinism, see the article by Otto von 
Slid [pseud.] in Curitiba Kompass, April 20, 1916, reprinted in Sinzig, Nach dreiszig 
Jahren, 138-40. 
34. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 62; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 23, 
1917. 
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Advertisements for Gennan and Austrian war bonds frequently appeared in the 
Gennan-language press. This example is from the Germania (Sao Paulo), Novem-
ber 20, 1915-
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money for war-relief purposes, purchased German war bonds, or 
conducted a rally or bazaar of some kind-all intended to help the 
German war effort. It was unquestionably their right as citizens of 
a neutral country to engage in such activities, just as supporters 
of the Allies could and did do similar things for England and 
France. The behavior of many Teuto-Brazilians was nevertheless 
indiscreet and led to a further deterioration in their relations with 
the rest of society. 
Sometimes the behavior on both sides was simply petty or petu-
lant. In Pelotas, for example, a Portuguese-language newspaper 
(Ditirio Popular) delighted in attacking Deutschtum. Germans were 
incensed to read that Beethoven was not a German after all, but a 
Belgian; and that the invention of printing with movable type 
should be attributed not to Gutenberg, but to some obscure French 
shoemaker. One German response was a spiteful play on words, 
suggesting that the proper German translation of Liga pelos AI-
liados (League for the Allies) was Luge der Allugierten (lies of patho-
logical liars), a coined term that sounds much like the correct Ger-
man translation, Liga der Alliierten.35 
In other instances, the behavior of the Teuto-Brazilians was 
insensitive or simply stupid. Some celebrated German victories 
ostentatiously; opened or closed meetings with the singing of 
"Deutschland iiber Alles," the German national anthem; and 
displayed German and Austrian flags everywhere. The last was 
especially offensive to Luso-Brazilians and sometimes led to 
trouble. One Sunday afternoon in August, 1915, a couple of 
Teuto-Brazilian merchants in Montenegro (near Porto Alegre) 
raised the German flag at a private gathering in a courtyard be-
hind their place of business. A mob of non-Germans ("yellows 
and blacks," according to the German-language newspaper) col-
lected outside in protest. Fortunately, police arrived in time to 
neutralize the crowd. Four days later, Brazil received the news 
that Warsaw had fallen to the German army. This time the mer-
chants in Montenegro and their friends celebrated with fireworks. 
Again a mob of forty or fIfty men appeared, armed with clubs and 
led by a well-known Luso-Brazilian of the community, and once 
more violence was narrowly averted by the police. Several days 
35. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 22, 1915. 
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A postcard advertising a special collection for Gennan war victims that was to be 
held on January 27, 1917. The message reads: "Let no one say, 'I have already 
given'; our troops also do not say, 'We have already fought! '" 
Author's private collection 
later a pro-German rally was held at the clubhouse of a local Verein 
in Montenegro. A Luso-Brazilian, Dr. Abreu de Souza, belabored 
the Allies as he praised the local Germans for the way in which 
their work, sweat, and blood had helped to build Brazil into a 
great nation. Still another anti-German mob tried to disrupt the 
meeting, and this time a detachment of military police was re-
quired to maintain order.36 
The aggressiveness of the German-Brazilian cultural chauvin-
ists in their defense of Imperial Germany inevitably provoked a 
response in kind. Some of the most distinguished of Brazilian po-
litical culture leaders, led by the brilliant orator and statesman 
Ruy Barbosa of Bahia and including the novelists Jose Gra~a Ara-
nha and Jose Verissimo, decided that the time had come for coun-
36. Ibid., August 11, 16, 1915; Haring, The Germans in South America, 45. 
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termeasures. In March, 1915, they founded the Liga pelos Allia-
dos (League for the Allies) with Barbosa as president. Its declared 
purpose was to defend the Allies, protest alleged German atroci-
ties and violations of international law, and raise money for the 
French and British Red Cross. Its strongly pro-French orientation 
made it especially attractive to the Positivists. The league also 
sought to hasten the assimilation of immigrants in the Portuguese 
language, and the promotion of Brazilian patriotism. An elitist, 
nativist organization, it soon became involved in domestic poli-
tics. For example, in response to Pan-Germanist propaganda, Ruy 
Barbosa proclaimed the dangers of German imperialism in the 
boundary controversy between the states of Parana and Santa Ca-
tarina. The disputed area, a lightly settled region in the west near 
the Argentine border, included a substantial concession that had 
been granted to a German company, which in turn reportedly 
sold its land to German settlers only. 37 
Both the Liga pelos Alliados and, later, the Liga de Resistencia 
Nacional bore a striking resemblance to the National Security 
League and the American Defense Society in the United States, 
organizations that saw themselves during the neutrality period 
chiefly as propagandizers for preparedness. In both countries 
these wartime patriotic societies led the campaign against the 
37. Martin, Latin America and the War, 33-35; Martin, "Brazil," 250; Gaillard, 
Amerique latine et Europe occidentale, 42; Rodrigues, The Brazilians, 96; Funfzig Jahre 
Deutscher Verein Germania, 148. 
Grac;a Aranha is often cited as a Brazilian intellectual whose much-praised 
novel Canaan (1902), set in a German district of Espirito Santo (where he had 
served briefly as a judge), reveals sympathetic understanding of Teuto-Brazilians. 
This is to overstate the case. At best, his understanding of the German settlers is 
superficial; he reveals no real comprehension of their behaviors, motives, and atti-
tudes, much less of their diversity. Although Grac;a Aranha respects their willing-
ness to work hard and their resultant economic power, he is also suspicious of 
their motives and critical of their reluctance to assimilate quickly. He portrays 
them as hard, mean-spirited, and unsympathetic, perhaps even cruel, to their own 
kind, just as he devastatingly describes minor Brazilian authorities as greedy, lazy, 
vindictive, and dishonest. There is no contradiction between Grac;a Aranha as the 
author of Canaan and as a militant anti-German in the era of World War I. The 
seeds of the latter are clearly in the novel, which also reveals fear of German impe-
rialism, envy of German economic success, and disapproval of Teuto-Brazilian 
slowness in learning Portuguese. Jose Grac;a Aranha, Canaan, trans. Mariano 
Joaquin Lorente (Boston, 1920). Cf. Skidmore, Black into White, 109-12. 
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German language and culture; they repeatedly cited "the German 
menace" as their chief international concern; and they all pro-
duced profound and enduring resentments among the German 
ethnic subsocieties. 38 
Germanische Bund fur Sud-Amerika 
Unlike the Luso-Brazilians, the Germans in Brazil were unable to 
establish a national organization comparable either to the Liga 
pelos Alliados or to the National German-American Alliance, 
which had been founded in the United States in 1901. The closest 
Brazilian equivalent to that aggressive, well-funded organization 
was the Germanische Bund fur Sud-Amerika (German Federation 
of South America), established early in 1916 through the efforts of 
G. W. Zimmerli, a Swiss by birth who appeared briefly in Brazil as 
a representative of the German Red Cross.39 
Intended as a mighty union of all Germanic peoples in South 
America-Germans, Austrians, Swiss, Dutch, and even Scan-
dinavians-the Germanische Bund, according to its constitution, 
was to promote broadly Teutonic culture (germanische Volkstum) 
within the framework of Brazilian law and in harmony with the 
responsibilities of Brazilian citizenship. Although it believed that 
envy was the real cause of anti-German agitation, the Bund al-
legedly wanted to develop friendly relationships between Luso-
Brazilians and Germanic elements in the population, as well as be-
tween the Brazilian government and the several Germanic states 
of central Europe. It supported German-language schools in Bra-
zil, but it also claimed to favor the increased use of the Portuguese 
language among Germans. It hoped to spread German literature 
through a monthly publication and to bring the glories of German 
literature to Brazilian readers through Portuguese translations. Fi-
nally, the Bund intended to guarantee the protection of law to its 
members, especially if they suffered discrimination because of 
their membership in an ethnic minority group. Unlike the Na-
tional German-American Alliance, on which it was patterned to 
38. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 159, 215, 251. Gaillard, Amerique latine et Europa 
occidentale, 49; Szilvassy, "Participa<;ao dos alemaes," 251; Love, Siio Paulo in the Bra-
zilian Federation, 237. 
39. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 19, 1916. 
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some extent, the Bund was not open to organizations but restricted 
its membership to individual persons. By November, 1916, it 
claimed to have attracted six thousand members. 40 
Such idealistic goals were attractive to many Teuto-Brazilians, 
and Zimmerli won much support as he scurried about in south-
ern Brazil and Argentina. Although he concentrated his efforts on 
the educated, wealthy Reichsdeutsche in the cities, he did not ig-
nore the isolated German communities in the serra, where his gos-
pel was at first gladly received, especially in Evangelical districts. 
Local chapters of the Bund were organized in many communities 
during January and February, 1916, and their officers often in-
cluded pastors and teachers of local Evangelical churches and 
schools. Temporary officers of the national organization were cho-
sen in February; A. Krall, an agent of the Hamburg-Amerika ship-
ping firm in Porto Alegre, became the first president. In Santa Ca-
tarina the prime mover of the organization was Arthur Koehler, 
the publisher of the Blumenau Urwaldsbote. Otto Rohkohl, de-
scribed as the German consul, served as the local chairman; to 
everyone's surprise, the Bund attracted the support of both the 
local Evangelical pastor, Walter Mummelthey, and the head of the 
Franciscan order, Father Marcellus. A new era of harmony and 
cooperation had arrived, it appeared, as the first issue of the 
Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes fUr Sud-Amerika was pub-
lished early in March. 41 
Zimmerli, an unusually energetic and aggressive person, moved 
so rapidly and successfully that one suspects that his employment 
as a Red Cross representative was merely a cover for his real job. 
Further research might well reveal that he, like Albert Dernburg 
and several other persons ostensibly working for the Red Cross in 
the United States, was an agent of the German government as-
signed to propaganda activity.42 It is obvious that the German-
40. Ibid., March 7, 1916; Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes far Sad-Amerika, I 
(March, 1916), 2, (November, 1916), 286; Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 269; 
Haring, The Germans in South America, 46. 
41. Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes fUr Sad-Amerika, I (November, 1916), 
312-13; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), January 21, February 16,1916; Fugmann, 
Die Deutschen in Parana, 130. 
42. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 127. In a communication dated June 13, 1916, 
Count Johann von Bemstorff, the German ambassador to the United States, re-
ferred to Zimmerli as a "Red Cross delegate" who had arrived in the United States 
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ische Bund was expected to counter the success of the Liga pelos 
Alliados; the inaugural issue of the Monatsbliitter explicitly cited 
the league as an enemy of Germany and declared its intention to 
combat the league's propaganda. Zimmerli enjoyed the immediate 
and full support of the German consular corps; the Reichs-
deutsche also responded eagerly. It is clear that Zimmerli's pri-
mary purpose was to mobilize German-Brazilian opinion, wealth, 
and influence under the kaiser's banner.43 All the fine talk about 
Germanic culture and the improvement of relations with Luso-
Brazilian society was a clumsy effort to screen the real purpose of 
the organization. Even more heavy-handed was Zimmerli's harsh 
condemnation of Teuto-Brazilian leaders who opposed his work. 
As a stranger to Brazil, Zimmerli was unfamiliar with the lead-
ership structure of the existing German-Brazilian subculture and 
he carelessly offended many influential persons. 44 Like his coun-
terparts in the United States, he had no real understanding of the 
degree of assimilation that had actually taken place among Teuto-
Brazilians, despite their continued maintenance of the German 
language and customs. Nor did he comprehend the ways in which 
his organization-an ephemeral expediency serving the imme-
diate interests of Germany-might undermine the established 
leadership structure of the ethnic subsociety or how his success 
threatened to cause a further deterioration of its relationships 
with Luso-Brazilian society. 
Opposition to Zimmerli and his Bund developed most quickly 
among the Evangelical clergy of Rio Grande do SuI and spread to 
the influential Verband deutscher Vereine in Porto Alegre. The 
Reverend Kolfhaus of Sao Leopoldo and Dr. Martin Braunschweig, 
the resident provost of the Prussian state church, led the attack 
through the pages of the Deutsche Post, a Sao Leopoldo news-
paper that catered to Protestant readers. Widely reprinted in other 
from Brazil "without means" and "compromised financially." Bernstorff reported 
that he had obtained from private sources the means to finance a two-month lec-
ture tour for Zimmerli in the United States. He assumed that he would subse-
quently receive reimbursement from Berlin. RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder. 
43. Monatsbliitter des Germanischen Bundes [iir Sud-Amerika, I (March, 1916), 2, 
(April, 1916), 55; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sui, 20-21; 
Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 7, 1916. 
44. Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 21. 
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German-language publications, including many that flatly re-
jected its arguments, the Post's articles crystallized opposition to 
the Bund by mid-March, 1916. By then the debate had degener-
ated into a mud-slinging contest, thereby dissolving any real pos-
sibility that the Bund might achieve its clandestine goals.45 
By the end of February the German-language newspapers were 
filled with charges, explanations, and countercharges about the 
Germanische Bund. The first criticisms were mild enough: If the 
real purpose of the Bund was to fight pro-Ally propaganda, why 
exclude non-Germans (Turks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and non-
German Austrians, as well as friendly Luso-Brazilians) from the 
organization? The argument of the Porto Alegre Verband deutscher 
Vereine was more to the point. Sensitive to the Bund's challenge to 
its status within the German ethnic community, the Verband ob-
served that since the goals of the Bund were so similar to its own, 
it made little sense to fracture the force of Teuto-Brazilian opinion 
by establishing a rival to its leadership.46 Meanwhile, the Sao 
Leopoldo Post charged that Zimmerli was exploiting German pa-
triotism for his own personal benefit and predicted that money 
collected by the Bund would never go to the German Red Cross. 
Such attacks on Zimmerli's integrity continued for a month. Highly 
sensitive to these personal charges, Zimmerli, a former Protestant 
pastor, blamed them on the Evangelical clergy, especially Provost 
Braunschweig. He was especially puzzled by Braunschweig's op-
position because the latter was, after all, an official representative 
of the German government. 47 Finally, when Zimmerli was de-
nounced as a danger to the Brazilian state by the president of the 
Verband deutscher Vereine, Aloys Friedrich, the Bund retorted 
that such a charge was like "throwing a firebrand into the lordly 
house of our Deutschtum."48 
By the end of March, news of the imbroglio had become stan-
dard fare even in the Portuguese-language press. Pro-Ally news-
45. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 18, 1916; Fischer, "Die deutsche 
Presse in Rio Grande do SuJ," 21-22; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 26, 
1916. 
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47. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), February 26, March 15, 16, April 3, 1916; 
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papers such as the Jornal do Commercio and A Noite charged that 
Zimmerli was at the center of a plot to destroy public order in 
Rio Grande do SuI. The Porto Alegre Ditirio (controlled by Teuto-
Brazilians) echoed the Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo in denounc-
ing Zimmerli as a thief and a swindler. The pro-German Ditirio of 
Rio de Janeiro reported the circulation of rumors that connected 
Zimmerli with an intended mobilization of the Germans in the 
southern states and that in Santa Catarina alone, Germans had a 
military force of eighty thousand armed men, including cavalry. 49 
It was obvious that Zimmerli's usefulness to the German cause 
had vanished. Early in April, 1916, he left for Rio de Janeiro to 
receive the commendations of the German ambassador before re-
turning to Europe via the United States. Little more was heard of 
him, but his organization and its periodical survived until Oc-
tober, 1917, when Brazil entered the war and put an end to such 
activity. During its year and a half of publication, the Monatsbliitter 
turned out page after page of the crassest sort of ethnocentrism 
and column after column of polemics aimed either at the Allied 
powers or at Teuto-Brazilians who disagreed with its purposes 
and methods. Unable to unite the Germans, it succeeded only in 
dividing them more deeply. Some local chapters of the Bund re-
mained active well into 1917, but others were neutralized by Evan-
gelical pastors who used their prestige to take over the leadership 
and then, having gained office, allowed the organization to wither. 
Bitterness, dissension, and anxiety remained as the heritage of 
Zimmerli's brief sojourn in Brazil. In effect he managed to inten-
sify the Teuto-Brazilian sense of alienation and insecurity on one 
hand and of bellicose superiority on the other. At the same time, 
Zimmerli's organization offended the Luso-Brazilians and stimu-
lated their determination to put an end to such divisive behavior 
as soon as possible. 50 
Luso-Brazilians, especially those who strongly favored the 
cause of the Allies, tended to see the Germans as a united group, 
despite the disagreements and divisions that were so apparent to 
49. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, March 26, 1916; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto 
Alegre), March 29, 31, 1916. 
50. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 31, April 3, September 22, 1916; 
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persons within the ethnic community itself. This tendency was 
enhanced by the Portuguese-language press, which reported as 
newsworthy the most extravagant opinions of German Brazilians, 
their most outrageous behavior, and the most exceptional events 
related to the problem. Rapid assimilators and others within the 
German community who disagreed with the chauvinists and 
were embarrassed by their behavior usually remained silent. Be-
cause they said or did nothing to attract the attention of the press, 
they were unable to modify the prevailing image of the Teuto-
Brazilian subsociety. Thus Luso-Brazilians assumed that the Ger-
mans spoke with one voice and that officers of ethnic voluntary 
associations, particularly those of unions such as the Verband 
deutscher Vereine, were representative of the entire German-
Brazilian population. Such an illusion of unity was precisely what 
these officials hoped for, because they believed that it would 
invest their defense of Deutschtum with greater authority and 
strength. Indeed, the Porto Alegre Verband deliberately cultivated 
this misapprehension when it characterized itself as an umbrella 
organization that spoke for all Germans in the city-Catholics, 
Evangelicals, Lutherans, merchants, professional people, crafts-
men, factory workers, and unskilled laborers. 51 
A Teuto-Brazilian Foreign Minister 
Pro-Ally Brazilians were also concerned about the few persons of 
German origin who held high political office in the national or 
state governments. They assumed that such persons would auto-
matically pursue policies that would favor Germany. It is a curious 
irony that the one Teuto-Brazilian who had attained genuine emi-
nence in the Brazilian government, Lauro Muller, held the office 
of foreign minister at that time. A politician of major importance, 
he was, according to Ruy Barbosa, one of a small group of five or 
six leaders who virtually selected Hermes da Fonseca over Bar-
bosa as the president of Brazil in 1909. Muller had been appointed 
to his office by Hermes in 1912 as the successor to the celebrated 
Baron Rio Branco. In general, he conducted the affairs of the For-
51. Cf. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), March 13, 1915. 
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Lauro Muller, foreign minister of Brazil from 1912 to 1917, born in Santa Catarina 
of German immigrant parents 
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eign Ministry with distinction, especially in strengthening rela-
tions with Argentina and Chile. 52 
With the advent of war in 1914, Muller sought to keep Brazil on 
a course of strict neutrality, believing that such a policy would be 
advantageous for Brazil. His position was analogous to that of his 
American counterpart, William Jennings Bryan, whose strong 
neutralism eventually led him to deep disagreements with Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson and ultimately to his resignation as secre-
tary of state in the wake of the Lusitania crisis in 1915.53 The Luso-
Brazilian elite, who clearly favored the Allies for economic as well 
as cultural reasons, interpreted Muller's policies as pro-German. 
From their point of view, the best interests of the country called 
for an outspoken pro-Ally policy. Because Muller's brand of neu-
52. Jose Maria Bello, A Histcrry of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964 (4th ed., trans. 
James L. Taylor with a concluding chapter by Rollie E. Poppino; Stanford, Calif., 
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ignores his role as foreign minister. See his "Lauro Mueller," 172-88. 
53. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 129, 136. Cf. Paolo Coletta, "A Question of Alter-
natives: Wilson, Bryan, Lansing, and America's Intervention in World War 1," 
Nebraska Histcrry, LXIII (Spring, 1982),33-57. 
The Distant War 113 
tralism also worked to the advantage of Germany, it seemed to 
give ample evidence of his deepest sympathies. 
Muller's detractors could not forget his German ancestry, de-
spite his record of patriotic service, nor would they let others for-
get it. For his part, Muller made no effort to hide or deny his ante-
cedents, even though he was keenly aware of the liability his 
ethnicity imposed upon his conduct of the nation's foreign affairs. 
A small incident suggests how deeply the problem affected him 
psychologically. Upon his return from a trip to the United States, 
Muller was the guest of honor at a reception held by a Brazilian 
politician. The host's son innocently asked Muller what he was, 
expecting an answer such as lawyer, engineer, teacher, or busi-
nessman. Caught off guard, Muller just as innocently replied, "I 
am a German." Needless to say, his enemies seized upon this slip 
and used it to discredit his alleged neutralism. It would be a mis-
take, however, to class Muller with the pro-German cultural chau-
vinists. He was thoroughly assimilated, and except for his final 
two or three years as foreign minister, the fact that he was the son 
of German-born parents was inconsequential. Another story that 
circulated about him was that on one occasion he slyly observed, 
"The only time I feel like a German is when I see a bottle of 
beer." 54 
The British Black List 
For a time it appeared to many Brazilians that Muller's policies 
were right after all and that the country's destiny was not in fact 
tied to the Allies. Early in 1916 the British Parliament approved 
the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, a central element in its eco-
nomic warfare with Germany. This law called for the development 
and regular revision of a register of persons and firms with whom 
British persons and firms were forbidden to trade. This Black List 
was intended to include any company anywhere that traded with 
the Central Powers. In fact, however, many companies were listed 
only because they were personally or corporately owned, con-
54. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania. 143; Oberacker. Der deutsche Beitrag. 
330-33; Konigk. Die Politik Brasiliens. 38; interview with Egon Schaden. January 8. 
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trolled, or managed by Germans or persons with German names. 55 
British consuls in Brazilian cities were especially influential in 
gathering information for the Black List. In Sao Paulo, for ex-
ample, George Falconer Atlee was unusually aggressive, doing 
everything he could to coordinate a Black List committee in the 
city and to drive German merchants and bankers out of busi-
ness. 56 In Sao Paulo as elsewhere in Brazil, the immediacy of war 
precluded the possibility of basing the Black List on substantial 
evidence or proof rather than on allegation or suspicion; hence in-
justices were as frequent as the many ingenious efforts to disguise 
trade with Germany through the use of intermediaries, false 
names of consignees, and the like. 
Before the war, Germany had ranked third behind the United 
States and Britain in the value of Brazil's foreign commerce. After 
direct trade with Germany had been eliminated by the British 
naval blockade, commerce increased markedly with the still-
neutral United States and the neutral countries of Europe, such as 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. But since British trade 
continued undiminished, it remained a powerful weapon to club 
neutral nations into line. The many bitter complaints that were 
registered about the injustices of the Black List were regarded by 
the British merely as unsolicited testimony to its efficacy. 57 
The Black List was widely perceived in Brazil and elsewhere as 
an unwarranted violation of neutral rights, and many Brazilians 
were appalled by the zeal with which British consular agents in 
Brazil tried to enforce it. Some Brazilian companies were devas-
tated by the shock waves that raced through the economy. In the 
three southern states, for example, coal was withheld from river 
steamers operated by firms with German connections, with the 
result that vital water transportation there was seriously disrupted. 
A substantial portion of Brazil's foreign trade was in the hands of 
firms with German names; the Black List included them as well as 
some corporations whose apparent German connections were 
55. The Brazilian finns on the Black List by city are given in Uhle's Kalender: 
191 7, p. 78· 
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limited to the names of certain stockholders. Although Teuto-
Brazilian firms in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere were dismayed by 
the Black List and the raw economic power it represented, they 
were not alone; many Luso-Brazilian businessmen swelled the 
chorus of opposition. Brazil formally protested in a diplomatic 
note to the British government that the nationality of a firm is de-
termined by its place of registration, not the citizenship of its 
stockholders, and that therefore such enforcement of the list in-
fringed upon Brazilian sovereignty. Like its counterpart in the 
United States, the normally pro-Ally Brazilian press sharply criti-
cized the Black List and its administration. 58 
The Bra2!ilian economy was similarly damaged in 1917 when 
Britain prohibited the importation of coffee, Brazil's chief export. 
Britain itself had an ample warehouse supply. By restricting cof-
fee imports, it freed much-needed vessels for the shipment of 
more vital commodities. At the same time, the British navy tightly 
controlled the quantity of coffee going to the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, thereby preventing the resale of sur-
pluses to Germany. Brazil was left holding the coffee bag as its ex-
ports of this commodity dropped in 1917 to 70 percent of what 
they had been in 1915. Again the Brazilian press condemned Brit-
ain for its restrictive policies, which continued even after Brazil 
broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in April, 1917.59 
As the war in Europe dragged on through the summer and fall 
of 1916 the German-language newspapers gradually seemed to 
weary of the subject. The evils of the Black List commanded the 
most attention in their columns, and defensive responses to slan-
der, real or imagined, against German culture continued as be-
fore. The papers printed many reports about the Germanische 
Bund and its activities, as German Brazilians continued to quibble 
over the usage of the terms germanisch as opposed to deutsch. But 
58. Martin, Latin America and the War, 42; Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Ger-
mania, 169; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 486-90; Uhle's Kalender: 1917, 
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German coffee-importing firm .of Theodor Wille, see Siegfried Zimmermann, 
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the heady excitement and enthusiasm of the first year of the war 
had abated. 
At least one Teuto-Brazilian, a resident of Lajes in the interior of 
Santa Catarina, was determined to have a little fun at British ex-
pense. Describing himself as a fanatical Deutschenfresser in a letter 
to the British consul in Porto Alegre, he reported that the "wicked 
German Franciscans" in Lajes had constructed what appeared to 
be a wireless radio station in order to receive communications 
from Germany. Nearly two months later, in October, 1916, an.En-
glishman attached to the British embassy arrived in Lajes to inves-
tigate. Ineptly disguised as a cattleman, he was accompanied by a 
black servant and a local boy as translator. At this point, everyone 
decided to join in the gag. A couple of wires were hastily strung 
from the top of a dilapidated windmill to an old printshop on the 
grounds of the Franciscan cloister. When the Englishman arrived, 
he was treated with all gravity. Unaware that he was playing the 
fool, he examined this evidence and then hurried back to Porto 
Alegre to file his report on the evil Franciscans' subversive activi-
ties. Meanwhile, the Germans hugely enjoyed their practical joke, 
which was subsequently reported in the German-language press. 
They could hardly believe that anyone could have taken the origi-
nalletter seriously, much less dispatch an embassy official hun-
dreds of miles into primitive country to investigate such a silly 
rumor. 60 
Some Comparisons 
The experiences of the Teuto-Brazilians during the neutrality pe-
riod were remarkably like those of German Americans. In both 
countries the leadership classes tended to be sympathetic to the 
Allied powers and in both most common people tended to regard 
war in Europe as a distant affair of no imme~iate concern to them. 
Still, German immigrants and their descendants naturally tended 
to be partisans of the Central Powers. 
The German-language press in both Brazil and the United States 
defended the kaiser and his troops against atrocity charges lev-
eled by British and French propagandists. Countless Vereine ac-
60. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 80-81. 
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tively supported the Central Powers through demonstrations, 
rallies, and bazaars organized to raise contributions for the Ger-
man Red Cross and to sell German war bonds. Germany sought 
to gain editorial control of newspapers in both countries and, 
under the protective cover of the German Red Cross, dispatch 
agents to organize German immigrant groups in support of the 
fatherland. In both countries the effect of the war in Europe was 
to energize German immigrant identity with Germany. 
The responses of the churches were more varied. In Brazil, the 
Evangelical synods, numerically dominant and proportionately 
much more important there than in the United States, relied on 
Germany for financial support and for a steady supply of pastors. 
Evangelical leaders in Catholic Brazil frequently articulated a rela-
tionship between German culture and Protestant theology that 
had no equivalent in the United States. Hence, partisanship for 
Germany tend to be comparatively strong among Teuto-Brazilian 
Protestants. At the same time, however, some Brazilian Lutherans 
had organizational bonds with American churches and refused to 
give any official support to the kaiser's cause. 
The hierarchy of the Catholic church in Brazil, which was largely 
drawn from Luso-Brazilian sources, naturally tended to support 
the pro-Ally stance of the Brazilian elite. Hence, such a German-
born prelate as Archbishop J030 Becker felt strong pressure to 
conform and to oppose those Teuto-Brazilian priests and lay-
persons who were vocally pro-German. A contrasting relation-
ship prevailed in the United States, where the Catholics were a mi-
nority and the hierarchy was dominated by Irish bishops, most of 
whom had scant sympathy for Britain. While few were indiscreet 
enough to oppose the Allies openly, there is little evidence of dif-
ferences in the United States comparable to those that divided the 
Brazilian church in this respect. 
In both countries the Germans were perceived by the host so-
ciety as a unified group without significant internal differences 
and conflicts. Hence, their threat to dominant pro-Ally attitudes 
was perceived as being greater than it really was. In Brazil as in 
the United States, prominent German ethnic leaders fostered this 
misperception because it seemed to grant greater authority to 
their defense of German goals and policies. 
The economics of both countries were deeply affected as world 
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war disrupted patterns of international trade. British efforts to en-
force the Black List led to rankling injustices everywhere and 
moderated pro-Ally sentiment among business leaders, just as 
pro-German spokesmen were stimulated thereby to press their 
partisanship with new vigor. Such developments left the German 
ethnic groups in both the United States and Brazil ill-prepared for 
the dramatic events that transpired in the spring months of 1917. 
5 
April Riots 
By THE END OF 1916 the news from the battlefields of Eu-rope had dissipated any illusions about the nature of mod-
ern warfare. The slaughter in the trenches was horrible 
beyond imagination; the countless wounded were theatened by 
disease; the smell of death penetrated hundreds of villages in all 
fighting areas; and many thousands-even millions-of persons 
living in otherwise rich and bountiful lands faced starvation. For 
the multitudes of war-weary on both sides, victory seemed an al-
most senseless goal; the attainment of some sort of peace was a 
more rational object, a more earnest hope. 
The United States, like Brazil, remained officially neutral, even 
though national sentiment tended to favor Britain, France, and 
their allies over Germany and Austria. Both countries were af-
fected economically in intricate and diverse ways; because of ex-
tensive trade relations, both were vitally concerned about sub-
marine warfare and its effect on neutral shipping. Following the 
destruction of the American vessel Sussex in March, 1916, the 
American government had successfully pressured the Germans to 
abandon unrestricted submarine warfare and to return to estab-
lished rules of visit and search before sinking merchant vessels. 
Germany adhered to this "Sussex Pledge" throughout the re-
mainder of 1916 and in December, having attained some military 
successes on its eastern front, undertook a peace offensive, sug-
gesting that talks begin without reference to terms. American 
President Woodrow Wilson, who clearly perceived that failure to 
120 Germans in Brazil 
attain a negotiated peace at that time would mean a return to un-
restricted submarine warfare and then American involvement in 
the war, publicly supported a settlement without indemnities and 
annexations in which both sides could negotiate as equals. Thus, 
as 1917 began, it appeared to many observers that peace was 
possible. 
Then came a dramatic and ominous change. Within the war 
councils of the German government, advocates of military solu-
tions won out over those who favored the diplomatic approach. 
Wilson's "Peace without Victory" initiative was answered with an 
announcement from the German government that starting on 
February 1, 1917, its submarines would sink without warning the 
ships of all nations destined for Allied ports. Three days later the 
United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, an ac-
tion fully expected by the German warlords, who believed that 
disrupting the flow of supplies to the Allies was worth the risk of 
American involvement. They confidently expected to deliver a 
military knockout before the unprepared United States could field 
an effective army on European soil. 
Before the month had passed, President Wilson asked Con-
gress for authority to arm American merchantmen and, in effect, 
to initiate an undeclared naval war against German submarines. 
Congress debated the issue at length but without resolution until 
the session came to an end. Wilson, who had begun his second 
term as president, thereupon used his executive authority to order 
the arming of the vessels. In mid-March, four American ships 
were torpedoed in rapid succession. Finding no honorable alter-
native to full-fledged belligerency, Wilson then called Congress 
into special session for the purpose of declaring war on Germany. 
After a few days of debate, the war resolution was adopted and 
signed by the president on April 6, 1917. 
Brazilian Response to German Submarine Warfare 
Although Brazil's Foreign Ministry remained in close contact with 
the American Department of State during those weeks, its re-
sponse to the Germans' resumption of unrestricted submarine 
warfare was less aggressive. Given the illiteracy rate among Brazil-
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ians generally and their physical distance from the theaters of 
war, there could be no genuine popular sentiment in favor of Bra-
zilian involvement. Nevertheless, many influential persons in Bra-
zil were remarkably belligerent. Several leading Rio de Janeiro 
newspapers were vociferous in their condemnation of Germany. 
The Jornal do Commercio, for example, denounced Germany's pol-
icy as "ruthless piracy," and the Correio de Manha declared that 
Brazil's place was "at the side of the United States." The Liga pelos 
Alliados adopted a resolution urging the president of Brazil to put 
an end to its "criminal neutrality, which shames us before the 
world and injures us economically and financially, while causing 
us to be suspected by the Allies as passive accomplices of the Ger-
man government."l Many of these same voices were raised in 
favor of preparedness; they argued that circumstances demanded 
that Brazil expand its armed forces immediately. 
No one person was more emphatic or more effective in promot-
ing support for the Allies than was the brilliant rhetorician Ruy 
Barbosa. A politician of unusual charisma, Barbosa was famous 
for his eloquent criticism of the government, the ruling class or 
clique, especially the military, and their policies. As a senator 
from Bahia, he had through the years built up a large personal 
following-perhaps the largest of any individual politician in Bra-
zil-and was a frequent but never successful candidate for the 
presidency. In 1916 he held the relatively unimportant post of am-
bassador to Argentina, but he used it to popularize his views, 
particularly in a widely publicized speech delivered at the law 
school in Buenos Aires in which he condemned neutrality in the 
Great War as immoral and cowardly.2 Like the former American 
president Theodore Roosevelt, whom he resembled in some ways, 
Barbosa perceived the world conflict as a titanic struggle between 
the forces of good and evil-democrats versus autocrats, the de-
fenders of liberty versus vicious perpetrators of international 
1. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 251, 255-56; The Brazilian Green Book, 
14-17; New York Times, February 5, 6, 7, 1917. 
2. Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 2)). See Magalhaes, "Germany and South 
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crime. He spoke at numerous patriotic rallies and demonstrations 
in 1916 and 1917; his speeches were widely reprinted and trans-
lated. One entitled "A grande conflagra<;ao" was published in an 
Italian-language edition of thirty thousand copies. 3 
The partisans of the Allies focused their attention on the foreign 
minister, Lauro Muller, whose ethnic antecedents they could not 
forget. Barbosa in particular seems to have been resentful of 
Muller and dismayed that the Foreign Ministry was in the hands 
of a man whose parents had been born in Germany. According to 
o Paiz, one of the most outspoken of Rio newspapers to advocate 
a pro-Ally policy, the moment had come for Muller to demon-
strate that his German origins would not "prevent him from act-
ing in a positive manner," by which was meant pursuing a policy 
matching that of the United States. Muller was also attacked in the 
Brazilian Congress, where Medeiros de Albuquerque, a member 
of the Chamber of Deputies, asserted that Brazil should have 
aligned itself long before with the Allies. He also implied that 
Muller, whom he described as a cowardly tool of Germanism, was 
humiliating Brazil by his policies and frustrating the "noble aspi-
rations of the Brazilian people."4 
In fact, however, MUller pursued a moderate and prudent 
course. Neither he nor President Wenceslau Braz believed that in-
tervention would be in Brazil's best interest. Sensitive to the limi-
tations placed on his political actions by the accident of his par-
entage, Miiller prepared a dispatch to the German government 
regarding Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine war-
fare. Ostensibly written by President Braz, the note protested the 
German policy as a violation of international law and announced 
that his government would hold Germany responsible for any 
hostile acts against Brazilian merchant vessels. 5 
Miiller's note was dismissed by his pro-Ally enemies as weak 
and indecisive. Medeiros de Albuquerque attacked it as a "terrible 
deception" that did nothing to dissipate the suspicion surround-
ing the foreign minister. If Miiller could back his empty words 
with decisive acts, Medeiros suggested, his aspirations to the 
presidency could be taken seriously, for in that event he would 
3. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 10, 1917. 
4. New York Times, February 5, 1917. 
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"win so great a victory over himself" that no one could dispute his 
right to the republic's highest office. 6 
Germany refused to attach much importance to the Brazilian 
protest. To abandon its submarine blockade, the Germans replied 
in a note delivered late in February, would risk national annihila-
tion; although it was indeed likely that Brazil would suffer losses, 
any claims could easily be negotiated through diplomatic dis-
course. 7 The German response seemed to validate the fears of 
Muller's enemies, and his position became increasingly untenable 
during the weeks and months that followed. 
Anti-German Propaganda 
Meanwhile, anti-German propaganda intensified. It was repeat-
edly charged that Germany had been plotting for years to use the 
German settlements in southern Brazil as the base for its imperi-
alist designs. Most of these allegations appear to have been drawn 
from several widely distributed tracts written by a French jour-
nalist and propagandist, Andre Cheradame, whose Pangerman 
Plot Unmasked (1917) claimed that Germany had coveted southern 
Brazil for years. Brazilians of German origin were "almost abso-
lute masters" in Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, according 
to Cheradame, and by virtue of a German law of 1913 that permit-
ted dual citizenship, they were "liege men of William II." Chera-
dame claimed that the "German Peril" was all the more real because 
the numerous SchiUzenvereine (rifle clubs) were in fact military so-
cieties capable of assisting in the establishment of a huge protec-
torate that the Germans planned to extend over Paraguay, Uru-
guay, and parts of Argentina and Brazil. 8 
Sympathizers of the Allies were only too eager to accept such 
propaganda as truth. A Noite of Rio de Janiero was especially ac-
6. New York Times, February 14, 1917. 
7. Ibid., February 26, 1917. 
8. Andre Cheradame, The Pangerman Plot Unmasked (New York, 1917), 193-98, 
and esp. the map (p. 194). The United States Department of State had heard 
rumors of "80,000 shooting club members" as early as June, 1916, and had asked 
the American charge d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro to check them out. The State 
Department regarded the rumors as propagandistic exaggeration and believed 
that the German Brazilians in fact represented no threat. See Leland Harrison to 
Alexander Benson, June 8, 1917, in RG 59, Entry 540, Letters Received by Leland 
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tive in promoting this brand of propaganda. In February, 1917, for 
example, it reported that the agent of German imperialism in the 
southern states was the Hamburg Colonization Company, an or-
ganization with which Lauro Muller had connections. The com-
pany had in fact been settling German immigrants in Brazil since 
1900. According to A Noite, only colonists of German nationality 
were admitted to settlement on company lands, which were lo-
cated near the border between Rio Grande do SuI and Santa Cata-
rina. It was also alleged that the colonists would soon demand the 
incorporation of southern Brazil with Germany under the name 
"Antarctic Germany." Several weeks later, A Noite assigned a re-
porter to study the "German Danger." According to his findings, 
Blumenau was a purely German city with forty Schiitzenvereine 
whose members were prepared to spring into action at a moment's 
notice. 9 
Another Noite article charged that a German pastor in Santa 
Cruz in Rio Grande do SuI, speaking from the chancel of his 
church, had advised the children of his parish to refrain from 
talking Portuguese because it was an inferior language that they 
learned on the streets from Negro youngsters. Although it is true 
that some Germans were capable of such cultural chauvinism, in 
this case the facts were twisted. It was the publisher of the Porto 
Alegre Volksblatt (not a clergyman) who had addressed the young 
people in a general meeting of German Catholics (not a worship 
service). He urged them to learn both the Portuguese and Ger-
man languages well and to use each as circumstances demanded, 
in preference to their German dialects and the dreadful Portu-
guese laden with vulgar expressions that "Negroes and other 
fourth-class persons use." The comment was certainly infused 
with a sense of ethnic superiority, but not at the expense of Luso-
Brazilian culture. 10 
Harrison, 1916-1918, Box 1; Alexander Benson to Secretary of State, March 20, 
1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9· 
For studies of Allied propaganda in the United States and elsewhere, see Read, 
Atrocity Prapaganda; and Horace Peterson, Propaganda for War: The Campaign against 
American Neutrality (Norman, 1939). 
9. New York Times, February 24, 1917; A Raw (Rio de Janeiro), February 7, 1917; 
Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), May 29, 1917. 
10. Uhle's Kalender: 1917, p. 76. 
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The German-language newspapers frequently protested against 
pro-Ally propaganda and accused French and English agents of 
originating the rumors, but their comments rarely found their way 
into the Portuguese-language press and thus had little effect. The 
Curitiba Kompass, for example, insisted that there was no basis 
whatever for the so-called deutsche Gefahr, either in Germany or 
among Teuto-Brazilians, the great majority of whom were citizens 
who readily identified Brazil as their fatherland. Even Clarence 
Haring, who wrote in the immediate postwar period, correctly as-
serted that there was no evidence that the German government 
ever intended to annex any part of Brazil and that any danger of a 
military sort from Teuto-Brazilians was remote. The typical Ger-
man farmer wanted most of all to be left alone. He had come to 
Brazil as an impoverished immigrant, had prospered there, and 
hence felt no particular loyalty to Germany. There may have been 
a few secret agents of the German embassy in the Teuto-Brazilian 
districts, but they posed no threat to Brazil, lacking both effective 
cohesion and leadership. If any peril to Brazil existed, wrote Har-
ing, it was to be found among some of the German capitalists of 
the coastal cities-Reichsdeutsche, supported by German 
banks-who believed that a German victory would enhance their 
business prospects. 11 
Some of these German businessmen were able to exercise con-
siderable influence on the German-language press. Thus it was 
that throughout the early months of 1917, some newspapers such 
as the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre and the Germania of Sao 
Paulo continued to follow a steadily pro-German line despite the 
ominous signs that Luso-Brazilian tolerance for such behavior was 
weakening. Even after the United States had declared war on Ger-
many, the Germania criticized German Americans for proclaiming 
that money collected for the German Red Cross would now go to 
the American Red Cross instead. Their desire as American citi-
zens to support the United States over was understandable, ob-
served the Germania, but it was hardly necessary for them to be-
have like loud-mouthed Yankees, declaring that their patriotism 
11. Curitiba Kompass, April 17, 1917; Haring, The Germans in South America, 66. 
See also "Situation at Sao Paulo," anonymous report transmitted to the Depart-
ment of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, 
April 26, 1918, in RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder. 
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was of the highest possible order. Still, the Germania recognized 
that the Teuto-Brazilian situation had become extremely sensitive 
and stressed the necessity of remaining calm. All eyes were on the 
southern states to observe the conduct of Germans, this news-
paper warned; unrest there could do extraordinary damage to the 
small colonies of Germans in such places as Pernambuco, Bahia, 
Rio, and Sao Paulo without helping the German cause a bit. 12 
Germans Sink the Parana 
Trouble was not long in coming. Although the northern cities did 
not escape the violence, the greatest damage was suffered in Porto 
Alegre and other centers of Teuto-Brazilian population and eco-
nomic power in Rio Grande do SuI. The tinderbox was set aflame 
by news that on Aprils, 1917, a German submarine off the coast 
of northern France had sunk the Parana, a small Brazilian freighter 
of 4,461 tons laden with 93,000 sacks of coffee. Official confirma-
tion of the sinking came on the same day that the United States 
declared war on Germany. Following his rescue by a French war-
ship, the captain of the Parana cabled the ship's owner, the Com-
merce and Navigation Company of Rio, that the vessel had been 
torpedoed without warning, that it had been shelled five times, 
and that three crewmen had been killed. 13 
There was little doubt that Brazil would respond with anything 
less than a formal break in diplomatic relations. The Liga pelos 
Alliados naturally demanded an immediate declaration of war. A 
Noite agreed, insisting that a mere break was insufficient. In addi-
tion, it demanded reprisals and a declaration of "sympathetic 
neutrality," but preferred that Brazil should join the Allies in war. 
Other papers took a similar position, but according to the New 
York Times, the U.S. Department of State estimated that the Ger-
man influence in Brazil was "still too strong" for a declaration of 
war. This was an oblique reference to Foreign Minister Muller, 
who somewhat quixotically fought a delaying action, urging that 
Brazil demand satisfaction from Germany in the form of punish-
12. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 2, 10, 1917. 
13- Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, April 6, 1917; New York Times, April 7, 8, 
9, 1917. 
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ment for the submarine commander and indemnification for the 
families of the victims; if Germany then failed to comply, he said, 
Brazil should cut off diplomatic relations. While Muller was strong 
enough to prevent an immediate declaration of war, he could not 
delay a severance of relations. Prompt action was demanded 
because at that moment nearly fifty German merchant vessels 
berthed in Brazilian ports were subject to seizure if a diplomatic 
rupture were declared. In order to head off their escape, the other 
cabinet ministers prevailed over MUller, and on April 11 the break 
was officially announced.14 
The next day, April 12, the Brazilian Ministry of Marine im-
pounded the German ships in an action tactfully described as a 
measure taken to prevent German crews from inflicting dam-
age on the ships. According to one newspaper account, customs 
guards in Santos caught disembarking German seamen carrying 
important and virtually irreplaceable parts of their vessel's en-
gines.15 The Brazilian government fully appreciated the potential 
value of forty or fifty German ships. They could go a long way 
toward indemnifying Brazil for the loss of some of its own vessels 
to German torpedoes; more important, they could greatly enlarge 
the size of Brazil's merchant marine and expand its capacity to 
market coffee, the keystone of the nation's buffeted economy. 
While government leaders debated the appropriate course for 
Brazil to follow, the superpatriotic press kept stoking the fires of 
anti-Germanism. A Noite in particular printed rumors about Ger-
man spies sending mysterious light signals and radio messages. 
In an article on the German rifle clubs (Schiitzenvereine) in south-
ern Brazil, the paper charged that they were military organiza-
tions. The Jornal do Commercio suggested that they be mobilized 
into the Brazilian army, where they could be properly controlled. 
The Liga pela Alliados sent a series of demands to President Braz 
that received extensive coverage. Included were the disarming of 
the rifle clubs, a rigorous surveillance of all Reichsdeutsche and 
a prohibition of correspondence among them, the dismissal of 
14. New York Times, April 8, 13, 1917. The Times reprinted numerous news 
items in translation from Brazilian newspapers. 
15. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 252; New York Times, April 13, 14, 16, 
1917. 
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Lauro Muller as foreign minister, and the appointment of Ruy 
Barbosa as his successor. Meanwhile, the Correia de Manha called 
for a full mobilization of military resources; 0 Paiz insisted on a 
declaration of war. In contrast to such jingoism, the governors of 
the southern states, Borges de Medeiros of Rio Grande do SuI and 
Felippe Schmidt of Santa Catarina (Muller's cousin), declared that 
absolute calm reigned in the German districts of their states and 
that the Teuto-Brazilians were incapable of hostile attitudes to-
ward their country. 16 
Such words of moderation were lost amid the widespread dem-
onstrations and patriotic rallies stimulated by the sinking of the 
Parana and the attendant publicity. Obviously orchestrated af-
fairs, the rallies attracted huge crowds in Rio, Sao Paulo, Porto Ale-
gre, and elsewhere. Orators delivered fervent patriotic speeches 
elaborating upon the barbarism of the Germans; national hymns 
and anthems were sung; Brazilian flags were displayed every-
where along with the national banners of the Allies and their new-
est recruit, the United States; and great crowds paraded through 
the major cities. Such processions typically moved from major 
government buildings to the offices of superpatriotic newspapers 
and to the consulates of the Allies. More speeches would be heard 
as the crowd shouted "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" and 
streamed forward to the German and Austrian legations, where 
police guards were often stationed to maintain order. In many 
cases the rallies were transformed into demonstrations against 
the Teuto-Brazilians as the crowds surged to prominent German 
business establishments, clubhouses of German societies, and 
German-language newspapers. Detachments of cavalry frequently 
accompanied the processions in order to restrain incendiary en-
thusiasms. Despite the laudable efforts of local governments to 
maintain order, epithets hurled at these symbols of German power 
in Brazil were often followed by rocks and stones. Such distur-
bances were most serious in Rio de Janeiro and in Sao Paulo, 
where the offices of the Deutsche Zeitung suffered extensive van-
dalism. In Sao Paulo, the American consul estimated the crowd at 
fifteen thousand persons. The police were determined to main-
16. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 12, 1917; New York Times, April 10, 
13, 14, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917. 
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tain order and in their effort to control the mob, one person was 
killed and many more were injured. 17 
Riots in Porto Alegre 
On Friday and Saturday, April 13 and 14, Porto Alegre experi-
enced patriotic demonstrations not unlike those that had occurred 
in other cities. On Saturday night, however, the spirit of the mob 
took over when a huge crowd gathered before the offices of the 
DUirio Allemao. Dr. Vieira Pires, head of the state police, tried to 
calm the multitude but withdrew after he was injured by a stone. 
The police were unable to prevent the mob from entering the 
premises, and pitching books, paper, and furniture into a huge 
bonfire in the street. IS 
Sunday was even more portentous. A relatively small group of 
superpatriots, perhaps a hundred, went by streetcar to Sao Joao, 
a suburb where many Germans lived, apparently in response to a 
deliberately planted rumor that some Germans were planning to 
burn a Brazilian flag on the playing field of the Turnerbund (gym-
nastic society) located there. Finding nothing, they returned to 
the city in a particularly agitated and belligerent mood. Their 
route took them past the Hotel Schmidt, a German inn of some 
renown, whose owner, fearful of the rabble and determined to 
protect his property, had erected a barricade in front of his estab-
lishment. When the frustrated assemblage of superpatriots passed 
by the hotel aboard streetcars, Friedrich Schmidt, supported by 
his son, an employee, and a neighbor, fired pistols into the crowd 
and lightly wounded two passengers. The hotelkeeper and his 
small band were quickly overcome, disarmed, and placed under 
arrest. 19 
17. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, April 12, 1917; New York Times, April 14, 
15,1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 11, 12,25,1917; Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), 
April 26, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April I}, 1917; Charles Hoover to 
Alexander Benson (charge d'affaires in Rio), April 11, 1917, in RG 59, American 
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8. 
18. A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917; Porto Alegre Correia do Povo, 
April 17, 1917. 
19. The account offered in this and the following paragraphs is based on the 
Deutsche Post of Sao Leopoldo, April 24, 1917. It is supplemented and verified by 
other reports in A Federa¢o of Porto Alegre, April 16, 17, 18, 1917; Correia do Povo 
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Then it was discovered that Schmidt had hidden additional 
weapons and ammunition within his hotel. The few police pres-
ent were unable to restrain the crowd and a fearful stoning of the 
hotel ensued. After smashing every window in the building, the 
mob pressed on to other Teuto-Brazilian structures in the neigh-
borhood, gathering recruits as they moved from street to street. 
German-language newspapers, bookstores, pharmacies, restau-
rants, and beer halls, as well as some larger commercial houses, 
were vandalized. Destruction continued through the evening. 
Not until well after midnight did the rioters disperse and peace 
return. But the calm was only temporary. 
On Monday morning, April 16, it appeared at first that the in-
tense emotions of the previous day had subsided. But the Porto 
Alegre newspapers published reports of the Schmidt incident and 
its aftermath, and even though mob violence was uniformly con-
demned, people were agitated. Those of a superpatriotic bent of 
mind were determined to find opportunities to strike back at the 
Germans in retaliation for Schmidt's absurd attack. The Teuto-
Brazilians were fearful. The officers of the Germania Society, for 
example, dispatched a letter to the governor in which they sharply 
denounced Schmidt and his accomplices. 
But it was too late for such well-meant gestures. A group of stu-
dents had previously planned a demonstration for Monday after-
noon. This gathering went out of control almost immediately. 
Swollen by new arrivals, it was tranformed into another ugly mob 
that streamed into the German district and resumed the system-
atic bombardment. All buildings in the area that were known to be 
occupied by either Teuto-Brazilians or Reichsdeutsche were sub-
jected to an awesome volley of rocks and stones. While looting oc-
curred, press accounts make little of it, thereby indirectly stress-
ing the ethnic animosity that seems to have stimulated the riot. 20 
As it had the night before, the riot centered on structures located 
on Caminho Novo, Rua dos Andrades, Rua 7 de Setembro, Rua 
Dr. Flores, Rua General Camara, and Rua 24 de Maio. 
of Porto Alegre, April 17, 1917; Jornal do Commercio of Rio de Janeiro, April 17, 18, 
1917; Germania of Sao Paulo, April 25, 1917; and Der Familienfreund: Katholischer 
Hauskalender fUr das Jahr 1918 (Porto Alegre, [1917]), 129. Cf. Konigk, Die Politik 
Brasiliens, 49-50. 
20. Konigk emphasizes that looting was extensive. See Die Politik Brasiliens, 49. 
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The ruins of the Hotel Schmidt in Porto Alegre, following its destruction by ar-
sonists on April 16, 1917 
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 
By four 0' clock the Hotel Schmidt was in flames. Even though a 
police guard had been posted, a mob estimated at a thousand per-
sons had broken into the building and demolished everything in 
sight. Then someone poured kerosene all around, ignited it, and 
transformed the hotel into a raging inferno. 
The arsonists moved on to the home of one Dr. Viktor Fischel, 
where a series of events unfolded that illuminate in a limited way 
the problems faced by the police. The rioters first bombarded the 
Fischel house with stones, then stormed the doorway, gained en-
trance, smashed its furnishings, and threw the remains into the 
street. The vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped police were pow-
erless to halt the havoc. When the rioters took steps to set Fischel's 
place ablaze, an officer named Hercilio Limeiro bravely faced up 
to the lawless mob and managed to dissuade them. Their atten-
tion was diverted temporarily by the discovery of what appeared 
to be an operation for the manufacture of counterfeit coins. The 
rioters demanded that the police arrest Fischel, who had not es-
caped. After this they went on to commit other criminal acts of 
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their own. Despite the commendable behavior of individual offi-
cers such as Limeiro, it is apparent that authorities were unable to 
dispatch reinforcements to the scene in sufficient numbers to 
maintain order. 
From Fischel's residence the rioters returned to the inner city, 
where on Rua Sao Rafael they came to the clubhouse of the Porto 
Alegre Turnerbund. Everything in it was destroyed-furniture, 
pictures, cabinets, gymnastic equipment. Plans to bum the build-
ing were frustrated by a Major Rath, an instructor in the police 
department whose living quarters were next door. With the help 
of just a few officers, Rath was able to force the mob out of the 
building, but not before much destruction had been wrought. 
The most dramatic events of those terrifying days occurred that 
evening (Monday, April 16, 1917). Reinforced by additions of 
rabble (so labeled by A Federa¢o, the voice of the Rio Grande do 
SuI state government), the mob gathered at 7:00 P.M. in Rua 7 de 
Setembro before the headquarters of the Bromberg Company, 
perhaps the largest, richest, and most powerful German-owned 
firm in Brazil. Again the police were powerless before the crowd. 
Equipped with axes and crowbars, the rioters broke down the 
doors and rushed into the building. Arsonists began their work 
immediately; soon the night sky was illuminated for miles around 
as flames shot upward from exploding drums of petroleum. By 
10:30 P.M., the fire had spread to neighboring businesses and 
warehouses. 
The elegant clubhouse of the Germania Society on Rua Dr. Flo-
res was the next victim. Kerosene was spread all around to guaran-
tee the rapid spread of fire. Within a few moments it was adding to 
the nighttime illumination of Porto Alegre.21 Since all buildings 
here were located immediately adjacent to one another, it seemed 
for a time as though the entire city would go up in flames. It was 
quite beyond the capacity of the municipal firefighters to extin-
guish the gigantic conflagration, but through heroic efforts they 
were able to prevent it from spreading. This achievement came at 
the expense of one fireman's life and injury to several more. 
21. [Sociedade Independencia], Betrachtungen zu Ihrer Geschichte aus Anlass 
der Jahrhundert-Feier, 1855-1955 (Porto Alegre, 1955), 31. See also Hundert Jahre 
Deutschtum, 300. 
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The entrance of the elegant clubhouse of the Germania Society of Porto Alegre 
following its destruction on April 16, 1917 
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 
Meanwhile, arsonists put the torch to scores of other German 
or Teuto-Brazilian residences and businesses. In addition to those 
owned by the Bromberg Company, several other large commercial 
and industrial buildings were destroyed that night. The list reads 
like a directory of major German companies. The printing plant of 
the Deutsche Zeitung suffered a surprise attack and much equip-
ment was damaged before it was saved from arsonists by the 
timely arrival of the military.22 Curiously, the Deutsches Volksblatt, 
which catered to Catholic readers, was spared. Whether the riot-
ers were capable of discriminating under prevailing conditions be-
tween the accommodationist Volksblatt and the more haughty, 
chauvinistic Zeitung cannot be determined. Later references to the 
riots suggest that they were carefully planned and directed, usu-
ally by non-Luso-Brazilian persons. One such account, written by 
22. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), April 16, 1917. Despite the date given for 
this issue, it was actually published near the end of the month. 
An interior view of the destroyed Germania clubhouse, Porto Alegre 
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 
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an Evangelical clergyman who retired to Germany after the war, 
flatly attributed the Porto Alegre riot to the English consul sta-
tioned there. He charged that the mob, after having been en-
livened with alcoholic drink, destroyed specific structures at the 
consul's direction. Although the newspapers make no reference to 
such activity by officials of the Allied powers, circumstantial evi-
dence tends to corroborate the charge. Much of the destruction 
seems to have been systematic, not random. A report received by 
United States naval intelligence from Sao Paulo suggests that Ital-
ian Brazilians, jealous of the influence German businessmen 
seemed to have with Brazilian politicians, had stirred up the dis-
turbances to get the Germans out and thereby enhance their own 
influence. 23 
The three days of riots left nearly three hundred buildings in 
various stages of ruin. As a protective measure some inhabitants 
of the German district displayed Brazilian flags; others prepared 
large signs with the inscription, "This house is Brazilian!" By 
Monday evening, cavalry formed cordons on streets adjacent to 
the conflagration in order to protect German homes that still re-
mained intact. Nonetheless, rioters continued to feed the flames 
with combustible materials when they could, and extraordinary 
movement continued in the streets all through the night. 
The next morning the city of Porto Alegre surveyed the destruc-
tion it had inflicted upon itself. The Germans naturally feared a 
resumption of the terror and many fled for refuge to relatives and 
friends in the serra. The state government of Borges de Medeiros, 
known for its firm commitment to "Order and Progress," imme-
diately imposed military law. Vieira Pires, the head of the state po-
lice, issued a proclamation censuring "the crimes and acts of ha-
tred and contempt that the mob committed against foreigners as 
well as natives." All public meetings or gathering in public places 
were forbidden and army units patrolled the streets. With one ac-
cord all the major newspapers, but especially the official Federa-
¢o, denounced the depredations and counseled calm. In Rio de 
Janeiro, President Braz took decisive action. He also condemned 
23. Cf. Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sul," 154; Dedekind, 
Brasilien, 12. "Situation at Sao Paulo," 4-5. 
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A row of burned-out buildings in the German district (Rua 7 de Setembro) of Porto 
Alegre following the riot of April 16, 1917 
Reprinted from Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 
the crimes, but more significantly he placed 7,400 federal troops 
at Borges de Medeiros' disposal to assist in the maintenance of 
order. 24 
Of course, the German-language press did not publish for the 
next several days. Some could not because of damages sustained; 
others voluntarily agreed to suspend publication until peace was 
assured. When the rural German districts failed to receive their 
usual newspapers, a sense of panic spread among many of the 
people in those areas. One response of the colonos was to halt the 
shipment of the agricultural products upon which Porto Alegre de-
pended until their confidence in the ability of the government to 
maintain order was restored. By April 25, most German-language 
newspapers were publishing again. 25 
24. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; New York Times, April 20, 
25. Kalender [iir die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918 (Sao Leopoldo, [1917], 192. 
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The Unrest Spreads 
Although the rural districts in Rio Grande do SuI experienced 
nothing compared to the Porto Alegre terror, anti-German dem-
onstrations or riots occurred in Santa Maria, Montenegro, and 
several other provincial cities. In Sao Leopoldo, for example, a 
mob threatened to destroy the Deutsche Post but was deterred at 
the last moment by an effective speech by a local government offi-
cial, Dr. Gabriel Azambuja de Fortuna. The Post, like the Porto Ale-
gre papers, suspended publication for a week. 26 
The numerous Germans in Pelotas were not so lucky. A port 
city located at the southernmost tip of Brazil near the entrance to 
the huge coastal sound, Lagoa dos Patos, Pelotas was the home of 
the Deutsche Wacht, an aggressive, chauvinistic journal started in 
1914. The editor at the time of the riots in 1917 was Rudi Schafer, 
who later recorded his experiences in those troubled days. On 
Monday, April 16, the Portuguese-language newspapers of Pelo-
tas received telegrams throughout the day reporting the tumultu-
ous events in Porto Alegre almost as quickly as they happened. 
Thus stimulated, certain partisans of the Allies, unrestrained by 
considerations of law or common sense, resolved to try to dupli-
cate the riots in the state capital. According to Schafer, who is not 
an unbiased source, careful plans were laid by an English national 
(an electrical engineer), several Italians, and a "renegade" Alsa-
tian. Through the generous dispensation of alcoholic beverages, 
these conspirators recruited supporters among illiterate black la-
borers found in waterfront saloons. Their enthusiasm for lawless-
ness was heightened by the excited rhetoric of student patriots 
and, perhaps more efficaciously, by the promise of opportunities 
for plunder. Rumors of an impending riot traveled briskly through 
the city. By late afternoon, Schafer received offers of sanctuary in 
the homes of discerning, respectable Luso-Brazilians, but he re-
solved to stay in his printshop and protect it with barricades. 
By nightfall a thousand or more persons had gathered in the cen-
tral plaza. Growing from moment to moment, the mob swarmed 
into the German district and began its work of destruction. The 
26. Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 238. 
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scenes that followed were almost a replication of events in Porto 
Alegre. Screaming "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" the multi-
tude swept from one building to another-first the clubhouse of 
the Concordia-Verein and the German school, and then a well-
known German bar and a German watchmaker's shop, establish-
ments capable of satisfying newly whetted appetites for liquor 
and loot. The mob went on to attack the Pelotas branch of the 
Bromberg Company, other large commercial establishments, and 
the Deutsche Wacht, where the besieged Schafer repeatedly but in-
effectually pleaded by phone with the police for help. 
After pelting the building with stones and firing revolvers for 
nearly half an hour, the mob battered through Schafer's barricade 
and poured into the Wacht's editorial offices and printshop. Many 
items were stolen, especially books, paper, and smaller pieces of 
furniture (some of which later reappeared in second hand stores); 
everything else, including boxes of type, was dragged out into the 
street, piled in a great heap, doused with kerosene, and burned 
like a huge funeral pyre. The vastly outnumbered police were in-
capable of coping with the rioters. Denounced as collaborators of 
the Germans, the police stood up to the mob and somehow man-
aged to prevent a conflagration like the one that was devastating 
Porto Alegre at that very hour. According to the Deutsche Post, the 
conspirators had planned further depredations for the next day, 
but a military detachment of one hundred men arrived the next 
afternoon and prevented any additional outrages. Meanwhile, 
many German families, including Schafer's, fled to a rural German 
district twenty-five miles away. 27 
Anti-German demonstrations in other states were less common 
and generally less severe. Almost none occurred in Santa Cata-
rina, possibly because Teuto-Brazilians occupied the governor's 
chair and many local positions of authority. In Parana, an attack 
on the Curitiba Kompass was prevented by the decisive action of 
the chief of the state police. In Sao Paulo state, Rio Claro was the 
scene of an outbreak on Sunday evening, April 15, when a mob 
attacked a German Protestant church and a boarding school asso-
ciated with it. After the vandals had done their work, the pastor 
27. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, April 18, 1917; Deutsche Post (Sao Leo-
poldo), April 25, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 27, 30, 1917; Fischer, "Die 
deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 322, 326. 
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was forced to kiss the Brazilian flag. Here as in Porto Alegre and 
Pelotas, the disturbances exceeded the ability of local authorities 
to maintain order and troops were sent in.28 Two weeks later, the 
indiscretion of a German Protestant pastor provoked another 
anti-German incident in Cam pinho de Santa Isabel, a small com-
munity in Espirito Santo. When his parish school was closed by 
the state director of education until Portuguese was introduced as 
the language of instruction, the pastor led a group of his parish-
ioners down the village street shouting "Viva Germany! Death to 
Brazil!" Appalled by such insolence, a gang of Luso-Brazilians at-
tacked the Germans until police intervened and forced the latter 
to "respect the proper sentiments of the Brazilian people." Far-
ther north, in Pernambuco, a mob burned a small private school 
to the ground. 29 
Taken as a whole, the violence visited upon Brazil in April, 
1917, was surprisingly widespread and severe. It came as a shock 
to many people, Luso- and Teuto-Brazilian alike. While few ob-
servers would ever have suggested that there were no ethnic dif-
ferences or frictions, most accepted the stereotype of Brazilian so-
ciety as pluralist, tolerant, and nonviolent; they saw individual 
Brazilians as amiable and easygoing, ready to accept ethnocul-
tural diversity and eager to reconcile differences. While the be-
havior of the superpatriots, typified by the Liga pelos Alliados 
and Ruy Barbosa, was often harsh and inflammatory, the govern-
ment on all levels-national, state, and local-apparently coped 
with problems of civil disorder as efficiently as possible, though 
there is some evidence that the protection of the law was withheld 
partially or temporarily. 30 
Governmental Responses 
In the days and weeks following the April riots, the several gov-
ernments resisted the temptation to succumb to superpatriotic 
28. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 25, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 100; Rio de 
Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 18, 1917; Uhle's Kalender fUr das Jahr 1918, p. 140. 
29. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 29, 1917; Porto Alegre Correio do 
Povo, April 17, 1917; Alfredo Carlos Schmalz, "400 anos de presem;:a gennanica em 
Pernambuco," in I. Col6quio, 304. 
30. Warren Dean, The Industrialization of Sao Paulo, 1880-1945 (Austin, 1969), 
166. 
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political pressure. Even though Borges de Medeiros' sympathies 
lay with the Allies, he did everything he could to maintain order 
and internal peace in Rio Grande do SuI. Shortly after the Porto 
Alegre disturbances, he met with the editors of the city's German-
language newspapers. He assured them of his determination to 
keep the peace and urged them to resume publication and to use 
their influence to calm the Teuto-Brazilians by restoring their con-
fidence in the government. Borges hoped especially to stop the 
movement of fearful Teuto-Brazilians out of the cities and, as 
some rumors had it, out of the state. 31 
It is obvious that Borges understood the Teuto-Brazilian citizens 
of his state. On the basis of th~ir past behavior, he knew that with 
few exceptions they were entirely loyal to Brazil, despite their cul-
tural ties to Germany. On a practical level, Borges wanted to 
counter the panic that had spread from the cities to the rural Ger-
mans and to restore the flow of agricultural products to Porto 
Alegre. 32 
Throughout this period, a number of journalists, both Luso-
and Teuto-Brazilian, played a key role in the effort to return to 
normal. The official newspaper of the Republican party in Rio 
Grande do SuI, A FederaftlO, condemned superpatriotic journals 
such as 0 Paiz of Rio, charging that their extreme partisanship 
had unintentionally promoted violence in Porto Alegre. It also 
sought to improve the public image of the Teuto-Brazilians by re-
printing a long, laudatory article that recounted the great contri-
butions of Germans to Brazilian history and culture. Another Por-
tuguese-language newspaper, A Republica, was alert to charges 
that Luso-Brazilians had acted brutally and senselessly in the 
Porto Alegre riots. Asserting that Brazilian culture dictates that in-
telligence and respect should govern the determination of action, 
this paper argued that attacks on Teuto-Brazilian citizens were 
simply unjustified, even if war was declared. 33 
31. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Com-
mercio, April 23, 1917; Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, April 21, 1917; Germania (Sao 
Paulo), April 23, 1917; Curitiba Kompass, April 24, 1917. 
32. For a more critical evaluation of Borges' role, see Konigk, Die Politik Bra-
siliens, 49-50. 
33. A Federapio (Porto Alegre), April 20, 25,1917; A Republica quoted in Curitiba 
Kompass, April 19, 1917. 
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In Santa Catarina, Governor Felippe Schmidt followed a course 
similar to Borges'. Schmidt convened a meeting of Teuto-Brazilian 
leaders to discuss the problem and to plan a course of action. The 
Germans responded unanimously by swearing their loyalty to 
Brazil; Schmidt so assured President Braz in Rio de Janeiro. As in 
Rio Grande do SuI, the German-language newspapers were re-
quested to continue publishing and to use their influence to en-
courage calm and to build confidence in the government. In Pa-
rana, the chief of the state police, Dr. Lindolfo Pessoa, said many 
of the same things and publicly credited the Germans for much of 
the economic progress made by the state. 34 
The superpatriotic press, however, continued as it had be-
fore the riots. The wildest rumors could find a place in the pro-
Ally newspapers and some had the characteristics of deliberately 
planted lies; others, oddly enough, seem to have originated in 
Montevideo. 35 The Correio do Povo of Porto Alegre, for example, 
published a dispatch from the Uruguayan capital about events in 
its own city. When the warehouses of the Bromberg Company 
were burned on April 16, the Montevideo dispatch alleged that 
they had contained enormous quantities of arms, ammunition, 
machine guns, and even artillery. The Jornal do Commercio picked 
up the item from the Correio do Povo and added an earlier rumor 
about a huge cache of weapons in Santa Catarina, where large 
numbers of mutinous Germans were allegedly congregating. The 
New York Times soon expanded on all this with a story entitled 
"Germans in Brazil Reported in Revolt." According to this and a 
subsequent account, heavily armed Germans had already tried to 
blow up bridges and an insurrection was imminent. The same ar-
34. Curitiba Kompass, April 17, 21, 28, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), April 28, 
1917. 
35. The Uruguayan rumors apparently were rooted in the historic fear that Uru-
guayans had of invasion from Brazil. Early in 1917, Manuel Otero, the Uruguayan 
foreign minister, spoke of an impending revolution in southern Brazil due to al-
leged German activity there. He feared that Germans in Brazil would acquire a 
cache of arms and ammunition, legally the property of Paraguay, that was known 
in diplomatic circles to be hidden since 1911 in Argentine territory between Para-
guay and Brazil. See Secretary of State [Lansing] to American Embassy in Buenos 
Aires, April 10, 1917, and [Frederic J.] Stimson to Secretary of State, April 11, 1917, 
both in RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Germany, 1910-1929 (M336, roll 67). 
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ticle reported that Jose Nabuco de Gourea, a member of Congress 
from Rio Grande do SuI, confirmed reports that the recent riots in 
Porto Alegre and elsewhere had been caused by the Germans and 
that "the native [sic] population was incensed and determined to 
crush the Germans if they did not desist from troublemaking." 
Meanwhile, the American consul in Rio Grande do SuI was less 
gullible. He reported to his superior in Rio de Janeiro that there 
was no probability whatsoever of the Teuto-Brazilians doing any-
thing significant to help Germany. 36 
Other rumors claimed that airplanes, presumably German, 
were flying in darkest night in the vicinity of Curitiba, where the 
office of the Kompass was alleged to house a secret radio station. 37 
A Noite reported that German importers in Santa Catarina, work-
ing in conjunction with German submarines, had plans to engage 
in piracy along the Brazilian coast in the event that war was de-
clared. When several foreigners purchased a plot of land on the 
Brazilian coast near Guaratiba, it was reported that Germans were 
plotting to construct a naval base there. When a Rio construction 
firm with a German name (Riedlinger) began to build a hotel on 
Flamengo Beach, the rumor was spread that Germans were con-
structing a fortress within the nation's capital.38 
Teuto-Brazilian Reaction 
The range of reaction among the Teuto-Brazilians in the wake of 
the April riots was as wide as among the Luso-Brazilians. Most 
were fully prepared to accommodate their behavior to the norms 
narrowed by the international crises. Some decided that the best 
course would be to make overt gestures of assimilation. This could 
be done most obviously in the matter of names. Although the 
transformation of family names seems to have been less common 
in Brazil than in the United States, many persons altered their first 
36. Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, April 20, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commer-
cio, April 23, 1917; New York Times, April 20, 25, 1917; Samuel T. Lee to Edwin V. 
Morgan, April 28, 1917, in RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Ja-
neiro, 1917, part 9. 
37. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 28, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, 
April 20, 1917. 
38. Noite quoted in Germania (Sao Paulo), May 1, 1917; Uhle's Kalender: 1917, 
P·78. 
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names from the German to Portuguese equivalents. Thus Hein-
rich became Enrique, Karl became Carlos, and so on. Name 
changes in commercial firms, already started by the imposition of 
the Black List in 1916, were accelerated. For example, Schnaken-
berg, Buttermilch, and Company reorganized in 1917 as Bernar-
dino and Zacharias-Schnakenberg's name was dropped, Bern-
hard Buttermilch's name reappeared as Bernardino, and the given 
name of a new Luso-Brazilian partner, Zacharias Junqueira, was 
added. Many voluntary organizations adopted the same cosmetic 
tactic. Thus the Deutsch-Brasilianische Mannergesang Vereine 
Frohsinn von Rio Branco reorganized simply as Club Rio Branco. 
It also altered its constitution to admit Brazilian-born people to 
membership. In other examples of accommodationist behavior, 
Teuto-Brazilian organizations and persons with obviously Ger-
man names wrote public letters to President Wenceslau Braz and 
Foreign Minister Miiller, expressing their support for the break in 
diplomatic relations with Germany. 39 
Despite such efforts to improve the public image of at least some 
individual Teuto-Brazilian organizations, the societies as a group 
entered a difficult period after the riots. Many persons, especially 
German-speaking Swiss and well-assimilated Brazilian-born Ger-
mans, dropped their memberships in the Vereine as participation 
in such organizations became a source of social embarrassment or 
economic loss. Treasury receipts were correspondingly reduced 
and some activities had to be curtailed.40 The Turnvereine also 
seemed apprehensive. Whereas in 1916 the pages of their Porto 
Alegre publication, Deutsche Turnbliitter, had been glutted with 
pro-German chauvinism, the issues following the riots were 
greatly toned down and offered neither propaganda nor com-
ments on the current wave of anti-Germanism. The Monatsbliitter 
des Germanischen Bundes chose the most prudent course of all-it 
simply ceased publication entirely, except for a final issue that ap': 
peared in October, 1917. 
39. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, April 30, 1917; Porto Alegre 
Correio do Povo, April 25, 1917. See also A federa¢o (Porto Alegre), April 18, 1917; 
Edwin Morgan to Secretary of State [Lansing], July 10, 1917, in RG 59, American 
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9; and Rio de Janeiro Jornal do 
Commercio, April 19, 26, 1917. 
40. fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 153. 
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The Teuto-Brazilian churches had mixed experiences and re-
sponses to the riots. German Catholic parishes had generally 
been ignored by the demonstrators. Archbishop Becker in Porto 
Alegre dispatched two letters to the priests and parishioners of 
his diocese, warning them of the dangers of war and reminding 
them of their responsibilities to Brazil, their fatherland. 41 There 
were individual priests whose pro-German sentiments remained 
unmodified, but as an organization the Catholic church strongly 
encouraged the accommodation of its German members to newly 
developed norms of patriotic behavior. Such German Catholic 
publications as the Marienkalender said little of the war and noth-
ing of the riots. 
The Lutherans of the Missouri Synod tended to see the riots as 
a vindication of their own assimilationist stance. Their synodical 
publication happily pointed out that not a single window had 
been broken in any of their churches and that their tiny theologi-
cal seminary in Porto Alegre had also been spared by the mob. 
The editor, Johann Kunstmann, subsequently published a long 
series of essays in which he explained how his church's distinc-
tion between church and state led to an understanding of Deutsch-
tum as a commitment to the German language and culture, but 
never as loyalty to the German government. In his view, the Ger-
man language and culture were valuable as means to keep mem-
bers within the church and to retain purity of doctrine; but they 
should never be understood as ends in themselves. 42 
The several Evangelical bodies were much larger and therefore 
more diverse in their experiences. Perhaps their most eloquent 
representative was Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund's Deutsche Post of Sao 
Leopoldo, which took a firm but moderate stance that was en-
tirely congruent with the position taken by state president Borges 
de Medeiros. In its first issue published after the riots, the Post 
commented that "we are citizens of this country and as such we 
have the primary duty to obey willingly the laws of the national, 
state, and local governments. We citizens of German descent are 
41. Rio de Janeiro Jornill do Commercio, May 2, 1917; Hugo Metzler, Die St. 
Josefsgemeinde der deutschen Katholiken zu Porto Alegre wiihrend des We/tkrieges (Porto 
Alegre, 1918), 7. 
42. Evange/isch-Lutherisches KirchenbIatf fur Sud-Amerika, XIV (May 1, 1917), 
~. See August and September issues for Kunstmann, "Vom Deutschtum der 
Missourier. " 
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just as good Brazilians as anyone else, no matter what their origin 
may be, but we must demonstrate that fact in deeds as well as 
words." In return for such unconditional loyalty, the Teuto-Brazil-
ians could expect the government to guarantee public order in 
general and the lives and property of Teuto-Brazilians in particular. 
Other Evangelical spokesmen also tried to bring their denomina-
tion closer to an accommodationist position. Clemens Branden-
burger, for example, strongly endorsed the teaching of Portuguese 
to children in German schools as early as possible. In short, these 
and other exponents of accommodation emphasized that it was 
possible to identify completely with Brazil as "our Fatherland" 
and, at the same time, retain German culture. 43 They also liked to 
point out that the riots were rarely incited by genuine Brazilians, 
but rather that they could be traced to instigation by English, 
French, or Italian provocateurs. 44 
The moderation of the Deutsche Post contrasted significantly 
with the more chauvinistic and secular Germania of Sao Paulo. 
Both counseled calm and the avoidance of provocation, but the 
latter remained more partisan than the Post was. The editor of the 
Germania could not resist sardonic slurs against other ethnic 
groups. When, on April 12, he warned of further outbreaks of 
vandalism, he remarked that in the next few days the Germans 
could expect "further manifestations of their [the Brazilians'] high 
civilization." When the Germania reported the brutal slaying of a 
Luso-Brazilian by an Italian several weeks later, he sarcastically 
observed that "this murder again places in proper light the excep-
tionally high culture of a race that calls us barbarians." At the 
same time he stopped printing part of the Germania in Portuguese 
and dropped its Portuguese subtitle, Diario Teuto-Brasileiro, com-
menting that "our genuine Brazilian friends read German and the 
others don't believe what we say in the Portuguese part."45 
A sharp division emerged among German Brazilians during 
those anxious days as to the proper course to follow after the 
Porto Alegre riots. While no one espoused a pro-Ally tack, the 
43. Deutsche Post (Sao Leopoldo), April 24, 1917; Clemens Brandenburger, "Der 
Schreib-Unterricht im ersten Schuljahre der zweisprachigen Schule Brasiliens," in 
Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918, pp. 177-79. Cf. Koseritz' Deutscher 
Volkskalender fur Brasilien aUf das Jahr 1918 (Porto Alegre, [1917]),87. 
44. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 150. 
45. Germania (Sao Paulo), April 20, 30, 1917. 
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moderates were clearly at odds with the die-hard chauvinists, 
who were more determined than ever to maintain their ethnicity 
and to assert the justice of the German cause as they saw it. 46 The 
latter were capable of remarkable self-deception or duplicity. Re-
garding the sinking of the Parana, they could say that a final inves-
tigation might well demonstrate that the vessel was not torpedoed 
by a German submarine but that the Allies had done the deed in 
order to provoke Brazil into entering the war. Newspaper articles 
in German on the Porto Alegre riots could omit entirely the role of 
Friedrich Schmidt and his firing into the crowd of superpatriots. 
The pro-German chauvinists also tended to criticize the gov-
ernment for its failure to prevent the destruction suffered by the 
Germans in the riots, hinting darkly that the police and fire de-
partments were held back from their responsibilities, thereby de-
liberately causing the destruction of the German district. 47 
Despite the pro-German tendencies of the Teuto-Brazilian lead-
ers and the widespread anxiety caused by the riots, the fact re-
mained that the majority of the German-speaking people in Brazil 
had been indifferent to the war. Europe was a distant place, Ger-
many an abstraction with no immediate significance for their 
daily lives. But in April, 1917, repercussions of war half a world 
away reached the German colonies of Brazil and touched them in 
frightfully direct and devastating ways. Given the unrestrained 
character of the riots and the ethnic hatred they seemed to reflect, 
many Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would happen to them if 
Brazil actually declared war. 
46. Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1918, p. 284. 
47. An example of such biased journalism appears, surprisingly enough, in the 
moderate Kalender fUr die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1918, pp. 190-93. Cf. Konigk, Die 
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The Drift Toward War 
I T WAS CLEAR that Lauro Muller's days as the Brazilian foreign minister were numbered. All through the month of April his 
enemies continued their attacks on him and his policy of neu-
trality. They did everything they could to paint him with a pro-
German brush. On April 16, at the same time that rioters were 
devastating Porto Alegre, Ruy Barbosa addressed a crowd of fifty 
thousand demonstrators at a rally sponsored by the Liga pelos AI-
liados in Rio De Janeiro. In his most florid and stirring style, Bar-
bosa denounced Muller's unwillingness to go further than a break 
in diplomatic relations. Asserting that there was an "absolute 
identity of interests between Brazil and the United States," Bar-
bosa demanded an end to neutrality and a Brazilian declaration 
of war. 1 
Muller remained the chief stumbling block. So long as he di-
rected the Foreign Ministry, it was unlikely that Brazil would drift 
any closer to belligerency. The Liga pelos Alliados thereupon 
stepped up its campaign to smear Muller. Its purpose was to in-
fluence Brazilian public opinion to the extent necessary to trans-
form Muller into a political liability so that President Braz would 
be forced to ease him from office. 
Muller's detractors rendered him vulnerable by pointing out his 
allegedly German economic, social, and personal connections. 
Claiming that he had a large personal interest in a variety of Ger-
1. Washington Post, April 17, 19i7; New York Times, April 17, 1917; Martin, 
Latin America and the War, 56. 
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man enterprises, they said he was the motive force in the Ham-
burg Colonization Company and associated him with various 
German-owned banks and importing firms, especially the Brom-
berg Company. They never distinguished between Teuto-Brazilian 
enterprises and those owned by investors who lived in Germany. 
Muller's critics also insisted that he was active in German social 
circles in Rio de Janeiro and that he was a prominent member of 
the Germania Society there. They characterized his home in Rio 
as a palace; they pointed out that he also kept a beautiful home in 
the summer capital, Petropolis, which since the days of the em-
pire had always had a sizable German population. It was virtually 
a German resort, they charged, where beer gardens and various 
amusements created a foreign ambience in which German music 
and German conversation were standard. The implications were 
obvious: One could not possibly have such pervasively German 
connections and still direct Brazilian foreign policy. 2 
The attack was carried to an intensely personal level. Clearly 
influenced by the anti-Muller campaign, the American charge 
d' affaires in Rio de Janeiro reported to the secretary of state in 
Washington that Muller was "selfish, shifty, and utterly unscru-
pulous," that he had amassed a large fortune while in public 
office, and that he had staffed the Brazilian Foreign Office with 
incompetents. The popular press reported that Muller regarded 
Brazilians with contempt and avoided social contacts with them 
whenever possible. It was alleged that he frequently made derog-
atory remarks to his German friends about Luso-Brazilians, say-
ing, for example, that they could think of nothing but eating and 
making love. 3 
There was little doubt, however, about Muller's actions as for-
eign minister. To the partisans of the Allies it appeared that every-
thing he did was intended to work for the benefit of Germany. He 
resisted the pressure to ask Congress for a declaration of war; he 
insisted on issuing an official statement declaring Brazil's neu-
trality in the war between the United States and Germany; and he 
seemed slow in getting Dr. Adolf von Pauli, the German minister 
2. New York Times, May 4, 1917. 
3. Alexander Benson to Secretary of State, May 10, 1917, in RG 59, American 
Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8; New York Times, May 4, 
1917. See Octiivio, "Lauro Mueller," 172-88. 
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to Brazil, out of the country after the break in diplomatic relations 
on April 11. 
Nearly two weeks had passed between the time that Von Pauli 
received his passport and his departure from Rio de Janeiro on 
April 27. Muller claimed the delay actually arose out of the refusal 
of British and French authorities to guarantee safe passage to Von 
Pauli unless he returned to Germany aboard a ship that was headed 
for a Scandinavian port and that would put into an Allied harbor 
for examination. For its part, the German government claimed 
that it could not possibly warn all of its naval units in time to as-
sure safe conduct. The decision was finally made that Von Pauli 
(and all German consuls in Brazil as well) would travel by train to 
Uruguay, a slow mode of transportation on a route that passed 
through Sao Paulo and the Teuto-Brazilian districts in the south-
ern states. 4 
Muller's last effort to halt the drift toward war was to issue a de-
cree on April 25 in which Brazil announced its neutrality in the 
conflict between the United States and Germany. To the super-
patriots, this was a retrograde step rendered unnecessary by Bra-
zil's severance of diplomatic ties with Germany; they saw it as one 
more example of Muller's pro-Germanism. But Braz seems to have 
agreed with Muller that Brazilian law made the step necessary. 
They insisted that they were obliged to enjoin aU government au-
thorities to observe neutrality "so long as they are not given orders 
to the contrary." The executive branch could do no more than 
this, Braz announced, until the Congress, to which the constitu-
tion assigned the initiative in such matters, assembled and took 
such action as it deemed appropriate. Moreover, they argued, the 
declaration of neutrality was a formality required by established 
diplomatic practice. 5 It was also a clever move on Muller's part-
his last before he was forced out of office-and it had the effect of 
delaying action for a month. It meant that if the partisans of the 
Allies were to have their way, they would have to get Congress to 
revoke the neutrality decree, and in order to accomplish that, a 
bill would have to be introduced and steered through the usual 
4. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, April 30, 1917; New York Times, April 29, 
1917. 
5. The Brazilian Green Book, 39; New York Times, May 2, 1917; Martin, "Brazil," 
252 . 
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time-consuming parliamentary procedures. Even more signifi-
cant, it meant that the coveted German ships sequestered in Bra-
zilian ports could not be seized and put to work for the benefit of 
the Allies until the decree was revoked or war declared. 
Meanwhile, the Liga pelos Alliados intensified its pressure on 
the Braz administration for Muller's resignation. It was joined by 
all the major newspapers-the Jornal do Commercio, 0 Pa{z, Correio 
da Manful, Epoca, and others, including journals in the Italian, 
French, and English languages. All endorsed the league's de-
mands that the arms of the Schiltzenvereine be confiscated, that the 
publication of German-language newspapers be halted, and that 
some sort of supervision be established over the Reichsdeutsche 
in Brazil. 6 
The Resignation of Lauro Miiller 
Muller continued to defend himself to the end. He insisted that 
Brazil's situation in relation to the United States was fundamen-
tally different from that of Cuba and Panama, two Latin American 
countries (both informal protectorates of the United States) that 
responded quickly to President Wilson's hope that other neutral 
countries would follow America's lead in declaring war against 
Germany. Muller dismissed as mere intrigue charges that he was 
friendly to Germany. "I am a Brazilian and only a Brazilian!" he 
cried. At the same time he condemned Ruy Barbosa as an irre-
sponsible demagogue who, like Demosthenes, swayed public 
opinion by eloquence rather than by logic or measured judgment. 
Muller's frequent assertions of loyalty to Brazil made no differ-
ence, even though as early as 1916 he had publicly denounced 
Teuto-Brazilians who claimed a dual nationality.7 
Muller understood, of course, that he had indeed become a po-
liticalliability to the Braz regime and that he had to resign, but he 
held off until Congress convened on May 3, 1917. In his letter of 
resignation, Muller explained that he had not wanted to abandon 
the president at a time when Congress was not in session; it is 
more likely that he had no intention of giving his successor, sure 
to be a sympathizer of the Allies, an opportunity to direct policy 
6. New York Times, May 4, 1917. 
7. Germania (Sao Paulo), May 1, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 46. 
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without the moderating influence of congressional politics. Presi-
dent Braz, who apparently retained a high regard for Muller's 
ability and a genuine admiration for his past accomplishments, 
offered Muller a different cabinet post. This may have been a cour-
tesyonly, and Muller wisely declined the honor, declaring that he 
preferred to return to private life or resume his army career. Ac-
cording to the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre, the Santa Catarina 
delegation in Congress sought out Muller at his home to ask him to 
resume a seat in the Senate. One incumbent, a Luso-Brazilian, of-
fered to resign in order to make room for him. Again, he refused. 8 
Once out of office, Muller received many plaudits for his long 
years of excellent service as foreign minister. The Jornal do Com-
mercio, which had earlier joined in the anti-Muller chorus, now 
claimed that he had been unjustly attacked and that suspicions 
regarding his loyalty had never been substantiated. The Jornal 
praised him lavishly for his earlier success in drawing the Latin 
American republics together. "Even in the most delicate of cir-
cumstances," this paper now declared, "he gave proof of his devo-
tion and patriotism."9 
The chances of Ruy Barbosa being named as Muller's successor 
in the Foreign Ministry were slight-he was much too controver-
sial a politician for that. Instead, President Braz found a substi-
tute in Dr. Nilo Pe~anha, who was satisfactory to Barbosa himself 
and to other prowar enthusiasts. Known for his pro-Ally sympa-
thies, Pe~anha was a prominent politician who had served briefly 
as acting president in 1909 and 1910. His appointment was well 
received; it indicated that in the future the Braz administration 
would pursue a clearly anti-German line. Indeed, many news-
papers predicted that a declaration of war would soon follow. It 
was even suggested in the press that Pe~anha had accepted ap-
pointment only on the condition that Braz would support Brazil-
ian intervention. 10 
8. New York Times, May 5, 1917; Germania (Sao Paulo), May 4,1917; Rio de Ja-
neiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), May 7, 
1917. 
9. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, May 3, 1917; New York Times, May 5, 
1917. 
10. According to the New York Times, May 6, 7, 1917, Pec;anha consulted with 
both Barbosa and Rodrigues Alves, the latter a former president and leading can-
didate to succeed Braz, before announcing his acceptance. The Jornal do Commercio 
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The Revocation of Neutrality 
Shortly after taking office, Pe<;anha revealed his belief that should 
Brazil take an active part in the war, the nation would not send 
troops, but would help by lending its moral support and by sup-
plying economic aid in the form of its agricultural products. Pe-
<;anha also expressed the opinion that the first step toward in-
volvement in the war would have to be the revocation of the 
neutrality decree of April 28. He obviously was inviting Congress 
to take the initiative, which in Braz's view belonged to t~e legis-
lative branch. For whatever reason, Congress did nothing, and it 
remained for the executive to take action. The opportunity for 
this came on May 23, when the news arrived that the Germans 
had sunk another Brazilian vessel. The victim this time was the 
Tijuca, an old steamer of 2,)04 tons built in England in 1883. En 
route from Pernambuco to Le Havre, the ship had been off the 
Brittany coast when the torpedoes struck. 11 By coincidence, the 
Brazilian government learned at the same time that a German 
prize court in Hamburg had denied a series of pleas to release the 
Brazilian steamship Rio Pardo, a vessel that had been confiscated 
by the German navy for transporting contraband within the war 
zone. 12 
Braz immediately sent a message to Congress recommending 
the revocation of neutrality in the war between Germany and the 
United States. Claiming that such annulment would be in har-
mony with the sympathies of the great majority of the Brazilian 
people, the president emphasized that the neutrality decree had 
been intended as a temporary measure and that the time had 
come for its withdrawal. He also reminded Congress that revoca-
tion was directly related to another matter that was paramount in 
many minds-the urgent need to utilize those German vessels 
that were being held in Brazilian ports. Once again the pro-Ally 
press crowed its approval and predicted that a declaration of war 
waS in the offing. The Jornal do Commercio somewhat prematurely 
reported that Barbosa advised Pec;anha to make the reorganization of the entire 
cabinet the condition of his acceptance. 
11. New York Times, May 7, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 41. 
12. New York Times, May 22, 1917. 
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announced, "0ur neutrality is ended-we are aligned with and 
for America. II 13 
The committee on foreign relations immediately drafted an ap-
propriate bill. A day later the Chamber of Deputies added an 
amendment specifically authorizing the government to put the 
German ships to work, passed the bill overwhelmingly, and sent it 
on to the Senate, all to the tumultuous approval of a gallery packed 
with prowar enthusiasts. On June 1, the Senate passed the bill; 
the president signed it the same day and undertook its enforce-
ment immediately, directing that the ships be prepared for sea as 
soon as possible. 14 
Thus began a new chapter in the saga of the German ships. 
Forty-six in number and sequestered in ports all along the Brazilian 
coast, but chiefly in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, the vessels 
had an aggregate displacement of 240,779 tons. The Blucher was the 
largest at 12'}50 tons; thirteen displaced less than 4,000 tons each. 
The serious shortage of shipping that had developed worldwide 
in 1916 was made much worse by Germany's policy of unre-
stricted submarine warfare, which had begun on January 31, 
1917. Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries possess-
ing a merchant marine of significant tonnage; seizure of the im-
pounded German ships would enable it to greatly expand its abil-
ity to capitalize on the ship famine. The pro-Ally press, notably 
the Jornal do Commercio, had persistently urged this course of ac-
tion and had linked it to the confiscation by Germany of Brazilian 
coffee stored in warehouses in Hamburg and Antwerp.Is So long 
as Lauro Muller was foreign minister, the Braz administration had 
been unwilling to run the risk; it meant giving Germany a cause 
for declaring war on Brazil. But now that Muller was gone and 
Congress had authorized the confiscation of the German ships, 
the partisans of the Allies would have been pleased if it had in-
deed provoked a German declaration of war; the blame would 
then go to the other side. Germany, of course, didn't bother. 
13. The Brazilian Green Book, 39-42; New York Times, April 23, 24, 25, 1917. 
14. New York Times, April 28, 29, 30, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 43-44; 
FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 293-94. 
15. New York Times, June 3,1917; Martin, Latin America and the War, 51; Martin, 
"Brazil," 251. 
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A Midyear Interlude 
During the next five months, from the beginning of June to the 
end of October, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was preoccupied 
with the problem of the German ships and their utilization. Al-
most all agitation calling for Brazil to enter the war ceased, pend-
ing the resolution of this issue. Persons who had been urging Bra-
zil to rally under the Allied banner of justice and righteousness 
against Germany now found themselves bargaining with the Al-
lies for arrangements they believed to be just and right for Brazil. 
They discovered that their Allied friends could drive hard bar-
gains with great skill; they also found that their enthusiasm for 
the Allied cause was modified by their desire to win advantages 
for Brazil in international trade and shipping. Brilliant speeches 
demanding an end to immoral neutrality were no longer neces-
sary; they could in fact inhibit the ability of the diplomats to ex-
tract favorable concessions from the Allies. 
Attacks on the Teuto-Brazilian population, their institutions-
SchiUzenvereine, private schools, the press-and the continued 
use of a foreign tongue also declined in number and intensity. Oc-
casional references to the "German danger" continued to appear, 
but they added nothing to the old propaganda that had been 
spread by the pro-Ally press for many months. The chauvinistic 
Correio da Manha of Porto Alegre repeated and embellished the 
rumors that had circulated in the aftermath of the diplomatic break 
in April that a Teuto-Brazilian military revolt was developing in 
Santa Catarina, centering in Joinville and Blumenau. An inves-
tigation followed, personally conducted by General Barbedo of 
the Sixth Military District. His report dismissed as fairy tales the 
rumors of armed hordes of Germans preparing to attack the Bra-
zilian army and stated that there was no evidence either of radio 
stations or of the importation of weapons. 16 There was no hysteria 
16. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), July 12, 19, 1917. The American ambas-
sador to Brazil, Edwin Vernon Morgan, concurred with Barbedo's assessment. In a 
letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Morgan wrote: "That the colonists have 
perfected a military organization and that they have imported ammunition and 
arms in quantity is more than doubtful. That they have in concealment a large 
number of rapid fire guns or that 20 or 30,000 perfectly equipped men can be 
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during this period-no riots, not even peaceful anti-German 
demonstrations. 
As the next step in the pursuit of its new policy of nonbelliger-
ency, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry tried to link the abandon-
ment of neutrality with the disposal of its huge coffee surpluses. 
The revocation act of June 1 applied to the United States only; Bra-
zil's several declarations of neutrality in the conflict between the 
other Allied powers and Germany, which had been announced in 
1914 and 1915, remained in force. Brazil therefore let it be known 
that it would revoke its neutrality with respect to Britain if the 
latter would remove its prohibition of imports of Brazilian coffee. 
Britain replied that it had enough coffee in warehouses to last five 
years and that it needed to reserve all available shipping space for 
essential food supplies. Brazil then requested the United States to 
intervene on its behalf. The result was that Britain expressed its 
willingness to buy a quantity of Brazilian coffee equal to 25 per-
cent of the coffee it had imported in 1916 from all sources. Brazil 
accepted this promise in good faith and, on June 29, 1917, with-
drew its neutrality decrees as they related to Britain, France, Rus-
sia, Portugal, Italy, and Japan, only to discover that the British 
now insisted that the coffee be transported in the recently seized 
German ships. Brazil thereupon declared, somewhat petulantly, 
that there were no former German ships-they were now all in-
corporated into Brazil's government-owned merchant fleet. 17 Inev-
itably the deal collapsed. Brazil had been outmaneuvered; it had 
revoked its neutrality decrees without gaining anything in return. 
Although Brazil needed the ships, it soon discovered that 
France, Britain, and the United States wanted them even more 
desperately. Each government made proposals, none of which sat-
isfied all parties. Brazil's hand was weakened by the common 
knowledge that the nation had the resources to put only thirteen 
of the forty-six vessels into service. Some had been either dam-
aged or otherwise rendered inoperable by the German crews; the 
placed in the field ... is probably untrue" (Morgan to Lansing, July 10, 1917, in 
RG 59, American Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 9)· 
17. The Brazilian Green Book, 74; FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 294, 296, 
304-305, 310. 
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remainder had deteriorated to such an extent that only a country 
with extensive shipbuilding and repair facilities, such as the 
United States, could return them to active service. Unsuccessful 
negotiations for sales, charters, dummy companies, repair ar-
rangements, operating arrangements, and cargo restrictions, as 
well as additional coffee purchases, continued through August, 
September, and October. 
Unlike the Allies, Brazil was in no great hurry; in the middle of 
September, President Braz, who played an active role in the bar-
gaining, decided to take a month-long vacation. Upon his return, 
Braz insisted that the Brazilian government would neither alienate 
nor charter the ships but would organize them in transatlantic 
lines under the Brazilian flag and with Brazilian crews. The Ameri-
can ambassador to Brazil, Edwin Morgan, pointed out that since 
Brazil could not in fact supply the latter, the operation of the ves-
sels would inevitably fall to Americans. Thus Braz's insistence on 
the maintenance of the Brazilian flag, Morgan observed, would 
soon have the effect of bringing Brazil actively into the conflict. 18 
Ultimately, however, other events intruded to lead Brazil to a dec-
laration of war. 
The first of these events related to the persistent but frequently 
repudiated rumors that Germans were gathering in southern Bra-
zil to stage an armed rebellion. Early in September such a rumor 
surfaced again, this time embroidered with the allegation that the 
governor of Santa Catarina, General Felippe Schmidt, stood at the 
head of this mythical army, ready to lead it against Brazilian forces. 
Shamelessly calculated to contribute to Schmidt's defeat at the 
polls, this fabrication was exposed in loud and angry speeches de-
livered in the Santa Catarina state legislature. 19 A month later the 
rumor appeared again, but this time its source seemed more reli-
able and its form and content more ominous. 
The Luxburg Dispatches 
At the center of the new imbroglio was Count Karl von Luxburg, 
the German minister to Argentina. For some months (at least 
18. FRUS, 1917, Supp. 1, The World War, 315, 318-21, 325, 331-32, 335, 345-46. 
19. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), September 3, 1917-
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since July 3, 1917), Luxburg had been communicating with the 
German Foreign Office in Berlin through the Swedish legation in 
Buenos Aires. In an egregious violation of its neutrality, the Swe-
dish government had permitted Luxburg to disguise his cables in 
its code as though they were official Swedish dispatches. Virtually 
all communications of the German Foreign Office with its agents 
in Latin American countries were funneled through Buenos Aires 
in this way. Ironically, the Swedish line of communication passed 
through England on its way to Stockholm, which was in regular 
and direct communication with Berlin. 
Late in July an informer connected with the Central and South 
American Telephone Company provided the American ambas-
sador in Buenos Aires, Frederic J. Stimson, with copies of nine-
teen of Luxburg's telegrams, all in the numerical code used by the 
Swedes. Some weeks later he received a second and larger group. 
All were quickly sent to Washington to be deciphered. Unable to 
decode them, the State Department cabled them to London, where 
British intelligence had cracked the Swedish code and had been 
quietly monitoring Luxburg's messages, the great majority of 
which were routine and without much significance.2o The Ameri-
can embassy in London then selected certain messages and re-
turned them to Washington. 21 
On September 8, 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, after 
consulting with President Wilson in the matter, released three of 
Luxburg's telegrams to the Washington press. He chose messages 
that were especially indiscreet. In one, Luxburg referred to the 
Argentine foreign minister as "a notorious ass and anglophile." 
In another he urged that two Argentine vessels in the war zone 
either ''be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace [spurlos 
20. The Luxburg dispatches were subsequently published in the Committee on 
Public Information's Official Bulletin, December 21, 1917. The original typed tran-
scriptions are in RG 59, Entry 543, Box 5, File 120. 
21. Frederic Jesup Stimson, My United States (New York, 1931), 399, 406-407, 
412; Stimson to Secretary of State, July 23, September 15, 1917, both in RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 
1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); Lansing to American Embassy in London, September 6, 
1917, in RG 59, Entry 543, Box 5, File 120; see also Ambassador Page to Secretary of 
State, September 6, 1917, in the same file. For extensive correspondence regarding 
the Luxburg telegrams, see RG 59, Entry 543, Classified Case Files of Edward Bell, 
1917-19. 
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versenkt]."22 Lansing's revelations immediately caused a huge up-
roar in the world press, and for several weeks countless stories 
appeared in all the major newspapers as journalists were titillated 
by Luxburg's vocabulary and appalled by Sweden's unneutral con-
duct. 23 Press accounts everywhere credited the American intelli-
gence service with having decoded the telegrams. 
Rumors soon began to circulate that the Luxburg dispatches 
also contained references to German intrigue in Brazil. On Sep-
tember 10 and 11, the American ambassador in London, Walter 
Hines Page, sent three more decoded messages to Washington 
with the recommendation that they also be published "for the 
sake of the probable effect in the Argentine Republic and Brazil." 
Telegram number 63, dated July 7, 1917, read in part: "Our [Ger-
many's] attitude towards Brazil has created the impression here 
[Buenos Aires] that our easy-going good nature can be counted 
on. This is dangerous in South America, where the people under 
thin veneer are Indians. A submarine squadron with full powers 
to me might possibly still save the situation." Telegrams numbered 
88 and 89 were both dated August 4, 1917. In the latter, Luxburg 
wrote: "1 am convinced that we should be able to carry through 
our principal political aims in South America: the maintenance of 
the open market in Argentina and the re-organization of Brazil." 24 
This dispatch seemed to confirm what the propagandists had 
been claiming for years-that Germany had political aims in Rio 
Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina and that by implication Teuto-
Brazilian citizens represented some sort of internal threat to the 
country. 
Instead of releasing these dispatches to the press immediately, 
as Page recommended, Lansing gave them on September 19 to the 
Argentine and Brazilian ambassadors, who immediately con-
22. Lansing to American Embassy in Buenos Aires, September 7, 1917, in RG 
59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 
1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); FRUS, 1917, Supp. I, The World War, 322-23. 
23. For example, see Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, September 10-25, 1917; 
see New York Times and Washington Post for the same period. The General 
Records of the Department of State, NA, contain many clippings from newspapers 
in England and other countries about the dispatches. 
24. Page to Secretary of State, September 10,11,1917, both in RG 59, Entry 543, 
Box 5, File 120. 
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veyed them to their superiors in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. 
Of course Lansing hoped that at least the Brazilians would be suf-
ficiently outraged to declare war, but President Braz and Foreign 
Minister Pe<;anha decided to use the dispatches carefully. After 
all, the telegrams were vague and their meaning subject to debate. 
It was by no means certain that their release to the press would 
trigger a popular clamor for war. They could be used more effec-
tively to convince members of Congress that the German threat 
was real. Thus, rumors about a German plot continued to circu-
late for the next month as the Brazilian government waited for the 
right occasion to exploit the Luxburg dispatches. 25 
It came near the end of October. The news arrived on the twenty-
third that a German submarine had torpedoed a fourth Brazilian 
vessel, the Macao, two hundred miles off the coast of Spain. 26 For-
merly the German ship Palatia and now part of the government-
owned Lloyd Brasileiro Line, the vessel was laden with a cargo of 
black beans and coffee intended for France. The Germans added 
insult to injury by taking the captain of the Macao captive. 27 
After conferring with government leaders, President Braz de-
cided that the time had come, as he put it in his message to Con-
gress on October 25, 1917, "to make legal our defensive attitude 
... and to develop the organization of national resistance." By 
torpedoing the Macao and seizing its commander, Germany had 
imposed a state of war upon Brazil, he declared; for that reason he 
felt at liberty "to recommend belligerent retaliation ... in order to 
maintain the dignity of the nation." Braz further announced that 
if Congress would declare war, he would immediately seize the 
25. Lansing to the American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, September 19, 
1917, in RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of 
Germany, 1910-1929 (M336, roll 67); Martin, Latin America and the War, 246n.124; 
New York Times, October 11, 1917. 
26. Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, October 26, 1917. One contemporary 
Teuto-Brazilian writer has made the astonishing and unsupported assertion that 
present-day Brazilian historians believe that the Macao could have been sunk by 
the Americans in order to bring Brazil into the war. See Klaus Geissler, "Deutsche 
in Amazonasgebiet," Staden-Jahrbuch: Beitrage zur Brasilkunde, XXIX (1981), 53. 
27. 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), October 26, 1917; Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), 
October 26, 1917; New York Times, October 26, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 
51; Martin, Latin America and the War, 67. 
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German gunboat Eber, then in the port of Bahia, and imprison its 
crew. 28 
The Declaration of War 
The next day, October 26, 1917, the Chamber of Deputies by a 
vote of 149 to 1 and the Senate unanimously approved a resolu-
tion proclaiming a state of war between Brazil and the German 
Empire. It also empowered the president "to take such steps for 
the national defense and public safety as he shall consider ade-
quate." Only then did Pe<;anha take advantage of the Luxburg dis-
patches. As though to justify Brazil's entry into the war, he an-
nounced grandiloquently that Germany had been caught in a plot 
to invade Brazil. It appears that in order to galvanize public opin-
ion in support of the war resolution, Pe<;anha grossly exaggerated 
the content and significance of Luxburg's messages. The press, es-
pecially in Argentina, then demanded that the Argentine govern-
ment release the actual text of the incriminating telegrams or else 
authorize their publication by a foreign government, i.e., the 
United States.29 In response to this pressure, the American secre-
tary of state released the texts of telegrams numbered 63 and 89. 
They were published in Rio de Janeiro papers on October 30, 
1917. The New York Times, which welcomed Brazil's entry into the 
war, reported that the Luxburg dispatches confirmed long-held 
suspicions of a German plot, but as for Pe<;anha's hyperbole, the 
newspaper merely noted that the texts did "not fully sustain the 
statements made by the Brazilian Minister."30 
On October 31, President Braz addressed a widely publicized 
manifesto to the presidents and governors of the states: "It is nec-
28. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, October 26, 27, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de Ja-
neiro), October 26, 27, 1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 87-88; FRUS, 1917, Supp. I, 
The World War, 351; New York Times, October 26, 27, 1917. 
29. Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, October 27, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), 
October 27,1917; The Brazilian Green Book, 88; FRUS, 1917, Supp. I, The World War, 
352; New York Times, October 27,29,31, 1917. 
30. Morgan to Secretary of State, October 30, 1917, in RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 (M336, 
roll 67); Rio de Janeiro lornal do Commercio, November I, 1917; New York Times, 
October 31, 1917. 
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essary that all internal differences disappear and that the nation 
stand forth one and indivisable before the aggressor." He added 
that Brazil's "liberal traditions have always taught respect for the 
persons and property of the enemy, as far as is compatible with 
public safety."31 Superpatriots heeded the former more than the 
latter. As in April, enthusiastic public demonstrations were ac-
companied by attacks on German and Teuto-Brazilian property. 
31. Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, November 1, 1917. The translation is 
from Martin, Latin America and the War, 69. 
7 
A Second Round of Riots 
W AR WITH GERMANY did not come as a surprise to the Teuto-Brazilians, though some tried to ignore its por-
tents throughout September and October, 1917. There 
were plenty of signs of changes in attitude. In addition to the pub-
licity attending the Luxburg dispatches and the revival of rumors 
about an impending German revolt in southern Brazil, the state 
legislature of Santa Catarina enacted a law on October 5, 1917, 
that established compulsory school attendance for all children 
from six to eleven years of age. It required all foreign-language 
schools to include Portuguese-language instruction in their cur-
ricula, in addition to Brazilian history and geography. 1 A few days 
later, there were reports in the press about the disposition of the 
court case filed against Friedrich Schmidt in Porto Alegre for his 
having fired upon patriotic demonstrators in April. Thus, just a 
few days before the sinking of the Macao, the prosecutor had the 
occasion to characterize anew the torpedoing of the Parana as a 
barbaric attack by the Germans on the dignity of the Brazilian 
people. Memories of the Porto Alegre riots were revived as news-
papers reported the prosecutor's review of those unhappy events. 2 
Some German-language newspapers made a halfhearted effort 
to prepare readers for the possibility of war. Less than a week be-
fore the declaration of hostilities, the Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Ale-
1. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 51; Schroder, Brasilien und Witten-
berg, 356; Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen! 21. 
2. Germania (Sao Paulo), October 17, 1917. 
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gre defended the Teuto-Brazilian record of citizenship and explic-
itly stated that all able-bodied Teuto-Brazilians would willingly 
bear arms against Germany, if citizenship required it of them. 
Still, the Deutsche Zeitung could not resist suggesting the improba-
bility of war because the Brazilian Constitution permits a de-
fensive war only, and Germany would never wage a war of con-
quest against Brazil. Thus, ethnic chauvinism remained naIve 
until the end.3 
When war was finally declared on October 26, the editor of the 
Deutsche Zeitung anticipated trouble; an intolerance of all things 
German, he wrote, could be expected as a matter of course. He 
suggested that scheduled ethnic festivals be canceled in order to 
avoid causing offense. He pointed outthat the president's message 
recommending war had immediately caused great excitement and 
enthusaism among the local youths who congregated in the streets 
and coffeehouses. 4 His advice was far too mild. Given their expe-
riences in April following the break in diplomatic relations, the 
Germans of Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and other cities as well should 
have been prepared for another round of violence, perhaps worse 
than the first. 
Unlike many of the Teuto-Brazilian leaders, some local govern-
ments did anticipate the possibility of new riots. This was espe-
cially true of Porto Alegre, where the police forbade all public 
demonstrations. A few other cities, including Rio de Janeiro, tried 
to ban public meetings of any kind, thereby hoping to nip in the 
bud any planning sessions for future anti-German depredations. 
At the same time, the Ministry of Justice in Rio issued a directive 
to all state presidents and governors that prohibited the publica-
tion of alarming rumors or routine information about the depar-
tures of vessels, the movements of troops, and other events of a 
military character. 5 
Most major cities, however, permitted (or could not prevent) 
patriotic demonstrations in those heady days following the decla-
3. Deutsche Zeitung (Porto Alegre), October 20, 1917. 
4. Ibid., October 26, 1917. 
5. Porto Alegre Correia da Manha, October 27, 28, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto 
Alegre), November 5, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Jamal do Commercia, October 31, Novem-
ber 1, 4, 1917. 
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ration of war. A few degenerated into scenes of anti-German agita-
tion. No doubt some were the result of several directives issued by 
the national government relating to the Germans. The most impor-
tant was an order issued by the minister of the interior to the state 
presidents and governors to end the publication of all German-
language newspapers, periodicals, and books. A second decree 
ordered the closing of all schools in which Portuguese was not 
taught. Similarly, the director of the Brazilian postal service an-
nounced that his agency would no longer handle materials pub-
lished in the German language. Subsequently, censorship was 
instituted, German sailors were interned, alleged "spies" were ar-
rested, identification cards were required of all Reichsdeutsche, 
and interstate travel by aliens without special permits was for-
bidden. 6 
New Violence in the Cities 
Newspapers and schools then became. prime targets in a new 
round of violence that occurred in Curitiba, Pelotas, Petropolis, 
Rio de Janeiro, and other cities. In general, these disturbances ap-
peared to have been more random in character, perhaps less well 
organized, and less severe than were the April riots. There is some 
evidence, however, that like the earlier disorders, these were at 
least partIy attributable to Italian immigrants whose anti-German 
sentiments were intense. In American intelligence reports, the 
riots were simply referred to as "the Italian demonstrations." Es-
pecially in Sao Paulo, where Italians constituted half the popu-
lation, they organized a vigilance committee, "a secret service 
force," for the purpose of German surveillance and fomenting 
anti-German activity. 7 
The first riot struck Curitiba, the capital of Parana, on Sunday 
evening, October 28, and continued into the early hours of the 
next day. Its origins are unclear. Catholic sources assert that anti-
6. Rio de Janeiro JOTlUlI do Commercio, October 30, November 1, 4, 1917; A 
Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), October 30, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 52; "Atti-
tude of Brazilians toward the War," anonymous report transmitted to the Depart-
ment of State by Capt. S. McCauley, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, April 
25, 1918, p. 11, in RG 59, Entry 540, Box 1, Brazil folder. 
7. "Attitude of Brazilians," 11; in the same me, see the "Situation at Sao Paulo," 
transmitted by McCauley, April 26, 1918, pp. 5, 9, 10, 11. 
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clericalism was at the root of the problem. In any case, a demon-
stration grew more or less spontaneously from a dispute among 
people of strong anti-German sentiments, and a large crowd gath-
ered. The assemblage then moved to the residence of the state 
president, where there was much patriotic display. A parade then 
formed that quickly degenerated into a mob seeking indiscrimi-
nate revenge on the Germans for the sinking of the Macao. 
At first the mob merely sought symbols of German power that 
they could destroy, such as flags, banners, and pictures of the kai-
ser and other German leaders. Such objects were taken from a 
German theater and the clubhouses of several Vereine and burned 
in the streets. As midnight approached, the mob moved on to 
the offices of the Beobachter, the anticlerical newspaper, and to the 
Kompass, the chauvinistic Catholic publication. The offices and the 
printshop of the latter were located within a complex of buildings 
maintained by the Franciscan order that included a school, apart-
ments for the teachers and editors, as well as the cloister itself. All 
were vandalized. Books, school equipment, clothes, and furniture 
were piled high in the street and burned. Other items were stolen. 
Printing equipment was wrecked, some of it beyond repair; doors 
and windows were smashed. Telephone calls were repeatedly 
made to the police. Someone had misdirected them to the brew-
ery, possibly intentionally. Finally they arrived, drove the mob 
away, and with the help of cloister residents extinguished the fire. 8 
Failure to comply completely and immediately with the injunc-
tion against publishing in the German language stimulated an-
other major disturbance in Pelotas, where the strongly pro-Ger-
man Deutsche Wacht, severely damaged in April, was now put to 
rest permanently. Its end came on October 30,1917, the same day 
that the editor, Rudi Schafer, had been informed officially that he 
could no longer publish. Schafer received the news after an issue 
had been printed but before it was distributed. He naIvely an-
nounced to the police that that day's product would be his last, 
implying thereby that the issue would be distributed. This infor-
mation was quickly spread through the city, and that night a mob 
8. 0 Palz (Rio de Janeiro), November 4, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 
100-103; Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 87, 121, 127, 192; Paul Rohrbach, Bei 
den Deutschen in Latein-Amerika (Berlin, 1922), 31; Arndt and Olson, History and Bib-
liography, 122. 
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destroyed the Wacht's building and its contents. Next, the rabble 
severely vandalized a German-language school and the clubhouse 
of the Concordia-Verein. Many other buildings were threatened 
with destruction, but the police were able to protect them. For 
several nights following, police closely guarded numerous Ger-
man businesses in order to prevent further depredations. 9 
Petropolis, the old summer capital of Brazil, was next. The dis-
turbance there began in the evening of Wednesday, November 1, 
1917, on the heels of news about the Curitiba riot. Apparentlyan-
other spontaneous affair, the Petropolis riot developed from a 
noisy argument, possibly prearranged, between two Italians, one 
of whom defended the Germans. Attracted by the commotion, 
a crowd gathered. Patriotic sympathies were heated by the ex-
changes, and soon cries of "Viva Brazil! Death to Germany!" kin-
dled enthusiasm for the liquor supplies in a nearby Gasthaus. 
After smashing its doors, windows, and furniture and depleting 
its liquid stores, the mob stormed a German bakery and a bowling 
club. Then, at midnight, they wrecked Father Sinzig's publishing 
house, where Vozes de Petr6polis and various German-language 
publications were produced. The riot continued until):oo A.M.; 
many German businesses and houses were damaged. In his ac-
count of the affair, Father Sinzig emphasized that the riot had 
been the work of a few agitators and that the respectable Luso-
Brazilians of the city were warmly generous in assisting their dev-
astated German neighbors. 10 
Rio de Janeiro experienced a major anti-German riot on Novem-
ber), 1917. According to the Jornal do Commercio, the disturbances 
were directly attributable to popular indignation over the torpe-
doing of two former German ships, the Acary and the Guahyba. 
Superpatriotic students led the demonstrations at first but soon 
the crowd mushroomed into an ugly mob, one so large and un-
ruly that the police were unable to control it. The disturbances be-
gan in front of the presidential palace but quickly moved to the 
9. A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), October 31, November 1, 9, 1917; Fischer, "Die 
deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 326. On October 31, 1917, Borges de 
Medeiros dispatched a long report on the riot to the minister of the interior in Rio 
de Janeiro. It is reprinted in Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 2, 1917. 
10. 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), November 3, 1917; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 
143-44. Jornal do Commercio ignored the Petr6polis disturbances entirely, despite 
the proximity of this city to Rio de Janeiro. 
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nearby German district, where a well-known German restaurant 
was completely wrecked. Next, the clubhouse of the Germania 
Society and a nearby German school were severely damaged, as 
the mob moved on to a special target, the buildings of Arp and 
Company, which had regularly displayed pro-German materials in 
its windows since the beginning of the war in 1914. Next, the offices 
and the equipment of the pro-German, Portuguese-language 
newspaper Ditirio Allemao were destroyed. Several other well-
known German commercial houses were vandalized, though the 
branch office of the Bayer Company was spared because the care-
taker had the presence of mind to place a large "For Rent" sign 
over the main entranceY 
According to one historian of the Rio de Janeiro Germans, the 
outrages committed by the rabble that night were done at the di-
rection of paid agitators. The American historian Oarence Haring 
reported that lithe police conveniently arrived after the damage 
was done." Still, the chief of police took immediate measures to 
strengthen security forces to prevent further outbreaks of popular 
indignation. Soldiers patrolled the streets in sensitive districts 
and guarded German-owned commercial houses and banks from 
further depredations as order was quickly restored in Rio de 
Janeiro. 12 
The great seaport of Santos, located near Sao Paulo, also en-
dured a severe riot in the evening of Saturday, November 3, 1917, 
at the same time the Rio disturbance occurred. In this instance, 
the American consul, Carl F. Deichman, was in the midst of the 
action and he submitted a report to his superior, Ambassador 
Edwin Morgan, at his earliest opportunity. In Deichman's view, 
the trouble was directly attributable to popular indignation over 
the sinking of the two Brazilian vessels, but he added that the 
crowds, which had gathered more or less spontaneously, were 
subsequently exploited by agitators who deliberately incited the 
crowd to acts of vandalism. Signboards in the German language 
were removed and destroyed, the German clubhouse was set on 
fire, and a variety of German-owned business houses were exten-
11. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 4,5, 1917; 0 Pa{z (Rio de Ja-
neiro), November 4, 1917. 
12. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 494-95; Haring, The Germans in 
South America, 65; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 5, 1917. 
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sively damaged. The police managed to save a German bank and a 
department store only by using their carbines and bayonets. Deich-
man himself narrowly escaped injury by gunfire in the melee. In 
the effort to save the offices of A Noticia, which was known as a 
pro-German newspaper, one man was killed and others were in-
jured, some seriously. Calm was finally restored when marines on 
Brazilian warships anchored in the Santos harbor were ordered to 
patrol the streets of the city. 13 
Many other Brazilian cities experienced similar disturbances 
during the first week of the war. Most were on or near the coast, 
such as Sao Paulo and Pernambuco, but some were remote, inte-
rior towns such as Cuiaba, the capital of Mato Grosso. This time 
the state of Santa Catarina was especially vulnerable to the con-
tagion, and serious disorders broke out in Itajaf, Sao Jose, and the 
capital city of Florian6polis. Problems in the solidly German com-
munities, including Blumenau and Joinville, were real enough 
though less severe. Most of the rural towns in the serra had no 
trouble, but a few were afflicted with endemic anti-Germanism 
for months afterward. 14 
Causes of the Disturbances 
In his report to the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Mor-
gan observed that the rioters usually had been "students, boys, 
and uneducated people." Had the police intervened, Morgan re-
ported, the mobs probably could have been disbanded. In Rio 
I}. Carl F. Deichman to Edwin V. Morgan, November 5, 1917, in RG 59, Ameri-
can Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8. See also Edwin V. Mor-
gan to Secretary of State, November 8, 1917, in the same source. 
14. Rio de Janeiro Jomal do Commercio, November 5, 1917; 0 Pafz (Rio de Ja-
neiro), November}, 1917; Pfarrer Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges auf 
die deutsch-evangelischen Gemeinden in Santa Catharina," in Geissler (ed.), Die 
Kulturbedeutung, 24; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 190; Der Familienfreund: Katholischer 
Hauskalender und Wegweiser fur das Jahr 1920 (Porto Alegre, [1919]), 124; Ambas-
sador Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, November 8,1917, in RG 59, Ameri-
can Embassy Correspondence, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, part 8. The American consul 
in Pernambuco reported that a riot occurred there on November 7. Several German-
owned buildings were destroyed, one policeman killed, and twenty-two persons 
injured. A. T. Haeberle to Secretary of State, November 8, 1917, in RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 
(microfilm roll 66). 
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Grande, Pelotas, and Florianopolis, order was reestablished, not 
by the appointed authorities, but by private citizens acting inde-
pendently. In Morgan's view, "the less guilty suffered the most" 
while the German-owned banks, which he regarded as agents of 
German propaganda and espionage, suffered insignificant injury. 
Morgan emphasized that Teuto-Brazilians generally were law-
abiding and loyal, and that the hatred directed against them was 
due, not to their own conduct, but to the acts of the German gov-
ernment. He predicted that leniency in the treatment of Teuto-
Brazilians was likely to develop, rather than the reverse. 15 
In most communities, ethnic strife was in fact short-lived. 16 Bra-
zilian behavior often resembled the huge bonfires set by the 
rioters. Fed with kerosene, paper, and smashed furniture, the 
flames flared up instantly, generated terrific heat, and then 
quickly burned out. Similarly, Brazilian intolerance of ethnic dif-
ferences or of perceived pro-German behavior flashed into vio-
lence, but then it subsided quickly, as more typical manifestations 
of the Brazilian personality returned, such as easy acceptance and 
good humor. 
Although the riots were clearly an urban phenomenon, they 
seem not to have been closely related to other social or demo-
graphic variables, such as density of German population, or even 
to indiscreet pro-German behavior in the period before the decla-
ration of war. Instead, the attitudes of local officials, or outstand-
ing personalities, seem to have been most significant. For ex-
ample, if the editor of a local newspaper had been especially 
intemperate in his denunciation of Germany and the pro-German 
behavior of Teuto-Brazilians, or if there were in a given commu-
nity persons who, for whatever political, economic, social, or cul-
tural reasons, took it upon themselves to plan, organize, and lead 
a demonstration and transform it into something more destruc-
tive, then anti-German riots were more likely to occur. Although 
newspaper accounts usually emphasized attacks on the German-
language press and commercial houses, both Catholic and Protes-
tant churches and schools were by no means immune to attack, as 
15. Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, November 5,1917, in RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Germany, 1910-1929 
(microfilm roll 66). 
16. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercia, November 5,6, 1917; "Attitude of Bra-
zilians toward the War," 12-13. 
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numerous histories of local parishes testify.17 As in the April riots, 
property damage was extensive, but physical injury to persons 
was relatively rare. IS Many accounts emphasize that the majority 
of Luso-Brazilians, especially government officials and respected 
leaders of society, did not condone the violence. While it does not 
follow that they approved of pro-German behavior, they were 
often helpful to individual Teuto-Brazilians whose lives or prop-
erty were threatened, and they were instrumental in restoring 
peace. At the same time, there is evidence, admittedly inconclu-
sive in character, to suggest that the police were sometimes delib-
erately slow in responding to calls for help and that they arrived to 
quell the disturbances only after rioters had a chance to work their 
destruction unhindered. 
It is impossible to determine the role of the Portuguese-lan-
guage press in stimulating this new wave of violence. Such quasi-
official newspapers as the Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio and 
A Federafiio (Porto Alegre) were not sensationalist sheets that ca-
tered to popular tastes. More conscious of their role as journals of 
official record and of elite opinion, they were often inadequate as 
purveyors of news. They reported what the government wanted 
reported. In his widely publicized message to the state presidents 
and governors on the declaration of war, President Braz revealed 
his government's expectation that "the press, which has never 
failed in its patriotism in the hour of danger, will avoid inoppor-
tune discussions." 19 It is not surprising therefore that the anti-
German riots in Curitiba, Pelotas, and Petropolis (October 28 to 
November 1) were not even mentioned in the Jornal do Commercio; 
it was only when Rio de Janeiro itself was afflicted on November 3 
that this newspaper provided coverage of the violence. 
Still, there is no question that because of its strongly pro-Ally 
bias, the Brazilian press contributed to an intense anti-German 
feeling that ultimately manifested itself in riots. Both before and 
after the declaration of war, the Brazilian public was fed a steady 
diet of stories about the internal German menace. Rumors about 
the gathering of armed Germans in southern Brazil were fre-
17. For examples, see accounts in Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien: Festschrift zum 
50-jiihrigen Bestehen der lutherischen Synode am 9. Oktober 1955 [1955], passim. 
18. For an example of personal injury to an Evangelical pastor, see Radlach, 
"Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 24. 
19. Martin, Latin America and the War, 69. 
A Second Round of Riots 
quently repeated, despite their utter lack of foundation in fact. 20 
Other reports claimed that virtually the entire Brazilian army was 
being sent to the south to suppress the impending German revolt. 
Meanwhile, nervous Brazilian navy men observed what appeared 
to be strange nighttime signals along the coast, presumably sig-
nifying some sort of enemy communication. Investigation proved 
them to be innocent enough, but in his war message to Congress, 
President Braz had warned the people to be on guard against en-
emy spies. It is hardly surprising that excitable persons were soon 
discovering them everywhere. There were rumors that Draconian 
measures would soon be taken against German (or Teuto-Brazil-
ian) products, but it was also reported that such steps would not 
be in harmony with Brazilian interests or with the country's liberal 
traditions. Some enthusiasts for the Allied cause were appropri-
ately horrified by the news that Rio de Janeiro police discovered 
seventeen cases of ammunition in the warehouse of Bellingrodt 
and Meyer, a German importing firm that for years had been mar-
keting such merchandise in Brazil. 21 
Patriotic organizations experienced a new surge of activity in 
the weeks following the declaration of war. This was especially 
true of the League of National Defense (Liga da Defesa Nacional), 
a preparedness association founded in 1916 that had urged the or-
ganization of paramilitary units (tiro da guerra) in which able-
bodied male citizens would be trained in the use of rifles. In gen-
eral, the League of National Defense was similar in purpose and 
organization to the American Defense Society in the United States. 
In Porto Alegre, several hundred Brazilians formed the League of 
National Resistance (Liga da Resistencia Nacional), an organiza-
tion especially devoted to eradicating German influence in Bra-
zilian life. It favored nothing less than a war on German culture in 
all its manifestations, not the least of which were German names 
of streets and towns. 22 
Many persons who joined in this anti-German agitation failed 
20. New York Times, November 1, 11, 1917. 
21. Haring, The Germans in South America, 43; 0 Paiz (Rio de Janeiro), November 
4, 6, 7, 1917; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 497; Hundert Jahre Deutscher 
Hilfsverein, Sao Paulo (N.p., 1963), 45; New York Times, November 11, 1917. 
22. Martin, Latin America and the War, 71-72. See also Rio de Janeiro Jornal do 
Commercio, November 1-15, 1917. A Federar;ao (Porto Alegre), January 4, Octo-
ber 14, 1918. 
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to distinguish between German aliens resident in Brazil (Reichs-
deutsche) and Brazilian citizens of German birth or descent (Teuto-
Brazilians). Much confusion resulted and not a few miscarriages 
of justice. But other persons understood the difference very well. 
Oaiming in a speech before Congress to have studied the German 
language in order to equip hims.elf better to understand the Ger-
man problem, one politician named Barbosa Lima excoriated 
Teuto-Brazilians who retained a IIdouble identity" and presum-
ably a double loyalty. In his view, a Brazilian could not speak Ger-
man habitually in public or at home or, for that matter, celebrate 
the defeat of the French at Sedan in 1870 or revere the memory of 
Bismarck as a great man. Other legislators of similar attitudes in-
troduced resolutions in Congress that would have confiscated all 
the property of Reichsdeutsche, as well as the remaining vessels 
in the sequestered fleet of German merchant ships.23 
Beyond all such superpatriotic behavior, however, it was nec-
essary for the government to impose certain basic precautionary 
restrictions on German aliens in Brazil. The most obvious was 
obligatory registration with the police. Photographing and finger-
printing became standard procedure in many areas. In Parana, 
alien registration even became the basis for a census of Germans in 
the state. Censorship of mail was also introduced. In some cities 
the newspapers printed lists of German aliens who had registered. 
This led 0 PalZ to observe that since the names of certain prosti-
tutes of German nationality appeared on such lists, the loyalty of 
any Brazilian citizen who patronized them should be questioned. 
Meanwhile, the army suspended furloughs, recalled officers to 
their garrisons, and doubled guard detachments on railroads.24 
Anti-German sentiment was greatly intensified on November 3, 
when the news of the sinking of two more Brazilian vessels (the 
Acary and the Guahyba) was released.25 President Braz decided to 
23. 0 Pafz (Rio de Janeiro), November 5, 6, 1917; Rio de Janeiro Tornal do Com-
mercio, November 5, 1917. 
24. 0 Pafz (Rio de Janeiro), November 4,8, 1917; Funfzig Tahre Deutscher Verein 
Germania, 157; Balhana and Westphalen, "0 Censo dos A1emaes do Parana," 
404-19; New York Times, November 4, 1917; Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 
277-79· 
25· Rio de Janeiro Tornal do Commercio, November 4, 1917; New York Times, No-
vember 4, 1917; Konigk, Die Politik Brasiliens, 52. The Acary was formerly the Ger-
man ship Ehrenburg. 
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cite these losses as evidence to support his request of Congress 
for new repressive legislation against German aliens (and their 
property and business) in Brazil. The huge anti-German riots in 
Rio de Janeiro were touched off by the same news. In his message 
to Congress, Braz asked for authority (1) to annul contracts for 
public works that had been negotiated with German: firms, (2) to 
prohibit any further concessions of new land to German subjects 
for settlement by German subjects, (3) to control German-owned 
banks in Brazil and eventually to annul their licenses and to ex-
tend similar measures to German-owned commercial firms, (4) to 
prohibit the sale of German-owned properties, and (5) to intern 
German subjects. 26 
Congress responded immediately. Afranio de Mello Franco, a 
prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, introduced a bill 
that corresponded to Braz's request. It was vigorously debated, 
amended in the Senate, and finally sent to the president, who 
signed it into law on November 16. Known as the Lei da guerra 
(war law), this legislation granted the executive all the extraordi-
nary powers he had asked for. The most significant powers in-
volved economic questions. The president was empowered to 
seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all goods consigned 
to them. The money acquired thereby was to be deposited in the 
national treasury as security against future losses caused by Ger-
many. Really intended to apply to German-owned businesses 
rather than to persons, the law defined a firm as German when 
half or more of its ownership was held by subjects of the kaiser. 
The location of a company headquarters in Brazil or Germany was 
considered to be irrelevant.27 
This legislation affected most directly the great German-owned 
banks in Brazil and their numerous branches, as well as the Theo-
dor Wille and Company, one of Brazil's largest coffee-exporting 
firms. Most of the provisions were standard or normal procedure 
at the onset of war. According to American historian Percy A. 
Martin, these parts of the Lei da guerra were moderate. Moreover, 
·the subsequent administration of the law was generally sensible 
26. The Brazilian Green Book, 97; Prazeres, 0 Brasil na guerra, 81-83; New York 
Times, November 4, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto Alegre), November 5, 1917. 
27. Rio de Janeiro Jomal do Commercio, November 6-16, 1917; Prazeres, 0 Brasil 
na guerra, 83-85. The full text of the Lei da guerra is given in English translation in 
The Brazilian Green Book, 99-102. 
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and marked less by a spirit of revenge than by a concern for the 
revival of trade in the postwar period. 28 
For the most anxious superpatriots, however, Braz's program 
did not go far enough. Stimulated by the many rumors of a poten-
tial German uprising in the southern states, they demanded and 
received a provision that granted the president the power to de-
clare any part of the country to be under a state of siege. The pur-
pose of this section (which was well within Brazilian tradition) 
was to enable the executive to suppress any further disorders-
either anti-German riots or any possible German revolt. 29 Drafted 
in haste at a time when passions were not always held in restraint, 
this section of the law (Article I) was ill-defined and soon led to 
wide inconsistencies in administration. 
In accord with his newly granted authority, President Braz de-
clared a state of siege the next day (November 17,1917). It applied 
to the Federal District (the capital city of Rio de Janeiro) and to the 
states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Parana, Santa 
Catarina, and Rio Grande do SuI. Martial law was imposed in these 
areas, and though it was neither possible nor desirable to intern all 
enemy aliens resident in Brazil, approximately seven hundred 
were arrested, most of them officers in the German naval or mili-
tary reserves. The army command at Porto Alegre ordered that all 
Schutzenvereine be disbanded and their guns and ammunition con-
fiscated. Detachments of the army were billeted in the rural Ger-
man colonies. In general, the Lei da guerra and the executive orders 
that preceded it were the basis for the repression and persecution 
experienced by the Teuto-Brazilians during World War I. 30 
28. Martin, Latin America and the War, 81; Martin, "Brazil," 256. 
29. Prazeres, 0 Brasil na guerra, 15-21, 100-198, provides extensive transcrip-
tions of the congressional debates in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
over the question of the state of siege. Other documents are also included. 
30. Ibid., 199; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 16,17,1917; Martin, 
"Brazil," 255; A Federafao (Porto Alegre), November 17, 1917; Nuno Pinheiro [de 
Andrade j, Problemas da guerra e da paz: (Legislafao de guerra do Brasil) (Rio de Janeiro, 
1919), 28; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 334; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 76, 79. 
Impact of War on German Ethnic 
Society and Institutions 
8 
T HE ORDER suspending all publications in the German lan-guage was the measure that affected the Teuto-Brazilians 
most immediately and most directly. The ethnic press was 
their basic means of intragroup communication. It also was their 
chief contact with the world of Luso-Brazilian society, and their 
way of finding out what the government required or expected of 
them. Yet the prohibition was total. It applied not only to news-
papers but to all periodicals, farm journals, church magazines, al-
manacs, devotional literature, even German translations of classic 
Portuguese and Brazilian literature, and school books of every 
kind, including texts for teaching Portuguese to German-speaking 
children. 
To the Brazilian mind, the Germans had had ample opportunity 
to learn the Portuguese language; if they had not done so, the ban 
on German would now force them to it. If they had no means by 
which to learn Portuguese, that was unfortunate, but it could not 
be helped, given the present emergency and the threat of German 
insurgency in the southern states. Moreover, the government 
lacked the means to monitor or translate all publications in the 
German language. It seemed better to prohibit them all. 
Such heavy-handed injunctions reveal the ignorance or lack of 
understanding the ruling classes of Brazil had of the Teuto-Brazil-
ian social and cultural circumstance. They seemed unable to read 
the evidence, pervasive though it was, that the great majority of 
the Germans in Brazil-farmers, laborers, small-business men, 
and craftsmen-felt no special loyalty to the German kaiser and 
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his empire; that they represented no potential threat, military or 
otherwise, to the established regime; and that as native Brazilians, 
they were naturally loyal to their government. Luso-Brazilians 
failed to recognize that the evidence they perceived as pro-German 
was mostly cultural in character, not political, and that it was usu-
ally based on the behavior of a nonrepresentative, elite segment of 
the German-Brazilian population resident in the large cities-the 
European-born journalists, clergymen, technicians, and entre-
preneurs with strong economic "or psychological bonds with 
Germany. 
The German-Language Press 
The total prohibition against any publication in the German lan-
guage was far more severe than any wartime restriction the United 
States government imposed upon its German-speaking minority 
during World War I. German-American newspapers were permit-
ted to publish throughout the war, though under inept surveil-
lance and under limiting circumstances that brought financial dis-
aster to many. 1 But in Brazil, economic survival was possible only if 
the German-language publishers switched entirely to Portuguese. 
A surprisingly large number of German-language publishers 
elected to try the Portuguese option. Thus, in Porto Alegre the 
Deutsches Volksblatt became the Gazeta Popular; the Neue Deutsche 
Zeitung became the Gazeta Colonial; in the backcountry of Rio 
Grande do SuI, the Serra-Post of Ijut appeared as the Correio Se-
rrano; in Santa Catarina, the Urwaldsbote of Blumenau was trans-
formed into the Commercio do Blumenau and the Blumenauer Zei-
tung became the Gazeta Blumenauense. The publishers of these and 
other similar Portuguese-language substitutes considered them to 
be temporary expedients to carry subscribers through the war to a 
time when they could resume publishing in German. Not all pa-
pers survived, but many did, even though they were closely cen-
sored. For example, the circulation of the Gazeta Popular dropped 
to 2,500, roughly one-third the subscribers it attracted after the 
war when it returned to the German language in 1920. It actually 
did quite well compared to some others, probably because it was 
1. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Layalty, 241-43. 
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widely known as the Catholic paper. With the church as its silent 
partner, it was reasonably safe. More important, however, was the 
fact that as a Catholic paper it would not persist in ethnic chau-
vinism, unlike the Jomal da Tarde (the transmuted Vaterland of 
Porto Alegre), which later in the war period was temporarily si-
lenced by another mob. 2 
The German Schools 
The decrees of October 29 also ordered that hundreds of German 
schools throughout Brazil (267 in Santa Catarina alone) were to be 
closed immediately. Nevertheless, many remained open until they 
received official notification early in November. The directive was 
straightforward enough: Only schools in which Portuguese was 
used as the language of instruction could stay open; all others 
were to remain closed until they could demonstrate to local school 
authorities that they were staffed with teachers competent in Por-
tuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese were to be 
used. In the United States, where school legislation was at that 
time exclusively the province of state and local governments, there 
was nothing comparable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private 
and parochial German-language schools, though many states cur-
tailed or abolished instruction in the German language as a part 
of the curriculum in the public schools. Only in Louisiana, where 
there were almost no German-language schools, was the prohibi-
tion against the ~se of the "enemy language" total,3 
In most German districts the news was received with surprising 
equanimity, probably because the long summer vacation (which 
coincided with the Christmas holiday) was near. But when the 
local churches or school societies tried to reopen their schools, 
2. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 49; Arndt and Olson, History and Bibliography, 112, 
116, 153; Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 57, 133-34, 156, 
181; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 288. 
3. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 50; Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commer-
cio, November 9, 1917; A Federapio (Porto Alegre), November 9, 1917; 0 Paiz (Rio de 
Janeiro), November 9, 1917; Frederick C. Luebke, "Legal Restrictions on Foreign 
Languages in the Great Plains States, 1917-1923," in Paul Schach (ed.), Language in 
Conflict: Linguistic Acculturation on the Great Plains (Lincoln, 1980), 1-19; U.S. Army, 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Compilations of War Laws of the Various State 
and Insular Possessions (1919), 47; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 252-55. 
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they found that they faced formidable problems. Finding teachers 
sufficiently competent in Portuguese to meet the new standards 
was often impossible; acquiring suitable Portuguese-language in-
structional materials was very difficult. Even though the enforce-
ment of the decree was lax in some places, many schools re-
mained closed permanently. Because public institutions had never 
been established in many areas of German settlement, the regula-
tion meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children had no al-
ternative schools to attend; they were simply deprived of educa-
tion. This was usually not the case in the cities, but even there 
some parents felt so strongly about the matter that they insisted 
on the right to educate their children at home. In some cases, ar-
rangements were made for a German teacher to go from house to 
house to instruct three or four children at a time. Resentment was 
increased by the knowledge that even though the decrees tech-
nically applied to all non-Portuguese-Ianguage schools, Italian in-
stitutions were ordinarily not forced to comply with the new lan-
guage restrictions. 4 
Enforcement varied considerably from state to state. In Parana, 
a state law placed all private schools under government super-
vision and required that Portuguese be introduced as the lan-
guage of instruction in all private schools by April, 1918. In Rio 
Grande do SuI, where Comtean Positivism continued to infuse 
much governmental thought and action, enforcement was often 
moderated by the application of common sense to specific cir-
cumstances. Reluctant to impose unreasonable restrictions on in-
dividual freedoms, local officials in Rio Grande do SuI were al-
lowed to stretch definitions of what constituted competence in 
Portuguese. In some remote districts the decree could even be ig-
nored entirely. This did not go unnoticed in Rio de Janeiro, where 
President Braz publicly criticized Borges de Medeiros as the only 
state president or governor who failed to require that all classes be 
conducted in Portuguese. More important, the Rio Grande do SuI 
government recognized that it had a responsibility to provide sub-
4. Das Brasildeutschtum lusobrasilisch gesehen, translated by Irene Schultz from 0 
Observador e Financeiro, no. 33, Rio de Janeiro, 1938 (Stuttgart, 1944), 107-39; 
Braunschweig, "Die rechtIiche SteIIung," 50; Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 326; Brepohl 
and Fugmann, Die Wolgadeutschen, 71; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 91; Sinzig, Nach 
dreiszig Jahren, 106; Dedekind, Deutschtum und Evangelium, 47. 
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stitutes for the closed German-language schools. By taking advan-
tage of a federal decree of May 4, 1918, that provided subsidies for 
schools established by state governments in areas inhabited by 
"European settlers," the Rio Grande do SuI government opened 
167 new public schools at one stroke. Nevertheless, most Teuto-
Brazilians refused to enroll their children in these substitute in-
stitutions. Ironically, it was the German districts that had been 
relatively well supplied with schools, albeit private ones, while 
other areas with much higher rates of illiteracy continued to go 
without them. 5 
In Santa Catarina, enforcement was more stringent. Here Posi-
tivism was weaker, nativism stronger, and the Catholic church 
more influential. The anti-German propaganda of 1917 had fre-
quently identified Santa Catarina as the center of the alleged Ger-
man insurgency, thereby intensifying the determination of offi-
cials to purify the state's reputation. Moreover, Santa Catarina had 
a unique history of government concern for and control of educa-
tion that had climaxed in the enactment on October 5 of the legis-
lation establishing compulsory education and requiring instruc-
tion in Portuguese. It was impossible for the schools, public and 
private, to accomplish both at once, yet strict enforcement was ex-
pected by state authorities. It was difficult to gain permission to 
reopen. Schools had to convince local authorities that projected 
daily schedules allowed ample time for instruction in Portuguese 
and in Brazilian history and geography; too much time assigned 
to religious instruction could jeopardize permission to reopen. 
Few German schools could meet the requirements, and the never 
numerous government schools could not possibly absorb all the 
German-speaking youngsters. The result was that as many as six 
thousand children in Santa Catarina were out of school during 
most of the war. In Joinville, for example, only one small private 
school and the Catholic parochial school were able to remain open. 
It its effort to cope, the Santa Catarina government introduced 
crash courses in Blumenau for German-speaking teachers to learn 
Portuguese, and procedures were established to test the ability of 
5. Fischer and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Braunschweig, "Die 
rechtliche Stellung," 49-50; Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 179; Schaden, "Aspectos his-
t6ricos e sociol6gicos da escola rural teuto-brasileira," 65-78; Oberacker, Die 
volkspolitische Lage, 67. 
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teachers to instruct in that language. Later, by the middle of 1918, 
authorities began to relax standards and to allow more private 
schools to resume instruction. But there were many others, espe-
cially in the more mountainous areas of the state, that were casu-
alties of the war and never reopened. 6 
The problem of the German schools was compounded by the 
fact that many of the teachers, unlike the children, were German-
born immigrants who had never bothered to acquire Brazilian 
citizenship. Inevitably, examiners were reluctant or unwilling to 
allow enemy aliens the right to teach. The indiscriminate closing 
of German-language schools created special hardships for the 
teachers, whose income was normally derived from small monthly 
fees collected from the parents of the schoolchildren. After their 
schools were closed, many Brazilian-born teachers sought em-
ployment in the new government schools and, if hired, never re-
turned to their old responsibilities. In other cases, the German 
schools-usually tiny, one-room operations-had as teachers the 
pastors of the sponsoring churches. One effect of the war-born 
regulations in this regard was to separate the teaching function 
from the pastorate and to allow the Gemeindeschulen to become 
state-supported public schools with no religious or German-lan-
guage instruction. 7 
The German Churches 
Like the schools, the German-Brazilian churches were also ob-
vious targets for superpatriots, and there were many minor anti-
German incidents, especially during the first several months 
following the declaration of war. Church services in some commu-
nities were interrupted, pastors threatened with physical harm, 
German-language signboards vandalized, and altar cloths bearing 
6. Koch, Das Deutsche Schulwesen, 17-24; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche 
Stellung," 51-53; Fischer and Jahn (ed.), Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Schroder, 
Brasilien und Wittenberg, 356-57; Rohrbach, Bei den Deutschen, 31; Biihler, Dona 
Francisca, 83; Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Entres (ed.), 
Gedenkbuch, 91, 222; Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, December 13, 1917, in 
RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Brazil, 
1910-1929 (microfilm reel 21; 832.49/9). 
7. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Lutherische Kirche in 
Brasilien, 60. 
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German (or even Latin) inscriptions destroyed. Inevitably the 
Protestants suffered more than did the Catholics because of their 
intimate bonds with the German language, culture, and institu-
tions. But some German Catholics were persecuted, too, espe-
cially the clergy. Sometimes German Catholics were mistreated by 
Luso-Brazilian superpatriots who ignorantly assumed that all 
Germans in Brazil were Protestants. 8 
Shortly after war had been declared, Cardinal Joaquim Arco-
verde, the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, together with several 
other bishops, issued a pastoral letter in which he announced that 
all further preaching in the German language in Catholic parishes 
was to be prohibited, and that the German language could no 
longer be used as the language of instruction in any Catholic 
schools at any level. Conversely, all Catholic schools were to stress 
patriotism, the history and geography of Brazil, and the Portu-
guese language. Moreover, this prelate announced his intention 
to remove German clergy from all positions of a public character. 
Other bishops issued similar orders, though one simply limited 
himself to a request for a substantial increase in prayers. The result 
of these several directives was that many German-born priests 
were removed and reassigned to other duties and that some ab-
bots of Franciscan and Benedictine monasteries were replaced.9 
Oppressive though these measures may have seemed at the 
time to Teuto-Brazilian Catholics, they were modified by another 
pastoral letter issued in November, 1917. In this instance the car-
dinal and his colleagues defended the "many Catholics and not a 
few Protestants of German origin" who were being unjustly at-
tacked and "surrounded by an atmosphere of hate." The letter de-
scribed the German Brazilians as "true and disciplined members 
of the church" who until very recently had been praised for their 
contributions to Brazilian progress. Declaring them worthy of 
"Christian love and protection," the cardinal courageously de-
nounced the attacks that had been made against them in the press 
8. Der Familienfreund: 1920, P.124; Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, Octo-
ber 12, 1920, in Joseph Scheben Papers, Institut fur geschichtliche Landeskunde 
der Rheinlande, Bonn. I am indebted to Walter Kamphoefner for bringing this 
letter to my attention. 
9. Rio de Janeiro Tarnal do Commercia, November 3, 11, 1917; A Federa¢o (Porto 
Alegre), November 9, 1917; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 237; Sinzig, Nach dreiszig 
Tahren, 144, 145, 149· 
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and from public rostrums. These hateful accusations, the cardinal 
warned, were clothed in the mantle of patriotism in order to dis-
guise anticlerical impulses. If these malicious slanders were not 
answered, he predicted, soon all representatives of the faith 
would be attacked or impugned. 1O Inevitably the cardinal's stern 
words stimulated a wave of anticlerical sentiment among the 
superpatriots. 
In Porto Alegre, Archbishop Becker was not so brave. Anxious 
to dispel a prewar reputation of being partial to the Germans in 
his archdiocese, Becker, like the other bishops, issued his own 
ban, directing that the German language could no longer be used 
in the celebration of the mass, in marriages, burials, or any other 
official functions in any of the churches or chapels under his ju-
risdiction. He also requested that the clergy seek to work out 
agreements with local officials and immediately report to the 
chancery any difficulties that they might experience in the exer-
cise of their office. Archbishop Becker would then seek to resolve 
the problem with state authorities. 11 
The government restriction, thus reinforced by an insecure 
prelate, intensified the anxiety of the members of St. Joseph's con-
gregation of Porto Alegre, the only Catholic parish in the city that 
was exclusively German. The subsequent experiences of this con-
gregation illustrate the tensions and confusion experienced by 
many German Catholics in Brazil during the war. By 1917, St. 
Joseph's had grown to a large congregation of more than four hun-
dred families. Its membership included many recent arrivals-
Reichsdeutsche-whose ability to speak Portuguese was limited 
or nonexistent. The parish maintained two schools, one for each 
sex, and together they enrolled about five hundred children. It 
was a vigorous, healthy congregation that counted among its 
members some of the wealthiest and most influential members of 
the Teuto-Brazilian community in Rio Grande do SuI. 
Shortly after Archbishop Becker issued his ban, the Correio do 
Povo of Porto Alegre published a remarkably unrestrained and 
hateful attack on St. Joseph's, which denounced the congregation 
10. Sinzig, Nach dreiszig Jahren, 101-102. Sinzig quotes the entire letter in Ger-
man translation. 
11. Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 7. Metzler's book consists almost entirely of 
documents. 
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as unnecessary, illegal, and disastrous for the unity of the Bra-
zilian nation. 12 In accordance with the archbishop's directive, the 
parish pastor, Father Aloys Kades, immediately sought episcopal 
guidance, even though he and the lay leaders of the congregation 
feared that Becker would dissolve the congregation in order to 
avoid trouble. Thus began a series of exchanges that, at least in 
the estimation of German Catholics of Porto Alegre, revealed 
Becker as fearfully indecisive, devious, and vindictive. J3 
The controversy between the archbishop and St. Joseph's con-
tinued for months. It attained a new level of acrimony in April, 
1918, when the government of Rio Grande do SuI announced that 
Protestant churches would be allowed, starting immediately, to 
use the German language in all parts of their public worship-lit-
urgy, hymns, prayers, blessings-except the sermon and other 
pastoral addresses. Catholic Germans then went to state president 
Borges de Medeiros, requesting that the language ban be lifted for 
them as well. Borges assumed that the request had the support of 
the archbishop and on June 22, 1918, announced that Catholics 
were also now included. St. Joseph's congregation then petitioned 
their archbishop for permission to resume the use of the German 
language. Becker refused to grant formal permission; however, 
through a subordinate he informed the congregation that what the 
government would allow, he would allow, but that he would ac-
cept no responsibility for the consequences. St. Joseph's there-
upon conducted German-language services on the following two 
Sundays without incident. At the end of July, however, the pastor 
of St. Joseph's received a notice from the chancery dated July 5 for-
bidding the use of German because it would encourage criticism 
of the church. Complaints and appeals, charges and counter-
charges continued until September 16, when Becker finally an-
nounced that the diocesan curia had decided to let St. Joseph's 
have its way, even though several German parishes in the rural 
colonies had been closed by police after the pastors had been ar-
rested for preaching in German.14 By then the German Catholics 
12. Porto Alegre Correio do Povo, November 27, 1917. A full translation in Ger-
man is provided in Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 8-10. 
13. Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 12-67. 
14. A Federapio (Porto Alegre), June 22, 1918; Metzler, Die St. Josefsgemeinde, 
45-46, 58-59· 
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of Porto Alegre wished that they, like their cousins in Rio de Ja-
neiro, had an archbishop who was Luso-Brazilian. 
The situation was radically different and generally more diffi-
cult for the Protestants, especially the Evangelicals. For decades 
their leaders had stressed the intimate bond between their faith 
and the German language. Moreover, they had become depen-
dent on direct support from Germany in the form of financial 
subsidies and the supply of trained clergymen, most of whom 
were now enemy aliens. Inevitably the Evangelicals were per-
ceived in some superpatriotic circles as minions of the German 
kaiser who threatened the country's peace and stability. In some 
cases their situation was made worse by their own manners-
some behaved like spit-and-polish junior officers in the Prussian 
army. In other instances trouble resulted from simple thought-
lessness or insensitivity. For example, one pastor neglected to 
cancel or reschedule various church activities that fell on Novem-
ber 15, 1917, which was the most important national holiday in 
Brazil. Not surprisingly, some local superpatriots interpreted this 
as evidence of German disdain or disrespect for Brazil. That eve-
ning they led a noisy procession of agitated citizens to the church 
and brought an abrupt end the choir practice and confirmation 
instruction that were under way. 15 
Similar disturbances occurred in many Teuto-Brazilian commu-
nities during the first months of the war. Some congregations 
were virtually frozen with fear as they posted night watches and 
guards to protect property and lives. A few pastors suffered physi-
cal abuse. Wild rumors raced through some congregations as re-
ports of violence, some of them true, were heard. Agitation was 
most common in communities with newspapers that published 
vehement, passionate anti-German diatribes. Some Evangelical 
pastors were personally attacked in print. Several years later, one 
cleric reflected that it is amazing that the persecution was not 
worse, given the overheated rhetoric that damned all Germans as 
brutal, barbaric, and utterly devoid of culture and civilization. 16 
15. Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, October 12, 1920, in Scheben Papers; 
Radiach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weitkrieges," 24. 
16. Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 150; Wolfgang Ammon, Chronik von Sao Bento in 
Santa Catharina, 1873-1923 (Joinvilie, 1923), 233; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, pas-
sim; Radiach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weitkrieges," 24. 
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Still, the violence visited upon the Germans was fitful or spo-
radic; there was no systematic persecution by the Brazilian gov-
ernment. Instead, violence emerged from the inability or un-
willingness of local authorities to control certain individuals who 
were determined, for whatever reasons of their own, to attack the 
Germans in their midst. Hence, the histories of some local Protes-
tant parishes describe the war period as a fearful time, but others 
report no problems at all-for them, life went on as always.17 
The first week of the war presented a dilemma for many Prot-
estant congregations because October 31, 1917, was the four-
hundredth anniversary of the beginning of Martin Luther's Refor-
mation. Many congregations had been planning festivities for 
months. Some anxiously canceled everything, fearing that their 
celebrations could easily be mistaken for pro-German demonstra-
tions, but others were determined to follow through, which they 
did without incident. 18 
The prohibition against using the German language in public 
services was not uniformly observed across the land. Apparently 
some remote parishes ignored it totally; others discovered clever 
ways of obeying the letter of the law while violating its spirit. At 
the opposite extreme were congregations that anxiously dropped 
all services for the duration of the war. In one Lutheran parish in 
Joinville, the pastor conducted public worship in German until 
Christmas Eve, 1917, when a mob forcibly brought an end to 
it. Thereafter the pastor, who escaped his enemies unscathed, 
deemed it prudent to observe the ban and no services were con-
ducted in his church for nearly three months. 19 In other commu-
nities, pastors made serious efforts to comply with the language 
restrictions. A Lutheran clergyman in Ponta Grossa, for example, 
tried to introduce a new Portuguese liturgy of his own creation 
17. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 274-75, 281-86; 75 Jahre Deutschtum: 
Santo Angelo-Agudo (1857-1932) (Sao Leopoldo, 1932), 120; Lutherische Kirche in 
Brasilien, passim; Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 26. 
18. Evangelisch-Lutherisches Kirchenblatt fUr Sud-Amerika, XIV (October 15, 1917); 
Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 150; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 49. 
19. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 25; Fischer and Jahn (eds.), 
Es begann am Rio dos Sinos, 150; Fritz Wiistner, Kirchengemeinde Joinville: Evangelische 
Bekennen in Schwachheit und Kraft, 1851-1951 (Joinville, [1951]), 51. For another 
incident involving the celebration of Christmas, see Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland 
Brasilien, 273. 
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but it proved to be decidedly unpopular with his congregants. But 
in so remote an area as Santa Maria Jetiba, located in the moun-
tains of Espirito Santo, the Lutherans built a new impressive 
church, which was dedicated, presumably in the German lan-
guage, in July, 1918. The historian of this parish laconically re-
ported that even though there were several anti-German mob 
scenes early in the war, the activities of the congregation were 
never seriously hindered.20 Still, remote location or isolation was 
not the only explanation. In Porto Alegre, the ladies' aid society of 
one Evangelical congregation noted that its work had not been 
disturbed in any way during the war period. Paradoxically, St. 
Joseph's Catholic parish in the same city claimed that every organi-
zational activity had been hampered and that there was nothing 
that could have been done about it except to wait for the storm to 
pass. 21 
The problems of the Protestant Germans were intensified greatly 
by the fact that almost all of their clergy were Reichsdeutsche. 
Even though many were long-term residents of Brazil, few had 
taken out citizenship papers because, upon their retirement from 
the ministry, they intended to return to the land of their birth. As 
enemy aliens, they were limited in their ability to negotiate with 
government officials. An exception to this tendency was the 
crusty, old Dr. Wilhelm Rotermund, venerated within church 
circles and highly respected beyond. A citizen since 1887, Roter-
mund was still serving the Riograndenser Synod as its president 
despite his advanced age of seventy-five years. 22 Like most Evan-
gelical pastors, he passionately believed that the survival of his 
church depended upon the retention of the German language and 
culture. But he also believed that Teuto-Brazilians had to learn 
Portuguese and, as citizens, participate intelligently in Brazilian 
life. Thus, Rotermund's personal record and position as the head 
of an organization with 100,000 members gave him an authority 
20. Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 140, 176, and see p. 151. 
21. jahresberichte der Deutsche Evangelische Gemeinde zu Porto Alegre aber das jahr 
1920 und des Vereines Frauenhilfe ... aber die jahre 1917 bis 1920, p. 29; Metzler, Die 
St. josefsgemeinde. 
22. Radlach, "Die Einwirkungen des Weltkrieges," 26; Fausel, Dr. Rotermund, 
203. 
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denied most Protestant pastors. He did not hesitate to use it. He 
stood up fearlessly and repeatedly for what he believed to be the 
constitutional rights of his people. 
Immediately following official notification of the ban on the 
German language, Rotermund vigorously protested the restric-
tion as a violation of the freedom of religion. In a sharply worded 
statement presented to the government, Rotermund pointed out 
that Article 72 of the Constitution granted the right of free prac-
tice to all religions. He argued that since the use of the German 
language was essential to the life of the Evangelical church, any 
restriction of this right was tantamount to an infringement of reli-
gious freedom and therefore unconstitutional. German, he in-
sisted, had the same relationship to Evangelical worship that Latin 
had to the Catholic ritual. Presumably as a result of Rotermund's 
plea, the Rio Grande do SuI chief of police subsequently an-
nounced that in Protestant churches of that state the liturgy (but 
not other parts of the service such as hymns and prayers) could be 
conducted in German. 23 This interpretation did not, of course, 
apply to states other than Rio Grande do SuI. 
Several weeks later, when the administration of the state of 
siege had been vested in a military commission, Rotermund again 
protested the language restrictions. Writing to the commanding 
general, Rotermund repeated his earlier arguments. The military 
authority expressed his sympathy for the plight of the German 
Protestants and personally deplored the restrictions. Neverthe-
less, though he understood that the Germans were no threat to 
Brazilian security, he required that they continue to refrain from 
using German in all public functions in order to avoid provoking 
the "lower classes." What language pastors used in private minis-
trations was of no concern to him. Of course, this response failed 
to satisfy Rotermund, especially because the general's clarification 
was never publicized among lower officials in government, with 
the result that enforcement was left largely to the discretion of 
local functionaries. Inevitably it was inconsistent and tension re-
mained high, especially in the large cities. 24 
23. Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 152. Rotermund announced this ruling in his Rund-
schreiben No. 948 of November 21, 1917. 
24. Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 153· 
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After several months the national government in Rio de Janeiro 
dispatched a high-ranking army officer to the southern states in 
order to sample public opinion in these matters. Rotermund once 
again used the opportunity to present the government with a de-
tailed description of the tribulations of the Rio Grande do SuI 
Evangelicals. "I cannot believe," he wrote, "that high government 
officials sanction the arbitrary character of events that have oc-
curred; I am astonished that clear directives have not been issued 
to end abuses. Agitators have moved against our churches and 
have perpetrated the grossest excesses on the basis of orders never 
published and decrees that no one has seen." Rotermund was es-
pecially outraged by a ruling that forbade the use of German-lan-
guage textbooks for instruction in Portuguese. "I cannot compre-
hend," he continued, "how a government that makes such a great 
effort to encourage the use of the Portuguese language can forbid 
the distribution and sale of materials for this purpose." He bit-
terly accused the government of stripping his people of their "ho-
liest rights" and of denigrating, by its incomprehensible policies, 
the qualities of firmness and integrity they displayed in their 
struggle for justice. If the Teuto-Brazilians did not fight to pre-
serve their inherited religion and language, Rotermund declared, 
they would quickly degenerate to the level of Helots. 25 
There is no firm evidence that Rotermund's frequent protests 
actually caused a change in government policy. Yet the national 
government did in fact relax its regulations early in 1918. When 
the original decree establishing the state of siege expired at the 
end of 1917, the government extended it only to February 26, 
1918, when it was allowed to lapse until March 6. The suspension 
was deliberate. It was allowed for political reasons: The days in 
question immediately preceded the national election. Various 
newspapers in the areas affected by the state of siege had pro-
tested the decree as an unnecessary curtailment of personal lib-
erty and of the freedom of the press. After the election, the state 
of siege was directly resumed and extended to December 31, 1918. 
Still, it was only six weeks later, on April 11, 1918, that the chief of 
police of the state of Rio Grande do SuI declared that Protestant 
churches would be allowed to use the German language in all 
parts of their public worship except the sermons and public an-
25· Ibid., 154-55· 
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nouncements. A similar relaxation was announced at the same 
time in Santa Catarina. 26 
For the German Protestant churches with connections in the 
United States, of which the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
was the most important, the war period was less stressful than it 
was for the several synods with strong ties to Germany. Most of 
the Missouri Lutheran pastors were American citizens, not Ger-
man, and thus were not subject to the restrictions imposed upon 
enemy aliens. Given their commitment to bilingualism and the 
gradual abandonment of the German language, this synod's clergy 
and congregations generally complied with the government's lan-
guage restrictions. There were instances, especially during the 
prewar period, in which some Missouri Lutheran pastors were 
noisily pro-German, but once war had been declared, discretion 
conquered sentiment. War also exacerbated old denominational 
rivalries, as, for example, when an Evangelical leader accused the 
Missouri Lutherans of gleefully pointing out in their church paper 
to officials that the provost of the Prussian state church resident in 
Brazil was, in fact, a German bureaucrat. 27 
The burdens imposed by war transcended parochial tensions or 
local incidents in which German pastors or their congregants suf-
fered some measure of harassment or persecution. The fact was 
that normal channels of communication were disrupted. Syn-
odical conventions were canceled because, as public meetings, 
they would have had to be conducted in Portuguese, and given 
the linguistic inadequacies of many pastors, that was impossible. 
The language ban also extended to the printed word and hence all 
church periodicals and annuals were suspended. In one case, 
four thousand undistributed copies of DeT Familienfreund, a Ger-
man Catholic annual, were confiscated as dangerous to the state. 
The finances of the Evangelical synods were also in deep trouble. 
Subsidies from Germany were cut off at a time when organiza-
26. Edwin V. Morgan to Secretary of State, January 2, 1918, and Morgan to Sec-
retary of State, March 6, 1918, both in RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Brazil, 1910-1929 (microfilm reel 21; 832.00/45); 
A Federa(ao (Porto Alegre), April 17, 1918; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 87. 
27. Roche, La colonisation allemande, 515; Haring, The Germans in South America, 
48; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 43. Provost Braunschweig was not in-
terned. He remained in Brazil throughout the war and shortly thereafter retired to 
Germany. 
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tional needs were increasing. Moreover, there was no longer a 
supply of German-trained pastors to fill parish vacancies. The 
care of retired clergymen also became a special problem, since 
such persons usually depended upon support from Germany. 
Translocal problems of this kind had to be solved without re-
course to normal modes of communication in church periodicals. 
Circumstances thus forced the German Protestants to become 
self-reliant in unprecedented ways. They learned to contribute 
money as never before; they took the first steps toward establish-
ing their own theological seminaries for the training of Brazilian-
born clergy. 28 
Generally speaking, the German ethnic churches of Brazil had 
to endure a repression that was different in some important re-
spects from what it was in the United States, where there was no 
blanket proscription by the federal government against the use of 
the "enemy language" in either the churches or the schools. Sev-
eral states, however, did enact restrictive measures. But most 
American state legislatures, which usually convened biennially in 
those years, were not in session during the greater part of the war 
period. Had this not been the case, it is likely that many anti-Ger-
man-language laws would have been enacted. Instead, efforts at 
language regulation in the United States commonly emanated 
from state and county councils of defense, which were special 
agencies created to coordinate the domestic war effort at the local 
level. Their directives and orders, oppressive though many of 
them were, lacked the force of law. As a result, most wartime re-
strictions on the German language in the United States tended 
to be highly local in character and resulted in such ugly phenom-
ena as public ceremonies in which German-language books were 
burned to the accompaniment of patriotic speeches and anthems. 
In other instances, clergymen were tarred and feathered and their 
church buildings splashed with yellow paint. The American op-
pression thus tended to be extralegal or informal, even though, in 
terms of human interrelationships, it was often intense and per-
sonal. 29 In Brazil, the legal measures created problems of a differ-
28. Der FamiIienfreund: 1920, p. 124; Fischer and Jahn (eds.), Es begann am Rio 
dos Sinos, 150-52; Fause!, Dr. Rotermund, 149-50; Lutherische Kirche in Brasilien, 2, 
60; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 79. 
29· Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 14-19, 225-67; Carl F. Wittke, German-Americans 
and the World War (Columbus, Ohio, 1936), passim; Donald R. Hickey, "The Prager 
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ent character and magnitude, even though there seem to have 
been proportionately fewer instances of personal violence and 
abuse after the wave of riots that occurred in the ftrst ten days 
after the declaration of war. 
German Clubs and Societies 
In spite of the many difficulties they experienced, most German-
Brazilian churches and their affiliated organizations tried to func-
tion as best they could during the year of war. As they saw it, they 
were in the business of saving souls from eternal perdition; given 
such a transcendent purpose, they were determined to survive. 
The numerous German ethnic societies, however, served no such 
noble end. Their goals centered on this life, not the next. Their 
existence was more temporary, more secular, more vulnerable. In-
evitably, they were prime targets of superpatriotic intolerance. 
Some Vereine suffered mob violence. Their halls were vandalized, 
their banners dragged through the streets and burned, their mem-
bers subjected to various indignities, such as being forced to kiss 
the Brazilian flag amid patriotic ceremonies.30 
Some of the Vereine quickly decided that expediency called for 
them simply to disband. Many others suspended all activities for 
the duration of the war and did not emerge from their hibernation 
until after the Armistice.3 ! Most of the remainder changed their 
Affair: A Study in Wartime Hysteria," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 
LXII (Summer, 1¢9), 117-34; Luebke, "Legal Restrictions," 1-19; Frederick C. 
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"Patriots on the Rampage: Mob Action in Lewiston, 1917-1918," Montana, XXXI 
(January, 1981), 30-43; Sister John Christine Wolkerstorfer, "Persecution in St. 
Paul-The Germans in World War I," Ramsay County History, XIII (Fall-Winter, 
1976),3-13. 
30. Joseph Grones to Mathias Grones, October 12, 1920, in Scheben Papers. 
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Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 510; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Ger-
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names to something appropriate in Portuguese, revised their gov-
ernance documents to modify ethnic exclusiveness, and tried to 
carry on as best they could. Since government regulations regard-
ing public meetings usually meant police surveillance, large for-
mal gatherings were normally avoided. Most Vereine experienced 
sharp losses in membership; for one's name to appear on the rolls 
was a potential source of trouble. 32 
Of course, the measure of accommodation necessary to satisfy 
superpatriotic demands varied greatly with the character of the 
organization. For example, one could hardly expect the singing 
societies suddenly to take up Brazilian folk songs with much zeal. 
The highly suspect Schiitzenvereine naturally tend to fade almost 
entirely from the scene as military authorities ordered their dis-
solution and confiscated their guns and ammunition. Apparently, 
some were converted into tiro da guerra, the paramilitary training 
units established by the government. In one community at least, 
Teuto-Brazilian young men participated with enthusiasm; ener-
getic recruitment efforts were followed by the construction of bar-
racks, which after the war were converted into a hospital. 33 
The large social organizations found in the major cities usually 
survived under protective coloration of some kind. 34 Compared to 
their equivalents in rural districts, they found it rather more diffi-
cult to persist. They were ready objects of superpatriotic envy and 
ire because their memberships usually included high proportions 
of prominent businessmen and professional persons, many of 
whom were Reichsdeutsche. 35 The latter often felt no loyalty for 
Brazil; subjects of the German kaiser, they were living in an enemy 
32. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio, November 6, 1917; Hundert Jahre 
Deutschtum, 35, 333; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 78; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 
539; Hundert Jahre Deutscher Hilfsverein, 45; Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Ger-
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35. For example, see the flyer distributed in Joinville, Santa Catarina, in June, 
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zation by name, occupation, and country of birth (flyer in Instituto Hans Staden, 
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Tiro Brasileiro, No. 227, of Estrela, Rio Grande do SuI. The unit enrolled approxi-
mately 140 men, of whom 80 percent were German Brazilian. The structure in the 
background is the Catholic rectory of Estrela. 
Reprinted from Uhle's Kalender [iir das Jahr 1918 
country; and some did what they could to help the German cause, 
short of criminal action. For example, members of the German 
Society in Bahia continued to collect funds through much of the 
war period for the German Red Cross. These they dispatched to Ar-
gentina, expecting that their contributions could be forwarded to 
Germany from that neutral country. Loyal Teuto-Brazilians often 
found such activity offensive and many withdrew from organi-
zations that were dominated by socially prominent and economi-
cally powerful Reichsdeutsche. 36 
German-Owned Businesses 
Virtually all commercial and industrial firms owned by either 
Germans or Teuto-Brazilians experienced some difficulties during 
the war. Superpatriots often failed to distinguish between the 
36. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 158; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 79. 
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two, though it is clear that branches of companies with headquar-
ters in Germany fared worse. The national government, of course, 
was concerned chiefly about the activities of German-owned com-
panies. By means of the Lei da guerra, it had decreed restrictions 
not unlike those imposed by most governments in wartime. All 
alien property, including money, credits, merchandise, and other 
goods, had to be declared and all such items were subject to se-
questration. Business relations with enemy subjects living abroad, 
through banks or other commercial houses, were prohibited. Ex-
porting any goods or merchandise of enemy ownership was for-
bidden. Moreover, any enemy alien "who proved to be trouble-
some or suspect to the Brazilian cause" was subject to internment 
in a concentration camp.37 Few Reichsdeutsche were willing to 
tempt fate by testing such a loosely worded law, especially during 
the first few months following the declaration of war. 
The Brazilian government quickly discovered, however, that 
strict enforcement of the economic provisions of the Lei da guerra 
worked to the detriment of Brazilian interests. If the letter of the 
law was to be observed, various German-owned banks, insurance 
companies, and other businesses would be unable to meet their 
obligations either to Brazilian-owned firms or to their many Bra-
zilian employees. Consequently the government granted the Ger-
man companies a series of concessions that allowed them to oper-
ate freely, short of enterprise that could possibly aid the enemy. 
Thus, despite the official limitations, most German-owned com-
panies continued through much of the war in good economic 
health. 38 
There were a few exceptions. In January, for example, the fed-
eral government canceled a contract for the delivery of war mate-
riel that earlier had been negotiated with the Brazilian represen-
tative (Haupt and Company) of the famous Krupp Company of 
Essen, Germany. In March it rescinded a contract with a German 
company for developing a railroad in Santa Catarina. But it was 
not until September, 1918, that it terminated the service of a 
37. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 495; Fiinfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein 
Germania, 157; The Brazilian Green Book, 99-100. 
38. PinheirO, Problemas da guerra, 37. Cf. Dean, The Industrialization of sao Paulo, 
100-101. 
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German-owned transatlantic cable between Pernambuco and Te-
nerife in the Canary Islands.39 
The most obvious beneficiaries of the government's liberal pol-
icy were the large German-owned banks, the Brasilianische Bank 
fur Deutschland, the Banco Allemao Transatlantico, and the Banco 
Germanico da America do SuI, each of which was deeply involved 
in financing the production and trade of coffee. Meanwhile, the 
great coffee-exporting firm of Theodor Wille and Company (head-
quartered in Hamburg) lost its leading position to British- and 
American-owned rivals, but it survived in Brazil by turning from 
coffee to manufacturing. Similarly, other German-owned compa-
nies that depended on internal trade weathered the storm easily. 
In Rio de Janeiro, for example, there were no bankruptcies among 
German-owned firms. Indeed, it was a period of prosperity for 
some, such as Lambert Riedlinger's construction firm, which spe-
cialized in reinforced concrete buildings. Luso-Brazilian mer-
chants continued to patronize German wholesale houses because 
it was in their private interest to do so. Haring observed that 
prominent Brazilians who preferred not to be seen trading in Ger-
man shops merely placed their orders by telephone or sent their 
servants to purchase the desired merchandise. 40 
No doubt there were some small-business men of German de-
scent who were ruined by the war, among them many store-
keepers and restaurateurs whose places of business were de-
stroyed in the riots of 1917. Others found their volume of business 
reduced by informal, local boycotts, but most had to endure noth-
ing worse than superpatriotic suspicion, innuendo, or an occa-
sional harsh word or insult. Nonetheless, it was in their interest to 
keep a low profile. Some businessmen avoided the inconvenience 
39. Pinheiro, Problemas da guerra, 243; [Brazil, Ministerio das Relac;:oes Exteri-
oresj, Guerra da Europa: Documentos Diplomaticos. Attitude do Brasil. 1918 (Rio de Ja-
neiro, 1918), 100-101, hereinafter cited as Documentos Diplomaticos, 1918. 
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of being German by claiming to be Dutch, Danish, or Norwegian. 
Most German-owned firms, both large and small, severely re-
stricted their advertisements in the newspapers. Few displayed 
the audacity of the Hasenclever Company, which had the courage 
in December, 1917, to sue the Brazilian government for the dam-
ages it had suffered during the Rio de Janeiro riots a month ear-
lier. Although a judge threw out the Hasenclever complaint, there 
is no evidence that the company experienced a consequent adver-
sity. Gradually, as the war year ran its course, German business-
men began to operate with new boldness, recognizing that the 
government was eager to establish and enlarge trade patterns and 
to take early advantage of the opportunities that would emerge in 
the postwar period. 41 
War and the Common People 
Common people of German citizenship, unlike the wealthy busi-
ness and professional elite, sometimes experienced serious diffi-
culties. Some were fired from their jobs by superpatriotic employ-
ers. Others were stranded in Brazil by the declaration of war. A 
few were hired by German companies, but others were simply 
without prospects. In Porto Alegre the Verband deutscher Vereine 
tried to relieve the distress by inaugurating its own "public works" 
program. It put unemployed enemy aliens to work as temporary 
groundskeepers for the German hospital and the Turnerbund's 
playing field.42 
For most ordinary Teuto-Brazilians, World War I was period of 
only mild discomfort, but it depended on where one lived and 
how seriously local officials took the war-born restrictions. In 
some of the remote, solidly German rural districts, life went on 
undisturbed. In small cities like Joinville and Blumenau, where 
persons of German origin dominated the community, compliance 
with the regulations was often indifferent and enforcement hap-
hazard. The American traveler Mark Jefferson reported that in 
Joinville's post office, there was a notice forbidding anyone to 
41. Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Handel, 497; Roche, La colonisation allemande, 
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speak German. Since many of the older residents could speak 
nothing but German, the injunction was ignored with typical Bra-
zilian insouciance. Sometimes such signs were simply mutilated 
with impunity. But it should be remembered that Joinville was 
also a place where almost all German schools were closed, where 
German street names were changed to something suitably Por-
tuguese or patriotic, and where a superpatriotic mob interrupted 
a German Lutheran service on Christmas Eve in order to stop the 
use of the "enemy language." There were other communities in 
which trouble was endemic. In Montenegro, for example, proper 
patriots staged anti-German demonstrations with some regu-
larity-every two or three months, by one account-to obliterate 
German-language signs and to deface German houses with pa-
triotic graffiti. 43 
In the large cities where the Germans were a small though 
highly visible minority, ethnic relations were often more tense. It 
behooved the ordinary Teuto-Brazilian in such places to be cir-
cumspect in his behavior. If there was trouble of some kind, they 
could expect to be blamed for it. It was widely rumored, for ex-
ample, that Germans were the cause of much labor unrest that 
swept Brazilian inq.ustrial centers at that time, but recent research 
has shown that they played no role in the movement.44 Not sur-
prisingly, large numbers of Teuto-Brazilians in the cities began to 
use Portuguese equivalents of their given names in order to mini-
mize suspicion. 
Relatively few Teuto-Brazilian young men were affected by mili-
tary conscription, but those who were drafted received an un-
precedented exposure to Brazilian society and culture. Although 
universal military training had been enacted a decade earlier, it 
had not been enforced. At the beginning of the war, the Brazilian 
army numbered no more than thirty thousand men, including 
officers. A law of December 27, 1917, established draft boards to 
43. Jefferson, "Pictures from Southern Brazil," 521-47; Haring, The Germans in 
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register all young men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, 
but few were actually conscripted because the government lacked 
the means to feed and clothe the draftees, much less equip and 
instruct them in the arts of war. 45 
There were other young Teuto-Brazilians, mostly from Rio 
Grande do SuI and Santa Catarina, who voluntarily enlisted for 
service in the army, a fact trumpeted by ethnic leaders who wished 
to establish the legitimacy of their claims for patriotism. Govern-
ment authorities, distressed that many of these young men could 
not speak Portuguese, nevertheless recognized that their literacy 
rates were much higher than those of other recruits, many of 
whom came from the lowest classes of Brazilian society. 46 
But whether they were draftees or volunteers, these young men 
were not the leaders of the ethnic group, unlike the clergy, teach-
ers, journalists, and businessmen whose stores, factories, or ware-
houses had been damaged or destroyed by riots. The war and its 
attendant restrictions affected the latter in direct and sometimes 
drastic ways. To these formulators of ethnic group opinion (per-
sons of high status and power within the subsociety), the war 
laws seemed unnecessary and harsh. They saw themselves not as 
threats to national security but as loyal, industrious"and valuable 
citizens or residents of Brazil. They considered themselves to be 
innocent victims of an irrational and undeserved anti-German 
hysteria instigated by a small but influential group of Francophile 
enthusiasts envious of German accomplishments. In their opin-
ion, the government had succumbed to political influence and 
powerful rhetoric and therefore it had decreed the many legal re-
strictions. But many persons in government, they believed, did 
not really share the superpatriotic view. 
There is much evidence to support at least parts of this inter-
pretation. The president and Congress clearly were sensitive to 
the pressure applied by the Liga pelos Alliados and other super-
patriotic organizations and leaders. The declaration of war itself 
and the enactment of the Lei da guerra were not responses by a 
45. Martin, Latin America and the War, 86. 
46. Haring, The Germans in South America, 59-60; Uhle's Kalender fur das Jahr 
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democratic government to a deeply felt popular sentiment. They 
were rather political reactions to the ability of certain ruling-class 
persons to manipulate public opinion and to influence decision 
making at the highest level. But the popular enthusiasm shown at 
the outset of the war could not be sustained indefinitely. While 
some persons in the government and the military services un-
doubtedly believed that the Germans of Brazil were a subversive 
and traitorous element, most others did not and enforced the re-
strictions to no greater extent than local circumstances demanded. 
The Role of Brazil in World War I 
During the first months of the war the government generally tried 
to enforce the war law and to participate in the Allied war effort to 
crush Germany. But it really lacked the means, if not the will. The 
market for Brazilian coffee was greatly reduced; the disruption of 
international trade diminished the revenue normally produced by 
tariffs on imports. Still, the war stimulated much business activity 
within the country, as it dramatically increased the production of 
foodstuff, especially sugar, beef, and beans, for the Allies. A few 
aviators and a military mission were sent to Europe and a small 
number of Brazilian soldiers actually fought in France. But the 
army as a whole remained tiny and never grew to more than sixty 
thousand men. The navy was engaged in patrol duty in the South 
Atlantic and only at the very end of the war was a squadron as-
signed to the Mediterranean Sea.47 
On the domestic front, the Brazilian government participated in 
a minor way in the propaganda war. In 1918, it published a series 
of books documenting through personal accounts and photo-
graphs the war crimes of the Germans. as Horrores de Wittenberg, 
for example, described brutal treatment Allied prisoners of war 
received in a camp in Germany. American propaganda was also 
imported. One of the pamphlets written by Earl Sperry and pub-
lished by the U. S. Committee on Public Information was trans-
lated in 1918 and distributed in Brazil as Intrigas e Conspira{:oes: 
47. Martin, Latin America and the War, 92-94, 87-90; Martin, "Brazil," 254-56; 
Documentos Diplomaticos, 1918, pp. 74-77, 92-97, 152-56; James, Brazil after a Cen-
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Dos Allemaes nos Estados Unidos durante 0 Periodo da Nossa Neutrali-
dade. But gradually, as the first months of Brazilian participation 
passed and it became clear that no significant number of Brazilian 
soldiers would be sent to the trenches in France, the restrictions 
of the war law and others were relaxed. 
In the opinion of one American resident of Brazil, popular atti-
tudes by March, 1918, had degenerated to what he called "almost 
complete apathy." In his view, Brazilian "passions have not been 
inflamed" and "even mercenary motives fail to rouse the people." 
In Sao Paulo, he reported, the German Brazilians "look with deri-
sion upon the 'play-war' which this country is indulging in." The 
Brazilian war effort was a bad joke and the enforcement of the 
anti-German measures he described as a "hollow pretense." 48 
By mid-1918, Brazilian superpatriots, also alarmed by instances 
of government laxity, registered loud complaints. In May, news-
papers had reported that the national government itself had no 
scruples about patronizing German-owned businesses: It had en-
gaged such a firm to decorate the Guanabara Palace in Rio in 
preparation for a reception to welcome a British mission to Brazil. 
It was also pointed out that though the Lei da guerra specified that 
German-owned banks were to be placed under direct government 
supervision, they had been allowed to operate more or less nor-
mally. This had worked to the advantage of both the government 
and many merchants and consumers. Finally, the government re-
sponded to the agitation of the Liga pelos Alliados, and on July 
28, 1918, the German-owned banks were ordered to cease opera-
tions. But even then, pending transactions were allowed to be 
concluded. The government did not formally cancel the right of 
the German banks to conduct business in Brazil until October 16, 
1918, less than a month before the Armistice. 49 
In general, the Brazilian response to the problems posed by its 
large German ethnic minority was violent and repressive. The 
anti-German riots of 1917 were unprecedented in Teuto-Brazilian 
experience; the imposition of martial law was of doubtful neces-
sity; the governmental regulation of German-language usage and 
48. "Attitude of Brazilians toward the War," 1, 5,10,14. 
49. Ibid., 12-14; Haring, The Germans in South America, 62-66; Pinheiro, Prob-
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the attendant infringements of the freedoms of press, assembly, 
and religious practice were of questionable constitutionality. Even 
though these restrictions were inconsistently enforced, they left 
strong impressions in many Teuto-Brazilian memories. German 
ethnic newspapers switched to Portuguese; others simply ceased 
publication. Scores of German schools were closed, many perma-
nently. On the whole, German Catholics suffered less than did the 
Protestants, whose institutional ties with Germany were close 
and clear. Many clubs and societies disappeared permanently 
while others suspended operations for the duration of the war, 
but most survived through the adoption of accommodationist 
strategies. The discomfort experienced by common' pegple of 
German descent varied greatly from place to place, but urban 
dwellers were more exposed to superpatriotic excesses than were 
the inhabitants of rural German enclaves. Although Brazil's re-
pression of the German ethnic minority is understandable within 
the context of its history, it was remarkably harsh in relation to the 
negligible threat that the Teuto-Brazilians actually posed to na-
tional security. 
9 
Aftermath and Retrospect 
W HEN THE NEWS ARRIVED in Rio de Janeiro that an ar-mistice had been signed at Compiegne on November 11, 
1918, the Brazilian Senate turned to its most distin-
guished member, Ruy Barbosa, for an oration suitable for the oc-
casion. Although ill and preoccupied with problems of Brazil's 
international relations, this champion of weak nations, righteous-
ness, and the Allies extemporaneously addressed his colleagues 
in the florid manner they expected of him. Describing the war as a 
dramatic struggle in which "cruelty that ex.ceeded the very limits 
of the satanic fought ferociously against divine loftiness of sacrifice 
and measureless abnegation," Barbosa grandly welcomed Brazil 
into the house of victory alongside Britain, France, and the United 
States. His speech, we are told, made a profound impression. 1 
Far to the south in Santa Augusta in Rio Grande do SuI, certain 
Teuto-Brazilians received the news of Germany's defeat with dis-
belief, and they dismissed it as a shameless lie. That the kaiser 
had abdicated, that Germany was experiencing revolutionary tur-
moil, or that a republic had been created was simply not possible 
in the Germany they remembered. Their Evangelical pastor de-
scribed those days as the blackest of his life, and one ninety-two-
year-old who had avidly followed the news of the war was heart-
broken. He died soon thereafter in inconsolable grief for his old 
fatherland. 2 
Neither Ruy Barbosa nor the die-hard chauvinists of Santa Au-
1. Ruy Barbosa, "Brazil in the House of Victory," Inter-America, II (1919), 139-44. 
2. Oberacker, 1m Sonnenland Brasilien, 288-90. 
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gusta were typical of the elite or the masses of Brazilian society. 
Of course, government officials were pleased that the war was 
over; it meant that they could turn to pressing problems of inter-
national trade and a growing national debt. At the same time, few 
Brazilians, including those of German birth or descent, were 
moved deeply by Germany's defeat. Most people naturally pur-
sued their private affairs in ways untouched by national politics or 
international conflict. For most Germans in Brazil, the Armistice 
made no immediate or significant difference in their personal 
lives, since most of the wartime restrictions (regardless of en-
forcement, or lack of it, in their own communities) remained on 
the books during the next several months, a time when much 
public attention shifted to the peace conference at Versailles. 
Brazil was a minor participant in these negotiations. Its delega-
tion was headed by Dr. Epitacio Pessoa, a minor political figure 
who was elected president of Brazil during the course of the nego-
tiations. The Brazilians concentrated on two issues, the Brazilian 
coffee seized by Germany and the German ships seized by Brazil. 
The first was settled easily; Germany was in no position to contest 
the. issue. But the second ran afoul of the French, who insisted 
that all former German ships sequestered or confiscated during 
the war be distributed among the Allies in proportion to their 
own maritime losses in the war. The Brazilian government, which 
had leased to France thirty of the forty-three German vessels it 
had requisitioned, argued that the issue was already settled be-
cause French acceptance of the leases w~s tantamount to recog-
nizing Brazil's right of ownership. Intransigent in its opposition to 
the French plan, Brazil resisted until May, 1920, when France fi-
nally conceded. 3 Thus the thorny question of the German ships, 
which had so preoccupied Brazil's leadership during much of the 
war, was finally resolved. 
The Return to Nonnalcy 
On January 12, 1920, President Epitacio Pessoa declared the Treaty 
of Versailles to be in force. The technical state of war following the 
3. Martin, Latin America and the War, 99-106; James, Brazil after a Century of Inde-
pendence, 174; Bernard M. Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections 
of the Treaty (New York, 1920), 37-39, 187. 
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Armistice, which had continued for a period slightly longer than 
the war itself, was officially at an end. All federal decrees and 
orders limiting the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and 
movement were repealed as the national emergency was termi-
nated. It remained for the state governments to remove such war-
time measures as they had individually enacted. Six weeks later, 
for example, the government of Rio Grande do SuI permitted 
schools to resume instruction in any foreign language, including 
German. At least one Teuto-Brazilian source attributed this gener-
ous action to the Positivist principles of its strong chief executive, 
Borges de Medeiros.4 
Santa Catarina was much slower to remove its restrictions. In 
that state the numerous Vereine continued to be persecuted. In-
deed, like many state governments in the United States, Santa 
Catarina had enacted additional restrictive legislation after the 
Armistice. In September, 1919, a law was passed that defined 
"foreign-language schools" as those in which instruction in one 
or more subjects was conducted in a language other than Podu-
guese, irrespective of the citizenship or birthplace of the teacher. 
A month later, Santa Catarina once again closed many German 
schools because they allegedly had violated the requirement that 
teachers provide evidence of competency in the Portuguese lan-
guage. In January, 1920, a further directive specified that the 
schools in the German colonies were to schedule at least twenty-
four half-hour periods per week for instruction in Portuguese in 
reading, writing, history, geography, music, and civics. Moreover, 
all school documents such as lesson plans, curricular statements, 
and attendance repods were to be prepared in the Portuguese lan-
guage. Not until September, 1921, did the Santa Catarina govern-
ment repeal the regulations it had enacted during the war.S Ob-
viously, in this nationalistic state the campaign to speed up the 
assimilation of Teuto-Brazilians by regulating their schools, which 
had been under way several years before the war, continued natu-
rally afterwards. 
4. Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 50; II. Jahresbericht des Deutschen 
Ev. Lehrerseminar fur Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa Cruz, 1920; Kalender fUr die Deutschen 
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Of course, such legal measures reflected upper-class concerns 
about the slowness of the Germans to be assimilated into Brazilian 
life. Most ordiriary folk were unconcerned whether the Germans 
were absorbed rapidly, slowly, or not at all. Similarly, the responses 
of the German ethnic group to the war and its aftermath are based 
on "elitist" evidence culled from editorials, reports, reminis-
cences, and commemorative materials. Ordinary Teuto-Brazilians, 
especially those marginally literate persons who had experienced 
downward mobility in the rural enclaves, left no record. But even 
among those in the ethnic leadership group who had perceived 
the war as a dangerous period in which their persons, property, 
and way of life had been threatened, there were many who de-
cided that the less said about the war and its concomitants the 
better off they would be. Thus many postwar reports, calendars, 
and anniversary booklets published by ethn,ic institutions avoided 
mentioning the matter. In effect, they blanked out of the record 
those months or years in which the use of the German language 
was illegal. For example, the 1919 annual report of the tiny Ger-
man Evangelical teachers college in Santa Cruz says nothing of the 
war's impact, including the fact that reports for 1917 and 1918 had 
never been published because of the language proscription. The 
1920 report merely prints a translation of a letter received from 
the Ministry of the Interior officially lifting the ban on German. 6 
The Deutsche Turnbliitter of Porto Alegre was explicit about this 
strategy of silence. In its first issue following the war, it declared 
its intentions to refrain from comment and to gather strength, 
presumably for future contests in which the integrity of the Teuto-
Brazilian community would be challenged.7 
German-Language Publications 
The Teuto-Brazilian newspapers were generally hesitant about re-
suming publication in German; governmental directives were un-
. clear and evidently varied from state to state. In Parana the Curitiba 
Kompass reappeared in German on July 29, 1919; in Sao Paulo, the 
6. 10. Jahresbericht des Deutschen Ev. Lehrerseminar fUr Rio Grande do Sui zu Santa 
Cruz, 1919; see also the eleventh report (for 1920). Cf. Luebke, "Legal Restric-
tions," 1-19. 
7. Deutsche Turnbliitter (July, 1920). 
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Germania resumed on August 19, 1919; and in Rio Grande do SuI, 
where restrictions were lifted on September 12, 1919, both the 
Deutsches Volksblatt and the Neue Deutsche Zeitung of Porto Alegre 
returned to German on September 16. Four days later, however, 
the Porto Alegre police shut down the Volksblatt in the belief that 
the Ministry of the Interior intended to withhold permission until 
after the peace treaty had been signed. A letter of protest was im-
mediately sent to President Pessoa, who responded with a tele-
gram clarifying the issue and permitting the Volksblatt to resume 
publication in German. B 
The German-language newspapers responded variously to 
their restored freedom to publish. The Kompass was mild: In a 
new epoch of social tensions, it reasserted its devotion to Chris-
tian culture and to the interests of the German ethnic community 
and of the Brazilian nation. The Neue Deutsche Zeitung described 
the war years as a troubled dream but declared that the distress 
had created a new sense of unity among the Teuto-Brazilians. It 
remained for the more chauvinistic Germania to follow a harder, 
more defensive line. This paper bewailed the fate of Germany, 
which it characterized as the vjctim of an Allied plan of eradi-
cation. It described its own recent experience as having been 
gagged and bound hand and foot, like everything else that was 
German. But now that those horrible times have passed, the Ger-
mania asserted, it must return to its duty to raise the conscious-
ness of German identity to new levels and to defend Germany in 
an unswerving and nonpartisan way. Its new slogan was to be 
"End hatred and agitation!" even as it would fearlessly defend 
Deutschtum and oppose unjust attacks on Teuto-Brazilians. Still, 
the Germania declared, it recognized the strong bond between the 
success of Brazil and the German colony and therefore it intended 
to foster good relations with the government and to defend it also 
from unfair criticism without reference to partisan interests. 9 
Another year passed before the many German-language calen-
dars reappeared, no doubt because, as book-length publications, 
8. Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do Sul," 154-55. 
9· Curitiba Kompass, July 29, 1919; Porto Alegre Neue Deutsche Zeitung, Septem-
ber 16, 1919, as quoted in Fischer, "Die deutsche Presse in Rio Grande do SuI," 
134; Germania (Sao Paulo), August 19, 1919. 
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they required months rather than days to be compiled and manu-
factured. The first postwar calendars were published in 1920 for 
use in 1921, and, like many other German-language publications, 
most preferred to tread lightly on the sensitive issues of the war 
and the distress it had caused. This was not true, however, of the 
calendar published by Rotermund, the grand old man of the 
Evangelical church in Rio Grande do SuI. It contains a long article 
entitled "Das brasilianische Deutschtum nach dem Kriege," which 
conveyed remarkable bitterness. Its author, identified only as "Dr. 
B.," declared that because of the calculated hatred of the French 
and British for everything German everywhere in the world, 
Teuto-Brazilians had not been safe in their own homeland. The 
pitifully weak president Wenceslau Braz had been unable to pre-
vent the dark machinations of a clique of money-hungry politi-
cians and businessmen to drag Brazil into the war. Teuto-Brazil-
ians, he said, were treated as pariahs in their own country, their 
schools closed, newspapers forbidden to publish, and printshops 
destroyed. German businesses and clubhouses went up in flames 
because officials ignored their constitutional duty to protect lives 
and property. Even freedom of conscience was violated, he de-
clared, as Teuto-Brazilians were forbidden to worship their God in 
their own language. While the Germans might have taken up 
arms against such a weak government, it would have been out of 
character for Germans to challenge the authority of the state. The 
author carried on in this fashion for several pages, at one point 
blaming Jews in the service of both the Allies and the Bolsheviks 
for the sorry state of affairs. 10 
Such venomous resentment was uncommon, at least in print. A 
more moderate response is provided by Koseritz' Deutscher Volks-
kalender, a secular rather than a church-related publication: "Even 
during the war the Germans of our state [Rio Grande do SuI] had 
to suffer relatively little, except for individual outrages perpe-
trated by mobs and for certain minor limitations on freedom of 
movement in churches, the press, schools, and associationallife. 
Now that peace has been restored, commerce has returned. Ger-
man instruction, German sermons, and German newspapers are 
again unrestricted. German songs resound in our singing so-
10. Kalender fur die Deutschen in Brasilien: 1921, pp. 35-40. 
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cieties and the gun clubs have gotten theit rifles back. Neverthe-
less, there still remains a residue of the desire to nationalize (read 
de-Germanize) everything." Despite this relatively placid view of 
recent Teuto-Brazilian experience, this publication, like many 
others, remained thoroughly committed to the maintenance of the 
German language and culture. It offered specific suggestions 
about what German Brazilians should do for the revival of Deutsch-
tum in Brazil: (1) Help the suffering people in postwar Germany; 
(2) restore Brazilian trade with Germany; (3) above all, revitalize 
the spiritual bonds with Germany-German books, newspapers, 
music, and art must be distributed more widely than ever before 
among Teuto-Brazilians; and (4) help newly arrived immigrants 
from Germany to make a new start in Brazil. A final exhortation 
cautioned against allowing differences of opinion regarding Ger-
many's internal political affairs to divide them, because as Brazil-
ians they are properly without influence in such matters.ll Thus, 
Koseritz' Deutscher Volkskalender articulated a cultural pluralist po-
sition that was unchanged by the war: unswerving political loyalty 
to the new fatherland combined with steadfast devotion to the 
cultural forms of the old. 
No matter how differently or how generously the publishers of 
German-language newspapers and periodicals might have per-
ceived their wartime experiences, the fact remained that a huge 
proportion of these publishing ventures failed to survive the war. 
The ban on German had been devastating; the substitution of Por-
tuguese was a mere expediency that was both difficult and un-
satisfactory. According to data accumulated by a leading student 
of German-language publishing in Brazil, there were twenty-one 
newspapers in 1917. A few were dailies; others appeared weekly; 
most were published two or three times per week. Of these, nine 
(43 percent) were casualties of war. Among them was the Deutsche 
Zeitung of Porto Alegre, the oldest continuously published Ger-
man-language newspaper in Brazil (since 1861), whose well-
known and influential editor, Arno Philipp, also had been a dep-
uty in the Rio Grande do Sui legislature. In Parana, the anticlerical 
and liberal Beobachter, founded in 1890, failed to reappear in 1919. 
But most of the other casualties, such as the notorious Deutsche 
11. Koseritz'Volkskalender, 1921, pp. 33-34, 102. 
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Wacht of Pelotas, were recent in origin and not well established. 
Meanwhile, the revived Germania of Sao Paulo, a venerable advo-
cate of social democracy, lasted only until 1921. 12 
It appears that publications lacking ties with the churches were 
the most vulnerable. Papers that catered to Catholic readers, such 
as the Kompass of Curitiba or the Deutsches Volksblatt of Porto Ale-
gre, or Evangelical readers, such as the Deutsche Post of Sao Leo-
poldo, drew strength from the informal support of organized insti-
tutions; anticlerical, liberal, freethinking, or socialist newspapers, 
however, had no comparable associational backing. Moreover, the 
churches had led the resistance to wartime oppression. Evan-
gelical pastors in particular had stressed the intimate connection 
between religious belief and German culture. 
Heavy though the losses were among the German-language 
newspapers, they were not indicators of the power of assimila-
tion, as they were in the United States. In Brazil, the nine casu-
alties were more than matched by the number of new ventures in 
German-language journalism that were attempted in the postwar 
period. A total of eleven newspapers were founded from 1919 to 
1923, though only two survived the decade. But a variety of peri-
odicals serving special constituencies, such as the members of 
teachers or farmers organizations, were also founded in the years 
immediately following the war. In the United States, where the as-
similation of the German ethnic group was more advanced, the 
war caused a permanent reduction in the number of German-lan-
guage newspapers and periodicals that was proportionately much 
greater than in Brazil. 13 
The Effects of the War on the Churches and Schools 
Similarly, in the United States the war had hastened the linguis-
tic acculturation of the German churches-dramatically in some 
cases. In Brazil this effect was much less apparent. Among the 
German Catholics, the tendency to use Portuguese had always 
been strong. Missouri Synod Lutherans, for reasons of their own, 
12. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 24-26; Arndt and Olson, History and Bibliogra-
phy, 91-221. 
13. Gehse, Die deutsche Presse, 23-37; Wittke, The Gennan-language Press in 
America, 274-76. 
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had repeatedly emphasized the need to switch to the language of 
the majority. But Evangelical synods continued to resist linguistic 
acculturation, as they had before the war. Such conservative lead-
ers as Provost Martin Braunschweig agreed unhesitatingly that a 
substantial measure of acculturation was necessary and desirable; 
they understood that prominent persons in the Brazilian govern-
ment, as well as Luso-Brazilians generally, continued in the post-
war period to expect Teuto-Brazilians to become totally integrated 
into the life of the country. But they still insisted that it was pos-
sible and preferable to retain German distinctiveness in language, 
culture, and customs, even though economic and political inte-
gration could be achieved and the Portuguese language mastered. 
Braunschweig and others continued to believe that if the German 
language were abandoned in worship, private devotional life, and 
in schools, Evangelical Protestantism as they knew it would even-
tually disappear. Even though they welcomed the development of 
new ties with North American Evangelicals, they refused to learn 
from the North American experience that linguistic acculturation 
of the church in Brazil was both possible and desirable. 14 
Still, the churches had been changed by the war. They had been 
forced by circumstances to depend on themselves rather than on 
donations of money and men from Germany. The development of 
financial self-sufficiency was essential, and they accomplished it 
under trying circumstances. This was especially true of synodical 
activities, as distinguished from the parish or congregational 
level. Thus, the Brazilian synods had to assume the costs of ad-
ministration, maintenance of synodical institutions, subsidies for 
pastors and teachers assigned to congregations that were not yet 
self-supporting, assistance for retired pastors who remained in 
Brazil rather than returning to Germany-all of which had for-
merly been supported by German mission societies or the Prus-
sian state church. 15 
The fact that well-trained pastors and preachers were no longer 
available had both immediate and long-range consequences. As a 
first step, the churches began to employ laymen as deacons, teach-
14. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 314-18; Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Dias-
pora," 41, 46-48; Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1921, p. 102. 
15. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151. 
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ers, and substitute pastors after they had been given brief training 
and examination. But more important, they agreed that it was es-
sential for them to establish their own Brazilian institutions for 
the preparation of parish pastors. The Evangelical Synod of Rio 
Grande do SuI therefore founded in 1925 a pretheological school 
patterned on the German model in Cachoeira, which several years 
later was moved to Sao Leopoldo. In this way the Evangelicals, 
like the Lutherans, would encourage the development of a native-
born clergy, even though the students would still be expected to 
go to Germany for formal theological training. In the decades fol-
lowing, this institution developed into a full-fledged theological 
seminary that educated nearly all of the pastors of what is today 
called the Evangelical Church of the Lutheran Confessions in Bra-
zil. German Catholics in Rio Grande do SuI recognized a similar 
need and in 1924 founded a small institution to prepare teachers 
for their schools. 16 
Meanwhile, the several church organizations resumed their 
regular schedule of conferences and conventions, and conducted 
their business almost exclusively in the German language. The 
Riograndenser Synod convened at Linha Brochier as early as May, 
1919, but most church-related organizations did not return to ac-
customed patterns of meeting until 1920. Church leaders con-
tinued to debate the need for and consequences of programs for 
nurturing the German language and culture. Some argued that 
the cultural chauvinism of the past had naturally or understand-
ably provoked Luso-Brazilians to repress the Germans; others 
continued to believe that the church would disappear if linguistic 
and cultural assimilation occurred. 17 
Much more than the churches, the German schools continued 
to be prime targets of nativists determined to force the assimila-
tion of immigrants. A mild nationalism continued throughout the 
1920S, leading to more regulatory legislation and the further es-
tablishment of "federal schools" by the government to render pri-
·16. Ibid·.; Braunschweig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora," 47; Becker, Deutsche 
Siedler, 82. 
17. Koseritz' Volkskalender, 1921, p. 102; Entres (ed.), Gedenkbuch, 224; Braunsch-
weig, "Die brasilianische Diaspora," 48; Biihler, Dona Francisca, 81-83; Dedekind, 
Brasilien, 57. 
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vate schools superfluous. The study of Portuguese became a regu-
lar part of the curriculum, and Brazilian history and geography 
were commonly introduced. By far the largest number of German 
schools continued to be in Rio Grande do Sul, a fact one Evan-
gelicalleader attributed to the Positivism that had become charac-
teristic of that state's government. 18 
Efforts were made in the postwar period to rebuild the system 
of German schools, but with limited success. Many that had been 
closed during the war never reopened; most of the others con-
tinued to be staffed by one teacher each. Although comparable 
schools in the United States rapidly shifted to instruction in En-
glish and placed renewed emphasis on religious education, the 
Brazilian schools seemed dedicated to cultural and linguistic main-
tenance. Schools run by churches were increasingly nonconfes-
sional, as formal religious instruction tended to disappear or be 
available only as Bible history. In some cases, parents who wanted 
more rigorous religious instruction for their children could pay 
extra fees and the school would make special arrangements. 19 
Opposition to the German schools increased strongly in the 
1930s. Various state governments enacted new limitations. For ex-
ample, in 1935, Sao Paulo designated Portuguese as the only per-
missible language of instruction in grades one to four; in the 
higher grades, only one hour of instruction in a foreign language 
was allowed per day. By 1938, the national government eliminated 
German entirely as a medium of instruction. In some districts the 
result of such legislation, as Martin Braunschweig had predicted 
in 1922, was illiteracy in two languages instead of only one. Dec-
ades later a pastor of a rural Evangelical congregation in Dois Ir-
maos (near Sao Leopoldo) elaborated on these effects. He de-
scribed how his parishioners, living in rural isolation, normally 
spoke the Hunsriicker dialect mixed with fragments of Portu-
guese. When their youngsters went to school, they heard what 
was for them an unintelligible foreign language. Meanwhile, they 
18. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151; Der Familienfreund: 1920, p. 125; 
Dressel, Der deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21; Schroder, Brasilien und Wittenberg, 
357; Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung fUr Rio Grande do Sui (May, 1921), 4; Dedekind, 
Brasilien, 25. 
19· Allgemeine Lehrer-Zeitung (May, 1921), 4· Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 
288-89· 
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had no opportunity to learn to read and write German, which 
was the language of the church. The result was that by the 1<)OOS, 
illiteracy rates of over 50 percent were common in a district that. 
years before had been entirely literate.20 
Societies and Business 
For the scores of German ethnic voluntary associations, the post-
war years represented a return to the status quo ante bellum. It is 
true that many Vereine did not survive the year of war, but most 
did, and within a relatively short time they were able to conduct 
their affairs as though nothing had happened. Recovery was 
closely related to the individual society's activities-school so-
cieties dealt with matters of greater moment than did bowling 
clubs. Location was also important; there was less tension in the 
rural colonies than there was in the cities. Some cities had had 
more difficulties than others. For example, in Bahia, located in the 
northeast where there were few Germans, the leading German so-
ciety, Germania-Verein, held its first official assembly after the 
war on June 29, 1919; but in Porto Alegre, the city with the largest 
German subsociety and where the worst riots had occurred, the 
Germania-Verein (which became Sociedade Independencia) did 
not convene again until April 12, 1920, at which time it took the 
first steps to rebuild its elegant clubhouse that had been destroyed 
three years earlier. In Rio de Janeiro, however, recovery was more 
rapid. By November, 1919, the Gesellschaft Germania was consid-
ering plans for the construction of a new, expanded clubhouse, to 
be erected at a new location. Ultimately this society chose to re-
model its old quarters, but not because of faltering membership. 21 
Anniversary publications and other reports of many other such 
societies often ignore the events of the war. No doubt this means 
that in many cases there were no unpleasant experiences to re-
port; but it may also reflect a desire to ignore and forget them. 
20. Fischer, "Geschichte der EKLB," 151; K1llender fUr den deut.-ev. Gemeinden 
in Brasilien, 1935; Braunschweig, "Die rechtliche Stellung," 53; Dressel, Der 
deutschbrasilianische Kolonist, 21-23. 
21. Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Verein Germania, 160; [Sociedade Independencia), 
Betrachtungen zu Ihrer Geschichte aus Anlass der Jahrhundert-Feier, 31; Hinden, Deutsche 
und deutscher Handel, 524. 
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Teuto-Brazilian and German-owned economic enterprises also 
quickly returned to normal. Although it was impossible for such 
giants as Theodor Wille and Company and the German-owned 
banks to recapture their former dominance, most of the smaller 
Teuto-Brazilian companies prospered as they exploited attractive 
opportunities in the postwar period. In Porto Alegre, Germans 
could be found in all branches of commerce-export, import, 
wholesale, and retail. Although Germans constituted about One-
eighth of the population of Porto Alegre in the mid-1920S, they 
accounted for nearly one-third of the commerce and industry in 
that city. Many of the largest firms continued to be German-
owned, just as many German-born persons were part Owners or 
managers of Luso-Brazilian firms. In Rio de Janeiro, the situation 
was much the same, as German-born businessmen and German-
owned companies moved into industry and manufactured ma-
chines, beer, dyes, glass, textiles, and furniture. 22 
The Tempo of Assimilation 
Despite the success of Teuto-Brazilian business enterprise and de-
spite the considerable efforts of the churches, the schools, the 
press, and the voluntary associations to sustain ethnic vitality, 
powerful sociological forces were at work that sapped the strength 
of the movement. Linguistic and marital assimilation was a natu-
ral process and it accelerated during the 1920S, especially in the 
cities and towns where frequent personal interaction of Germans 
with Luso-Brazilians was inevitable. Bilingualism became com-
mon in the less isolated communities, and by the 1930S, many 
young people in the German districts preferred to COnverse with 
each other in Portuguese. Similarly, the adoption of Portuguese 
forms of given or first names became standard. Even among 
wealthier and better-educated persons, who were often contemp-
tuous of Luso-Brazilian culture and who saw assimilation as a men-
ace, the shift to Portuguese could not be prevented. In the centers 
of urban population, linguistic acculturation was especially rapid 
22. Hundert Jahre Deutschtum, 251-53; Hinden, Deutsche und deutscher Han-
del,506· 
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among lower-class persons, who often perceived knowledge of 
Portuguese as a means to social and economic advancement.23 
Yet sociological forces could work in other directions, too. 
Among German Catholics, the multi-ethnic character of the church 
tended to reduce enthusiasm for maintaining private German-
language schools, with the result that such institutions were in-
creasingly identified with Protestantism.24 The sense of cultural 
distinctiveness was correspondingly increased, among Evangeli-
cals in particular. 
Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil 
during the postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just 
as some Brazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity 
demanded programs of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Bra-
zilians who felt more disillusioned and more alienated than ever. 
Political involvement seemed pointless to such persons. Some 
Teuto-Brazilian leaders observed this apathy, and while they could 
not peer into the future, they recognized how unhealthy such iso-
lation was and feared for its consequences; they urged Teuto-Bra-
zilians to assume their political responsibilities as citizens of their 
adoptive fatherland. Although there were differences of opinion 
regarding the best means to achieve ethnic political goals, the 
Teuto-Brazilians were generally more unified than were their 
counterparts in the United States, who disputed endlessly about 
the proper strategy to follow. 25 
The times were such, however, that participation in the political 
process was not always easy. The 1920S were a decade of political 
ferment in Brazil, and violence was not uncommon. Rio Grande 
do SuI especially experienced revolutionary unrest reminiscent of 
the 1890S. In 1923, civil war engulfed some of the German rural 
colonies and self-protection against revolutionary bands became 
necessary in some communities. In Neu-WiirUemberg, for ex-
ample, Germans formed a military organization of a thousand 
23. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 460-61. Cf. Fouquet, Der deutsche Einwan-
derer, 184. 
24. Willems, "Linguistic Changes," 460. 
25. Buchmann, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Brasilien," 221; Fugmann, Die 
Deutschen in Parana, 199. Cf. Frederick C. Luebke, "The Germans," in John Higham 
(ed.), Ethnic Leadership in America (Baltimore, 1978),64-90. 
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men for such purposes. Taken together, the experiences of the 
postwar decade caused many German Brazilians with resentful 
hearts to be receptive to the siren song of Volkspolitik. When Nazi 
variations on that theme were played in the 1930S, some found the 
music irresistible.26 Given this history, it is no surprise that the 
programs of forced assimilation undertaken by the Gerulio Vargas 
regime and thereafter were more intense and prolonged than 
were any such attempts during World War I. 
The new wave of immigrants from Germany that entered Brazil 
after the war was a source of concern for some Teuto-Brazilian 
leaders. Most welcomed the newcomers, but some worried about 
the possibilities of backlash. One writer was especially frank as he 
composed ten commandments for them. His first injunction was: 
Don't be a disgrace to Germans and to Germany; another was to 
learn Portuguese, but never forget German; a third was even more 
pointed-Don't criticize Brazilian circumstances as long as you 
do not know the customs, usages, and ways of life of those who 
were born here. 27 
During the 1920S, immigration from Germany reached its high-
est level in history. The total for the decade was 75,839, a figure 
that was more than double that of any previous ten-year period. 
The banner year was 1924, when 22,170 persons fled runaway in-
flation in Weimar Germany for the promise of a better life in Bra-
zil. Relatively few settled in the rural enclaves of Rio Grande do 
SuI and Santa Catarina, where the governments were anxious to 
restrict the growth of the German subsociety. Instead, the major-
ity sought employment in such metropolitan centers as Rio de Ja-
neiro, Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre. 28 
Obviously the fact that Brazil had been an enemy of Germany 
in World War I had no effect upon the image Germans had of Bra-
zil as a land to which they might migrate. It is unlikely that most 
newcomers had even heard of the anti-German riots of 1917, 
much less other, minor manifestations of cultural clash. More-
26. Love, Rio Grande do Sui, 204-11; Becker, Deutsche Siedler, 84; Konigk, Die 
Politik Brasiliens, 66. 
27. Fugmann, Die Deutschen in Parana, 40. 
28. Carneiro, ImigrQ/;ao e colonizat;ao no Brasil, table facing p. 60; Becker, Deutsche 
Siedler, 84. 
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over, it is clear that Teuto-Brazilian society had not been changed 
in any fundamental way by the war. There were minor changes, of 
course, as we have seen. Assimilation was accelerated in some re-
spects, but at the same time, the war experiences had accentuated 
the sense of differentness, if not of cultural superiority, that some 
German Brazilians had, especially persons closely associated with 
the Evangelical synods and most persons in positions of ethnic 
group leadership. For them, the siege mentality that often devel-
ops among ethnic minorities was intensified. At the same time, a 
substantial part of the rural Teuto-Brazilian population-marginal 
farmers struggling for survival in an indifferent milieu-were 
quite unaffected by the war and its concomitants. They sensed no 
change; they had no reason to modify their behavior. For them as-
similation was a glacially slow process of which they were scarcely 
aware and which still remained incomplete decades later. 
Comparisons with the United States 
The great majority of non-German Brazilians-blacks, caboclos, 
immigrants from Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as well as impover-
ished Luso-Brazilians-continued to perceive the Germans in the 
1920S as they always had, some with envy, most with indifference. 
But some of the Luso-Brazilian elite-members of the leadership 
classes in that stratified society-were disturbed by the failure of 
the Germans to assimilate and were determined to accelerate the 
rate of change through legislation. In this respect, the Brazilian 
experience was sharply different from that of the United States. 
Brazil had nothing equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
(Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923) that declared unconstitutional the efforts 
of state governments to eliminate foreign-language instruction in 
American schools. Nor did Brazil restrict immigration as the U.S. 
Congress did by means of the National Origins Act of 1924.29 
But the differences were more basic than that. In the United 
States the natural process of assimilation (which is related to such 
variables as rate of immigration, density of settlement, occupation 
patterns, wealth, education, and degrees of cultural differences) 
29. Luebke, "Legal Restrictions," 1-19. 
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had advanced more rapidly than it had in Brazil. This meant that 
when the crisis of a war with the homeland of a substantial ethnic 
minority came in 1917 and 1918, the Germans in the United States 
could adapt more quickly and effectively, and in the postwar years 
consciously and deliberately make decisions to speed up the pro-
cess. 30 In Brazil, where the social and cultural variations between 
the German ethnic group and the host society were greater and 
where the size of the German group was proportionately smaller 
but at the same time spatially more highly concentrated, the war 
produced destructive riots in addition to restrictive measures that 
severely curtailed the freedom of Teuto-Brazilian citizens. In the 
United States, the rate of assimilation continued at such a pace 
during the 1920S and 1930S that when World War II arrived in 1941, 
the country experienced no repetition of the anti-Germanism of 
World War I. In Brazil, where the rate of assimilation continued at 
a much slower tempo, and where German ethnic institutions and 
behavior patterns had been only slightly modified by war-inspired 
riots and restrictions, severe though they were, World War II was 
the more traumatic experience. Once again, Brazilian programs of 
forced assimilation were pushed far beyond anything perceived at 
any time to be necessary in the United States. 
Still, the experiences of the German ethnic groups in Brazil and 
the United States provide a series of remarkable parallels. Both 
countries received large numbers of immigrants from roughly the 
same parts of German-speaking Europe at approximately the 
same times in the nineteenth century and generally for the same 
reasons. Both developed important German-speaking subsocie-
ties that evolved and maintained full complements of the same 
ethnic institutions-German-Ianguage newspapers, churches, 
schools, and voluntary associations of all kinds. In both coun-
tries, the German groups confronted the same crisis-war against 
the old fatherland-in much the same way. Presumably, circum-
stances in both countries illuminate how "enemy" minorities re-
spond in times of national or international crises and how mod-
em societies in tum treat such "foreign" elements. 
When world war engulfed Europe in 1914, the governments of 
both the United States and Brazil declared their neutrality. For 
30. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 329. 
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most ordinary people in both countries, but especially in Brazil, 
the war in Europe was a distant affair of no particular conse-
quence. It seemed to affect their daily lives in no direct or discern-
ible fashion. Still, the war tended to evoke sympathies for one side 
or the other. Immigrants and their descendants naturally felt an 
emotional bond with their ancestral homeland and were con-
vinced of the justice of its cause. Leaders of the German ethnic 
groups in both countries tended to be extravagant in their par-
tisanship for Germany. They delivered speeches and wrote edi-
torials defending German war aims and behaviors; their news-
papers eagerly reported glorious German victories over French 
and British arms; they organized rallies and bazaars to collect 
contributions for the German Red Cross and for war widows and 
orphans; and they bought German war bonds as German reser-
vists in both countries responded to the call to colors. The two 
German sub societies experienced similar excitement and rejuve-
nation as a horrible war was fought on distant battlefields. 
Meanwhile, Germany sought to exploit pro-German sentiment 
in both countries and in the same ways. Efforts were made to ac-
quire control of newspapers to propagandize for the German 
point of view. The German Red Cross was used as a cover for 
agents in both countries-Albert Dernburg in the United States 
had an equivalent in G. W. Zimmerli-and the latter's German-
ische Bund was in some respects similar to the National German-
American Alliance. 
At the same time, dominant elements in both countries tended 
strongly to favor the Allies. Their presses were harshly critical of 
Germany, both warned against German spies and reported on 
strange and suspicious behaviors as alleged evidence of German 
plots and conspiracies. In the United States, organizations such as 
the National Security League and the American Defense Society 
propagandized for preparedness and for support for the Allies; 
Brazil had its equivalent in the Liga pelos Alliados. If Theodore 
Roosevelt can be identified as a major political figure who cham-
pioned England and France, the eloquent Ruy Barbosa was his 
counterpart in Brazil. Both countries had foreign ministers-
William Jennings Bryan and Lauro Muller-who opposed the 
pro-Ally drift in their respective countries during the neutrality 
period, and both men were forced by circumstances to resign 
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their positions, Bryan two years earlier than Miiller. The United 
States and Brazil responded adversely to the British imposition of 
the Black List in 1916, but in neither case was the pro-Ally senti-
ment seriously modified as a consequence. 
In 1917 the neutrality period came to an end as both the United 
States and Brazil declared war on Germany, ostensibly because 
vessels in their respective merchant marines had been torpedoed 
by German submarines. The ways in which the people of Brazil 
and the United States responded to the problem of having many 
Germans in their populations provide another set of comparisons. 
In the United States, the war introduced a period of persecution 
for German Americans. Many citizens of German origin were 
suspected of disloyalty. Individuals were harassed in various ways 
as the American people were swept up in a wave of anti-German 
feeling. In effect, there was a war against the German language 
and culture. The climate of suspicion produced such measures as 
the ban on German-composed music and the renaming of per-
sons, foods, streets, parks, and towns. German-language instruc-
tion in the schools was restricted or eliminated and German-lan-
guage newspapers were closely regulated. There were scores of 
patriotic demonstrations in which German Americans were forced 
to kiss the American flag, buy war bonds, or sing the national an-
them. There were other ceremonies in which German-language 
books were burned. There were frequent instances of vandalism, 
beatings, arrests for allegedly unpatriotic utterances, and even a 
lynching of a German alien in Illinois. 31 
But the American behavior pales in contrast to the Brazilian. 
Following the Brazilian break in diplomatic relations with Ger-
many in April, 1917, German Brazilians were victims of numerous 
destructive riots. Property damage was enormous as hundreds 
of residences, German-language newspapers' offices, churches, 
schools, clubhouses, businesses of all kinds, factories, and ware-
houses were damaged or destroyed by mobs gone out of control. 
Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war in October, a 
31. Ibid., 3-24; Wittke, German-Americans and the World War. A variety of stud-
ies on the local level have been published during the past decade, especially in 
state and local historical journals. See above, Chap. 8, n. 29. See also Phyllis Kel-
ler, States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1979). 
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second series of riots resulted in more destruction. Martial law 
was declared in Rio de Janeiro and all southern states, where the 
great majority of the Teuto-Brazilians lived. All publications in the 
German language were forbidden. All instruction in the German 
language was banned in all schools at all levels. All German-
language church services were outlawed. The president was em-
powered to seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all 
goods consigned to them. While it is true that enforcement of 
these repressive measures was inconsistent and sometimes hap-
hazard, the fact remains that Brazilian behavior was remarkably 
violent and repressive compared to the American. 32 
It is easy to explain the Brazilian response to the German prob-
lem in terms of the classic stereotype of the Latin temperament as 
irresponsible, unrestrained, volatile, emotional, and spontane-
ous. That was how the young Clarence H. Haring, already one of 
the most distinguished Latin Americanists in the United States, 
interpreted the phenomenon in 1920. He wrote that the "Bra-
zilians' attitude toward the war may probably be explained by the 
difference between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon temperaments. 
The Brazilian is easily aroused, as the violent anti-German dem-
onstrations in some of the cities reveal, but he also easily for-
gets." 33 Thus Haring also used the stereotype to explain the rapid 
return to normal attitudes and behaviors in the postwar era. Even 
though stereotypes are often founded in experience as inter-
preted by participants in a particular culture and in that sense 
convey a measure of "truth," it is also true that this interpretation 
in fact explains very little because it fails to penetrate surfaces. It is 
more useful to compare the Teuto-Brazilians' and the German 
Americans' circumstances in the decades before the war. 
While Germans represented a much smaller proportion of Bra-
zilian than of American society, their settlement patterns were 
more highly concentrated, exclusive, and isolated in Brazil. Usu-
ally better educated and often wealthier than the average Brazil-
ian, the Germans there inevitably were more slowly assimilated, 
compared to German Americans. This was also true of many Ger-
man farmers in the rural enclaves who experienced downward mo-
32. Cf. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 225-301. 
33. Haring, The Germans in South America, 66. 
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bility as they struggled with the exigencies of a subtropical envi-
ronment. As northern Europeans, the Teuto-Brazilians, in contrast 
to the more numerous Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immi-
grants in Brazil, had a language and a culture that were signifi-
cantly different from those of the host society. Differentness in 
tum promoted a heightened sense of minority group identity in 
addition to a full complement of ethnic institutions-churches, 
schools, social organizations, a German-language press-that 
tended to be more closely tied to Germany than were their equiva-
lents in the United States. All this combined to promote a general 
sense of cultural superiority that had no real equal in the United 
States. Moreover, leadership among the Germans of Brazil was 
more often vested in the Reichsdeutsche, whose bonds with Ger-
many were close. Finally, compared to their American cousins, 
the Germans in Brazil wielded greater economic power, but their 
political influence was weaker. 
The comparison should be carried a step further. Brazilian so-
ciety, compared to the American, was the more highly stratified: 
Its rich were richer and its poor poorer. Illiteracy was pervasive. 
Because its economy was less developed, it lacked the means to 
provide its citizens with universal, free education. Indeed, the no-
tion of schooling the masses as the responsibility of the state was 
not advanced in Brazil, where education was the privilege of the 
few, not the right of the many, as it had become in both Germany 
and the United States by 1890. Moreover, Brazil had no long-
standing constitutional tradition. Most Brazilians did not place 
the same high value as Americans did on freedoms of religion, 
press, and assembly. This was also true of the Teuto-Brazilians, 
both as Germans and Brazilians. 
Was Brazil the more violent country? Surely that is a question 
that deserves more attention than what it can be given here. While 
the stereotype many Americans hold of Latin American culture 
answers affirmatively, it should be remembered that the United 
States only a few decades earlier had experienced a civil war of 
unprecedented proportions and that riots emerging from cultural 
differences were remarkably frequent in the nineteenth-century 
America. By the 1880s, cultural contrasts between immigrants 
and old-stock Americans informed much political debate at the 
state and local level, and conflict, sometimes violent, over alco-
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holic drink, Sabbatarianism, and schools was endemic in many 
northern and western American communities. Ethnic antipathies 
and prejudices, one suspects, were more deeply rooted in the 
United States than in Brazil. Violence in Brazil, common though it 
was in the southern states where the Germans lived, especially in 
the 1890S and the 1920S, usually emerged from sources other than 
ethnocultural diversity. But when it was visited upon the German 
minority, it came with a severity surpassing anything generally 
experienced by the Germans in the United States. 
As the spirit of nationalism swelled early in the twentieth cen-
tury, the Brazilians, like the Americans, naturally acted on the 
basis of stereotypes that obscured individual differences and be-
clouded interpersonal relationships. Lacking both knowledge and 
understanding of the separatistic German subsociety, its manners 
and institutions, they demanded an unprecedented measure of 
conformity to established Brazilian ways. Had the Germans in the 
United States been as divergent from the American norms as the 
Teuto-Brazilians were from the Brazilian, it is likely that they too 
would have suffered from destructive riots, as the Chinese did in 
mining camps of the American West in the nineteenth century, or 
as American blacks did in Chicago, East St. Louis, Tulsa, and else-
where in the immediate postwar period. 
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